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Abstract
Six degrees of early stage ventures
Marc Felske
Private markets investment volume and valuations exceed the level of the dot-com
bubble (PwC and CBInsights, 2019). The available amount of capital surges as
investors announce new multi-billion dollar funds (Kruppa, 2019). Even large, insti-
tutional funds in the Silicon Valley, who are used to investing in later stages, move
upstream to invest in fledgling firms to achieve higher ownership and returns (Clark,
2019a)1. Despite the high private market liquidity2, standing out from the crowd is
critical and has become more difficult to achieve, even for innovative entrepreneurs
(Planko et al., 2017).
Curiously, venture capitalists who expect the latest technology and innovation from
new ventures, did not themselves significantly innovate in their approach, including
methods of evaluating ventures (Kupor, 2019). Few investors came up with new,
differentiated investment strategies, one such example being data-driven investing
(Pitchbook, 2018). Although venture capitalists seek to invest in firms which benefit
substantially from the notion that “data is the new oil”, few practice to leverage data
for their investment process (Parkins, 2017; Dance et al., 2018; Arroyo et al., 2019;
Gompers et al., 2020). Instead, the overwhelming majority adheres to the motto
“picking investments is an art, not science” and relies primarily on its networks as
the most valuable resource (Bell, 2014; Huang and Pearce, 2015; Gompers et al.,
2020). Venture capitalists’ focus on their social networks could not only negatively
affect investment decisions and returns, but also promote group-think and stifle the
progression of their investment thesis (Wuebker et al., 2015).
Reviewing the previous works on entrepreneurship, venture evaluation, and venture
capital revealed a significant gap in the literature. While investors and entrepreneurs
depend heavily on their social networks, these networks play an insignificant role
1 In 2000, 848 early-stage ventures with headquarters in the US, UK, Germany, and France raised
$5.5b venture capital funding across 866 funding rounds compared to 2018 when 10,885 early-
stage ventures raised $31.0b capital across 12,399 deals. This data represents 62% of early-stage
ventures and 63% of the globally committed capital in rounds up to Series A and is inflation
adjusted (PitchBook Data, 2019).
2 In 2000, 669 early-stage venture capital funds with headquarters in the US, UK, Germany,
and France raised $193.2b compared to 2018 when 556 early-stage venture capital funds raised
$452.4b. This data represents 93% of global early-stage funds and 92% of capital committed and
is inflation adjusted (PitchBook Data, 2019).
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in venture evaluation. The existing frameworks are inadequate to accurately assess
early-stage ventures and thus a rethink of methodology is needed to better cap-
ture the networked nature of today’s ventures (Miloud et al., 2012; Dusatkova and
Zinecker, 2016). This thesis suggests a new perspective for early-stage venture eval-
uation, with particular focus on formalising the ventures’ social networks.
Contributions made by this thesis are fourfold and relevant to entrepreneurs, in-
vestors, and academic theorists. Firstly, existing theories that explain venture
fundraising success are expanded by adding a social network perspective. Secondly,
this research provides a comprehensive overview of stakeholders’ roles and their con-
stellation in social networks around the entrepreneurs and their ventures. Thirdly,
for entrepreneurs, different modes of leveraging their social networks for critical busi-
ness functions are identified. Lastly, an evaluation tool for venture capitalists to the
investability of early-stage ventures is developed. In summary, results provide new
insights into entrepreneurial strategies for leveraging social networks to enhance
operations, differentiate from competitors, send positive signals to investors, and
ultimately improve the venture’s assessment by the private market.
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1.1 Research problem
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Venture capital (VC) has financed the commercial exploitation of
some of the most outstanding technologies in the 20th and 21st cen-
turies including several of today’s largest corporations by market cap-
italisation (Gompers et al., 2020). Of the 1,339 United States (US)
companies that went public between 1974 and 2015, 41.5% were VC
backed (Kaplan and Lerner, 2010). In an average year between 1980
and 2010, these companies created 2.9 million jobs and today di-
rectly employ 20% of the US working population plus an additional
30% indirectly (NVCA, 2019). The 556 VC backed companies cre-
ated a financial value representing 63% of the market capitalisation
and account for 85% of total research and development (R&D) spend-
ing (Ramsinghani, 2014; Gornall and Strebulaev, 2015). During the
1990s, over 90% of global VC dollars were invested in the US. How-
ever, the rest of the world caught up and in 2018 the US accounted for
51% of the VC investment volume (PitchBook, 2020b; Crunchbase,
2020).
When looking at the life-cycle of a venture, VCs are among the first
investors who get involved as they fund entrepreneurs with ideas but
insufficient capital in hopes for high returns (Gompers and Lerner,
1999). This thesis will demonstrate the complexity of investing into
this high risk, illiquid asset class. The lead researcher of this thesis
worked in the VC industry throughout most of the research period
and his key learning was that VC is first and foremost a patience and
networking game. Hence, the famous adage “it’s not what you know,
it’s whom you know” suitably describes the VC world. The adage ap-
plies to both sides of the table, entrepreneurs and VCs, since founding
a successful venture is a highly cooperative and multifaceted process, especially dur-
ing its earliest stages (Hoffmann and Yeh, 2018).
For this thesis, early-stage ventures (ESVs), also commonly referred to as “startups”,
are understood as companies during their “company childhood” which is defined as
the stage before reaching the growth phase and “company adulthood”.
During an ESV’s fledgling stages, entrepreneurs must look out for many different
elements to increase their odds of success. For example, entrepreneurs search for
promising ideas, market need, cost-effective development and production processes,
efficient distribution channels, and a strong team. On top of this, entrepreneurs
need to consider the right timing and location to release their idea into the mar-
ket. Notably, each of these elements are difficult to quantify and therefore almost
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
immeasurable for a VC when sizing up the investment opportunity. This presents a
research opportunity which into which this thesis delves deeply: the pre-investment
evaluation of ESVs.
Evaluation of ESVs is not trivial, as a consequence of the lack of insightful and
reliable information. Four trends amplify this uncertainty. Firstly, in the aftermath
of the Dot-com bubble, VCs increasingly diversified their portfolios to be indus-
try, technology, investment stage, and geography agnostic, as a means of mitigating
investment risk (Matusik and Fitza, 2012). This diversification increases the due
diligence effort for investment teams, as their domain experience from one evalua-
tion rarely translates to the next. Secondly, the advent of accelerators and use of
private market databases creates additional visibility of investment opportunities
for investors1 (Miller and Bound, 2011; Lyons and Zhang, 2018). What follows is
a fast-paced environment in which decision-makers are forced to make decisions in
very short periods of time. For instance, during pitching contests and demo days,
multiple VCs might be bidding for the best deals, which compromises a deliber-
ate, carefully considered investment decision (Hochberg, 2016). In such moments,
VCs revert to heuristics and gut-instinct, which may lead to sub-optimal decisions
(Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001; Shepherd et al., 2003; Kahneman, 2013). Thirdly,
later-staged VCs became increasingly comfortable investing in less mature ventures
and crowded the private market (Kim and Wagman, 2016; Loizos, 2019a). The US
enactment of the JOBS Act2 and advent of equity crowdsourcing around the world
were designed to lower the bar to become a VC. Lowering the bar, in turn, has
successfully increased the number of investors, fund sizes, and the availability of
capital3. Critics warn that capital is consequently exposed to higher risk, and the
effects are already noticeable as the failure rate and cost of failure increased (Crunch-
base, 2019; May, 2019; McMorrow, 2020). At the same time, companies stay private
longer and the private market volume grows steadily (Loizos, 2019b). Finally, ESVs
increasingly engage with external organisations to develop their products (Knoben
and Bakker, 2019). This opening of the company borders can be attractive for ven-
tures by helping alleviate financial constraints while mitigating risk and dependency
(Crossley et al., 2015; Ng et al., 2014). While such collaboration is of vital impor-
1 Before 2005, accelerator programs were not known in their current form. Today the largest
association of accelerators, the Global Accelerator Network, counts 105 members who accelerated
1344 ESVs in 2018 (Global Accelerator Network, 2019).
2 The “Jumpstart Our Business Startups” (JOBS) act is a US legislation that took effect on 16th
May 2016, and eases rules that are enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
For instance, the JOBS act allows businesses to issue securities to the public through crowdfund-
ing, changes requirements to become an accredited investor, and increases the maximum number
of shareholders a business can have before having to file for going public (SEC, 2019a,b).
3 For a visualisation of historical data on investment volumes see Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 in
Appendix A on pages 237 to 238.
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tance for ventures (Street and Cameron, 2007), evaluation for the VCs becomes
more complex. Complexity for VCs increases, as the unit of analysis grows from an
isolated ESV to a highly interconnected business where surrounding stakeholders
can create opportunities, dependencies, and threats and must, therefore, be taken
into consideration (Street and Cameron, 2007; Spinelli et al., 2012; Gompers et al.,
2020). In summary, the fast-paced and complex environment makes investment de-
cisions challenging and strengthens the case for formalised and applicable tools to
benchmark investments (Zachary and Mishra, 2013).
Searching for a decision-aid for VCs, researchers consistently found that it is difficult
to value an ESV based on traditional, tangible evaluation metrics and attested
inadequacy in pre-revenue, volatile situations (Venkataraman, 1997; Miloud et al.,
2012). While traditional metrics might apply for later-stage investments, they fail
when evaluating fledgling firms (Black, 2003; Kumar, 2015). Thus, some researchers
suggest that the better alternative would be to evaluate non-traditional, intangible
metrics such as the quality of the entrepreneur, product, or social networks allowing
for “a better alternative than ‘pure guess’” (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Miloud et al.,
2012, p. 153; Sharma, 2015). In response to this gap, this thesis suggests a novel,
non-traditional evaluation perspective for ESVs.
1.2 Research relevance
Despite increased liquidity, early-stage VCs have concentrated the invested capital
behind a smaller number of ventures, and therefore only a low single-digit percent-
age of ventures receive external funding (Miles, 2017; Kupor, 2019). Concentrated
investments present challenges for entrepreneurs who might not be able to fund
their venture. The findings of this research show that entrepreneurs who develop
an increased awareness of the importance of social networks can increase their odds
when seeking investment from VCs by differentiating their venture from the com-
petition. In response to existing research, the findings suggest that an awareness of
non-traditional market differentiators and how to communicate these effectively, on-
line as well as offline, is an important part of the entrepreneurial skill set (Ries, 2011;
Yang and Berger, 2017). Besides entrepreneurs, VCs can draw insights from this the-
sis. The results of the study indicate that VCs could make more informed decisions
by understanding investment opportunities from various perspectives, including the
social network perspective which the thesis focuses on. Therefore, this thesis adds to
existing research on triangulating investment opportunities from multiple perspec-
tives, as well as the use of decision-aids, which both were found to reduce risk and
increase returns (Moesel et al., 2001; Townsend and Busenitz, 2015; Gompers et al.,
2020). Increasing entrepreneurs’ and investors’ mutual understanding of evaluation
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mechanisms and their underlying assumptions could help to facilitate communica-
tion during the investment process. Improving communication has consistently been
found to be a driving factor behind closing the funding gap (Peemo¨ller et al., 2001;
Mason and Harrison, 2002a; Maxwell et al., 2011; Kupor, 2019)
1.3 Previous research
Evaluation of newly founded ventures is difficult (Audretsch and Link, 2012; Festel
et al., 2013). The absence of hard financial data in combination with mostly covert
operations, unproven business models, intangible knowledge assets, and the pres-
ence of many “unknown unknowns” make the evaluation of ESVs more of an art
than a science (Sudek, 2006; Huang and Pearce, 2015; Huang, 2018). Consequently,
VCs struggle to evaluate ESVs accurately and identify the most promising invest-
ment opportunities (Gompers and Lerner, 2001a; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Miloud
et al., 2012). Valuation methods for later-stage ventures are well established, but
they fail when applied to pre-revenue, early-stage businesses (Miloud et al., 2012).
An analysis of non-traditional evaluation methods for the VC industry shows that
assessing non-financial information, such as the founding team’s composition or pre-
vious entrepreneurial history, can provide clues for future performance forecasting
(Gompers et al., 2010). Already today, industries such as consumer credit, insur-
ance, online dating, real estate, cybersecurity, epidemiology and wider biolology use
intangible metrics in their models (Newman, 2014; Baraba´si, 2016; Scott, 2017). In
these areas, social network analysis (SNA) serves as a useful tool (Baraba´si, 2016;
Hvistendahl, 2018) and, according to recent studies, will continue to move into the
field of social sciences (Borgatti et al., 2009; Kwon and Adler, 2014; Baraba´si, 2016).
Applying SNA in an ESV context yields potential, since VCs and entrepreneurs are
familiar with the concept and aware that their profession relies on dependable social
networks (Starr and Macmillan, 1990; Hsu, 2004; Witt, 2004; Spiegel et al., 2016;
Spender et al., 2017; Scott, 2017; Kupor, 2019). Previous research has empirically
proven that established partners, who can lend newcomers their reputation, are ben-
eficial for ESVs not only for resource acquisition, but also in overcoming liabilities
of newness. (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002; Chang, 2004; Freeman and Engel, 2007;
Pollock et al., 2010; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). In response to calls from academics in
literature and practitioners interviewed as part of the research, this thesis suggests a
social network perspective on evaluation and methods specifically designed for ESV
evaluation (Sharma, 2015; Arroyo et al., 2019).
1.4 Research gap and contribution
A review of entrepreneurship and VC literature revealed that existing theory pro-
vides an incomplete understanding of ESV evaluation. In response to the emerging
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trend of data-driven VC investing in VC, recent researchers began to study the novel
evaluation methods and incorporated evidence from practice (Gompers et al., 2020).
As a result, this thesis is particularly timely.
To date, both the positive and negative notion of ESVs social networks’ impact
on the perception by private market investors is an under-researched field. This
research sets out to understand multiple facets of the social network perspective
which are required to bring more clarity to ESV investing, before attempting to
build models that serve as decision-aids for practitioners. For theorists and practi-
tioners, the contribution of this work is fourfold. Firstly, the exploratory qualitative
studies identify modes of ESV signalling to VCs and determine key stakeholder
groups in ESVs’ networks. Secondly, these findings informed subsequent qualitative
research into different approaches undertaken by ESVs to engage with their net-
work and harness opportunities by leveraging social networks for their individual
benefit. In total, ESVs’ strategic approaches are investigated based on evidence
from over 100 case study interviews that were conducted for this thesis. Thirdly,
the subsequent quantitative research enquiries establish actionable guidelines such
as favourable social network constellations, which can be understood as the archi-
tecture of network patterns in which crucial stakeholders are connected among each
other. These findings highlight the consent and dissent of entrepreneurs and VCs re-
garding constellations which are perceived as favourable, valuable, and informative,
including the identification and testing of tangible qualitative metrics to quantify
the evaluation. Finally, metrics identified with this research are cast into a bespoke
model and subjected to real-world ESV investment data, to examine its usefulness
as a decision-aid for practitioners.
1.5 Thesis storyline
As Figure 1.1 shows, following this introduction, Chapter 2 contains a literature
review that provides the foundation for this thesis and the positioning in relation
to existing works. Next, Chapter 3 outlines the research approach, discusses the
research methodology and its implications in a wider philosophical context. Chap-
ter 4 describes a practitioner-oriented, exploratory study that informs subsequent re-
search and ensures its real-world applicability. Of the next three chapters, Chapter 5
takes a qualitative perspective, followed by Chapters 6 and 7 which use quantita-
tive methods. Each chapter thereby discusses the studies’ individual limitations and
suggests future research opportunities. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises and contrasts
the results, and discusses the thesis’s contribution to theory and knowledge.
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Literature review
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This chapter provides a summary of three pertinent literature streams that under-
pin the theoretical foundation of the thesis and concludes in the identification of a
research gap. A review of business venturing (2.2), entrepreneurship (2.3), as well as
social capital and social network literature (2.4) provides the context for this study.
Together, the three literature streams help bring clarity and structure to the central
research problem of this thesis, the evaluation of ESVs.
In the entrepreneurship and business venturing literature, researchers of the two
domains often investigate the same research problem from their perspective (Land-
stro¨m, 2007; Huang and Knight, 2017). Figure 2.1 illustrates the mirrored rela-
tionship between entrepreneurship and business venturing literature, as the review
gradually narrows the focus towards SNA.
Venture capital
Early-stage venture capital
Early-stage venture evaluation
Social network analysis
Entrepreneurship
Early-stage ventures
Early-stage venture signals
Social capital theory
Identified research gap
Figure 2.1: Literature synthesis, own illustration.
Academics and practitioners in the investor community aim to understand how VCs
can develop tools to assess ESVs, and reach investment decisions in the face of un-
certainty (Higashide and Birley, 2002; Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Navis and Glynn,
2011; Gompers et al., 2020). In turn, research on entrepreneurship studies the chal-
lenges of entrepreneurs during early stages, the process of seeking investment, and
predictors of ESV performance (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Zacharakis et al., 2010).
Ultimately, these two perspectives on entrepreneurial parameters that determine
venture performance are of similar interest for the entrepreneurship and VC com-
munity (Landstro¨m, 2007).
The second literature stream thematises social capital, one of three forms of capital
besides human and financial capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Semrau and Werner,
2014). Researchers of social capital are concerned with people’s engagement in social
interaction, the derivable goodwill, and the intricacies of the social networks which
provide the structure through which social capital exists (Kwon and Adler, 2014).
Furthermore, researchers of social networks, a research field subordinated to social
capital, brought forward constructs to qualitatively and quantitatively asses social
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networks (Scott, 2017).
The underlying mechanism, which connects the research into entrepreneurship and
social capital is that entrepreneurs procure social capital through stakeholders in
their social network. This thesis investigates how such ESVs stakeholder networks
can be assessed by investors to inform investment decisions and increase confidence
(Baum et al., 2000).
Sources reviewed in this literature chapter include English and German texts in
journal publications, industry reports, books, databases, as well as newspaper and
online articles. A broad array of additional sources was reviewed in addition to im-
plementing recommendations from industry experts, to capture the often contrast-
ing views of different market participants, and to substantiate results with manifold
perspectives.
2.1 Relationship of entrepreneurship and VC
When VCs and entrepreneurs create a successful symbiosis, it connects people with
ideas to others who created a business around funding innovators (Gompers et al.,
2020). The combination of audacious entrepreneurs combined with experienced VCs
financing their endeavours had substantial impact on modern society (Kupor, 2019).
Historically, most entrepreneurs have been wealthy individuals who can self-support
their experiments (He´bert and Link, 2009). A relatively recent advance is in the
financing of the entrepreneurial ventures through VC.
Many origin stories include claims to be the first modern VC. Lawrence S. Rockefeller
is among the most credited pioneers of early-stage technology investing which later
came to be known as VC (Nicholas, 2019). Starting in 1946, Rockefeller Brothers
Inc. invested in companies researching and developing nuclear power, jet engines,
helicopters, aircraft radio, avionics, and reconnaissance cameras. Later, the focus
shifted away from military innovations towards computing, which led to the founding
of Venrock in 1969, a VC fund which subsequently invested in companies like Apple
and Intel (Winks, 1997). To date, Venrock invested in over 400 companies, of which
more than 100 went public through an initial public offering (IPO)1.
The Dot-com bubble, a financial markets crash in the early 2000s, abruptly shook
the industry and hit VC particularly hard. After more than a decade of recovery,
the global fundraising activity again reaches levels that are even beyond those in
the prequel of the Dot-com bubble.
Interestingly, the duality of entrepreneurs and investors translated into the formation
of two academic camps, who are the respective authors of entrepreneurship and
business venturing literature. This separation is reflected in the literature review
1 Investor profile of Venrock obtained from https://pitchbook.com/profiles/investor/11326-33
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chapter, with dedicated sections dealing with the investors’ (2.2) and entrepreneurs’
(2.3) perspective.
2.2 Investors’ perspective
Beginning with a broad description of VC, the following sections position VC in the
context of other asset classes and further highlight (a) the essential characteristics of
different types of VCs and (b) describe specific stages of venture maturity which are
important to position the research in the spectrum of early-, growth-, and late-stage
investments (Gompers and Lerner, 2001a). Subsequently (c) common structures of
VC funds and (d) the resulting duties of VCs are elaborated, particularly focusing
on early-stage VCs.
2.2.1 VC asset class
There are four main asset classes to be differentiated (Ang, 2014):
• Public equities, i.e. shares of publicly listed companies
• Fixed income, i.e. bonds and annuities
• Alternative assets, i.e. mostly non-publicly traded and illiquid assets
• Cash equivalents, i.e. short term liquid securities
VC is a subcategory of alternative assets and private equity. Figure 2.2 illustrates
the landscape of asset classes and the location of VC within.
Legend: Thesis focus Other asset classes
Asset classes
Public
equity
Fixed
income
Alternative
assets
Cash
equivalents
Hedge funds Real estate Private equity Commodities
Debt capital Venture capital Buyout & growth capital
Early-stage Growth-stage Late-stage
Figure 2.2: Overview of asset classes, own depiction with information from Gom-
pers and Lerner (2001a), Ang (2014), and Ramsinghani (2014).
In contrast to public markets which match buyers and sellers of equities on a stock
exchange, in private markets, buyers have to identify sellers and vice versa to ne-
gotiate prices and trade. Hence, VC qualifies as a high-risk investment class which
potentially locks investors in their investments for years until their portfolio invest-
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ment completes its IPO or is acquired by a buyer. As a result, investors have to
carefully consider which companies they fund.
Different risk tolerances and investment preferences become evident through an anal-
ysis of the profiles of investors who participate in the private market.
(a) VC investor categories
The private markets attract different investor categories. However, during the last
decade the boundaries of what constitutes target investments for each category have
become more fluid across the investment categories, as some later-stage investors
started investing in earlier stages and vice versa (Ramsinghani, 2014; Clark, 2019a).
On a high level, four main investor categories, informal VCs, corporate venture
capitalists (CVCs), institutional VCs, and banks can be differentiated (Gompers
and Lerner, 2001b; Ramsinghani, 2014).
Informal venture capital investor. Informal investors include high-net-worth
individuals, also known as “angel investors” or family offices (Freear et al., 1994;
Ramsinghani, 2014). Informal investors invest during the earliest stages of a business
which have the highest associated risk of failure (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003) This
investor catregory often invests as an angel investor syndicate or as part of an
angel group to share the risk (Gompers and Lerner, 2001a; Mason and Harrison,
2002a; Wright and Robbie, 1998). Some angel investors have professionalised their
operations and belong to a sub-category called micro-VC (Ramsinghani, 2014).
Corporate venture capital investor. CVCs have a corporate limited partner
(LP) and act as the investment arm of a larger organisation, also referred to as the
corporate venturing unit (Spinelli et al., 2012). These CVCs are often incumbent
firms who use their venturing activities as a means of corporate innovation and
capture strategic value from external organisations (Gompers and Lerner, 2001b;
Chesbrough, 2003; Tidd and Bessant, 2013). Thus, as opposed to traditional VC
investments, CVC does not only seek financial return but also strategically valuable
insights for the parent company (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015).
Institutional venture capital. This form of VC is also called “formal” VC, and is
the category that practitioners refer to when using the term “VC”. As the following
chapters explain in detail, a general partner raises outside capital, sets up a fund,
and acts as the VC. Most of the capital is committed by the VC’s LPs and deployed
over a time-frame of a decade by investing in venture businesses (Sahlman, 1990).
Larger investment sums characterise this form of VC, especially when compared to
angel investments. Institutional VCs are primarily concerned with financial over
strategic objectives as opposed to their CVC counterparts (Bygrave and Timmons,
1992; Barrell et al., 2013).
Private equity investor. This form investing in private equities is comparable to
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institutional VC and not to be confused with the name of the asset class in Figure 2.2.
Characteristic for this investor category are late-stage investments and leveraged
buyouts, during which an entire firm is taken over by a private equity investor,
restructured, and sold in the hopes of exceeding the purchase price (Schwarzman,
2019).
Banks. Some specialist banks provide capital to venture business, often during the
later funding rounds in the form of debt financing in preparation for an IPO (Spinelli
et al., 2012; Ramsinghani, 2014).
It is important to not that this thesis focuses on institutional VC. A further char-
acteristic for VCs, especially early-stage VCs, is the active involvement of investors
with portfolio companies compared to banks or other investors who are more hands-
off (Elango et al., 1995; Caselli, 2010). In VC industry parlance, investor involvement
is also called active ownership or smart money which captures the idea that VCs buy
and build the firm they invest in (Maula et al., 2005; Barrell et al., 2013; Fitzpatrick
et al., 2016). For this thesis a VC is defined as:
Definition 1: A “VC” is an investor who provides capital to early-stage
ventures which exhibit high growth potential in exchange
for an equity stake.
The involvement of VCs along the life-cycle of a company from first fundraise until
the exit changes fundamentally, which becomes clear when looking at the different
investment stages.
(b) VC investment stages
As ESVs receive funding from an investor, entrepreneurs work towards agreed-upon
milestones (Zheng et al., 2010). The following overview shows the main stages a
venture can complete on its way to an IPO. In practice, additional sub-stages and
terminology exists. However, a description of these would go beyond the scope of
the thesis, the terminology used for this research is stated below.
Pre-seed & Seed. Investors fund young firms during the earliest phases of the
life-cycle. Entrepreneurs use the funds for early product development and talent
hiring (Campbell, 2003). Financiers are in most cases informal investors and early-
stage VCs (Spinelli et al., 2012; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992) and help build out the
ESV’s team, provide mentoring, and manage proof of concept (PoC) pilots (Strelet-
zki and Schulte, 2013; Islam et al., 2018)
Series A. Ventures in this stage are usually still developing their product in which
case they are considered an ESV. However, the firm gains some traction with first
customers and sales (Campbell, 2003; Feld and Mendelson, 2011).
Series B & C. Series B and C funding are sought when the ESVs completed the
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product development, proved the business model, but the customer base is still too
small (Campbell, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2001a). At this stage, a venture busi-
ness is not considered an ESV anymore because injected capital is used to expand
the market reach, for instance, through acquiring new customers, building facilities,
or internationalising (Feld and Mendelson, 2011; Huang and Knight, 2017).
Series D-F. These funding stages are the first ones to be considered private equity
investments (BVCA, 2017). They occur pre-IPO, and denote late-stage investments
in mature companies in growth, turnaround, distress or management buyout situa-
tions (Campbell, 2003; Caselli, 2010). At this stage, VCs invest to promote further
growth, for instance, through an internationalisation strategy (Gompers and Lerner,
2001a). The investment mechanism is mostly mezzanine capital, and securities are
issued shortly before the company goes public (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
IPO. The IPO denotes the transition phase of a company from a private into a
public equity. Often, VCs divest their shares at this stage (Bygrave and Timmons,
1992; Bussgang, 2010).
M&A, trade sale, and secondary sale. In contrast to the IPO, a secondary sale
means the asset is sold from one investor to another within the private market. Such
transactions are referred to as merger and acquisition (M&A) or trade sale when
the buyers are a corporate entity. In case of corporate M&A the acquisition target
is subsequently integrated into the new parent firm (Gompers and Lerner, 2001b;
Ramsinghani, 2014).
The central topic of the thesis is the pre-investment evaluation of ESVs by in-
stitutional VC investors from a social network perspective. Institutional VC is a
sweet-spot for the chosen evaluation perspective of social networks. On the one
hand, angel investors who invest even earlier stages conduct less extensive due dili-
gence (Spinelli et al., 2012; Croce et al., 2017). Professional investors who conduct
more extensive due diligence could use decision-aids during the pre-investment pro-
cess (Gompers et al., 2020). On the other hand, later-stage investors perform due
diligence that gravitates towards financial analysis which does not directly apply to
ESVs for reasons later described in Section 2.2.2. To understand an institutional
VC’s investment strategy it is necessary to understand their mandate and fund’s
organisational structure.
(c) VC fund structure
Institutional VC firms are structured as limited partnerships. Figure 2.3 illustrates
the relationship of the VC, its LPs, and portfolio companies.
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Management firm
(Commits capital and manages fund)
Limited partners
(Investors commit capital to fund)
LP 1 LP 2 LP 3 LP X
Venture capital fund
Portfolio company 1 Portfolio company 2 Portfolio company X
Joint ownership of the fund
Fund owns shares in portfolio companies
Figure 2.3: VC fund structure, own illustration with information from Ramsing-
hani (2014).
The management firm raises and manages a VC fund, to which LPs commit their
capital, and jointly own the fund. VCs make investment decisions on behalf of their
LPs and fund companies which thereby become part of the portfolio. Especially the
vetting of an investment opportunity, which occurs during the due diligence phase,
and the post-investment involvement differ dramatically across funds and invest-
ment stages as the ventures mature (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and
Lerner, 2001a; Campbell, 2003; Barrell et al., 2013; Miles, 2017).
Typical examples of LPs are public and corporate pension funds, endowments, foun-
dations, fund-of-funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices, high-net-worth indi-
viduals, finance and insurance companies (Ramsinghani, 2014). LPs are not the
focal actors in this thesis, nonetheless, they represent an essential stakeholder group
in a VC’s social network and will reappear in the networks investigated.
Summing up, to classify a VC, it is crucial to know which investor category they
belong to, as well as their investment stage focus. These characteristics determine
the level of involvement of a VC and thus the corresponding duties.
(d) Duties of a VC
The main tasks of VCs encompass sourcing venture investment opportunities, con-
ducting due diligence and evaluation of investment prospects, investing and poten-
tially follow-on investing in later rounds, providing post-investment support, and
exiting from the investment to return the capital to its LPs (Gorman and Sahlman,
1989; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship of the indi-
vidual tasks and emphasizes that this thesis focuses on the pre-investment evaluation
of ESVs.
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Legend: Thesis focus Other duties
Source Evaluate & invest Monitor Exit
Traditional valuation Non-traditional evaluation
Qualitative methods Quantitative methods
Figure 2.4: Duties of a VC, own illustration with information from Gompers and
Lerner (1999), Miloud et al. (2012), and Koller et al. (2015).
2.2.2 Evaluating: due diligence and decision-making in VC
Sizing up an investment opportunity during due diligence is an often unstructured
approach with few guidelines to follow (Ramsinghani, 2014). Gompers and Lerner
(2001b, p. 154) state that “uncertainty and informational asymmetries often char-
acterise young firms, particularly in high-technology industries.” Due diligence is
a process widely used by financial market actors to rigorously evaluate an invest-
ment opportunity which serves the basis for investment decisions (Gompers and
Lerner, 2001b; Ramsinghani, 2014). In early-stage investment due diligence, mainly
intangible assets are evaluated which is why it is common practice to triangulate
by using different perspectives (Busenitz et al., 2005; Sievers et al., 2013). As part
of their due diligence VCs ought to address two systematic problems, (a) unequally
distributed levels of information and (b) uncertainty. Over the years, VCs devel-
oped their own quantitative and qualitative valuation and evaluation methods and
borrowed existing methodologies from other asset classes. These methods include
(c) traditional methods that are purely financial and quantitative as opposed to
(d) non-traditional methods which can be qualitative or quantitative and describe
intangible assets (Gompers and Lerner, 2001a; Audretsch and Link, 2012; Koller
et al., 2015; Wu, 2016).
(a) Information asymmetry
Preferably, decision-makers would factor into their decision all available information
(Kahneman, 2013). This assumption, called complete information, was elementary
in most economic models of the last century (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Stiglitz,
2000). In the absence of complete information, asymmetric information levels are
present among decision-makers (Stiglitz, 2000). The first to recognise that complete
information inaccurately represents most economic situations were Akerlof (1970),
Spence (1973), and Stiglitz (1985), who were awarded a Nobel prize for their works.
Stiglitz (2002, p. 470) states that information asymmetries occur when “different
people know different things”.
In a VC context, Gompers and Lerner (1999) clarify the relationship between infor-
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mation asymmetry and uncertainty in that information asymmetry is a consequence
of different levels of uncertainty on the entrepreneur’s and investor’s side. Few ex-
amples of existing business venturing literature address solutions for informational
asymmetries, though notable exceptions are Gompers and Lerner (1999) who found
that VCs expect an allocation of contractual rights, staged capital investments which
increases as the venture is de-risked, as risk is shifted towards entrepreneurs. These
measures mitigate the so-called principal-agent problem which will be discussed in
Section (b). As a second, alternative approach to reduce information asymmetry,
Venkataraman (1997) took a social network perspective and suggested that shared
social relationships between entrepreneurs and investors allow not only information
exchange but also create an obligation. In line with this argument Coleman (1988),
Elitzur and Gavious (2003), and Hoang and Antoncic (2003), ascertain that social
ties to multiple, preferably shared connections, act as a sanction mechanism. Cole-
man (1988) adds, misbehaviour towards one individual in a social network could
be swiftly communicated and have wider implications for the remaining social ties.
Coleman further theorised this in his concept of network closure, which states that
a dense social network allows establishing trust and norms, in which individuals
who take advantage are more likely to be exposed. In the VC context, this can be
effective prevention for principle-agent issues and opportunistic behaviour (Stuart
and Sorenson, 2007). In an ideal situation, connectedness through a social network
brings trust and reciprocity to business relationships and enables economic exchange
with lower risk and quicker decisions (Uzzi, 1996).
Hitherto, research on reducing information asymmetry mainly focuses on IPOs and
analyse the filings disclosed by companies. Additionally, more recent investigations
study information asymmetry between investors and ESV in an equity crowdsourc-
ing context and how online social media platforms reduce information asymmetry in
addition to the mandatory documentation ventures have to make (Cohen and Dean,
2005; Escobari and Serrano, 2016; Albarrak et al., 2019).
Only a few studies focus on lowering information asymmetry in ESV investing
and specifically at the screening and evaluation stage of the pre-investment pro-
cess (Wang, 2016; Janney and Folta, 2003). An in-depth review of ESV specific
signals to reduce information asymmetry is discussed in Section 2.3.3. The next
section describes how VCs aim to overcome the inherent uncertainty in early-stage
investing.
(b) Overcoming uncertainty
Early-stage investing bears many “unknown unknowns”, both for entrepreneurs and
investors, which are difficult to mitigate (Diebold et al., 2010). However, there are
several known unknowns especially for the investors which they aim to estimate with
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their due diligence. As mentioned above, research frames the relationship between
entrepreneurs and VCs via the theoretical construct of a principal (entrepreneur)
and agent (VC) problem (Grossman and Hart, 1992; Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2001).
Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2001) states that VCs have three main levers to mitigate
this conflict. Investors can (1) collect information and perform thorough due dili-
gence before investing and potentially defer an investment opportunity, (2) obtain
control rights through a contract, or (3) monitor and get involved personally post-
investment. It is worth noting that these actions closely match the duties of a VC
described in 2.2.1 (d), the sourcing, evaluating, investing, and monitoring before
exit. Researchers focusing on all these stages shows that throughout the life cycle,
from the first contact to exit of an investment after several years, reducing uncer-
tainty is crucial for VCs (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Navis
and Glynn, 2011). Of the three levers available to VCs this section focuses on the
mitigation of uncertainty through (1) pre-investment due diligence.
The uncertainty associated with an investment decision depends largely on the avail-
ability of reliable information about a company’s assets, especially of financial and
other quantifiable, measurable assets. Scholars distinguish between hard and soft
as well as tangible and intangible assets (Adams and Oleksak, 2010; Koller et al.,
2015). Table 2.1 explains the terminology.
Table 2.1: Asset classification by hard and soft, tangible and intangible based on,
International Accounting Standards in Adams and Oleksak (2010) and
IFRS Org. (2017a,b).
Soft assets Hard assets
• Can have physical substance • Can have physical substance
• Hard to measure or unmeasurable • Measurable
• Has no intrinsic value • Has intrinsic value
• Not listed on the balance sheet • Listed on balance sheet
• Employees, reputation • Liquidity, contractual liabilities
Intangible assets Tangible assets
• No physical substance, indiscernible • Physical substance, discernible
• Non-monetary but identifiable • Measurable
• Can be listed on the balance sheet • Listed on balance sheet
• Patents, brand • Cash, real estate, equipment
ESVs start their life cycle almost without tangible assets and increase these over
time (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Therefore, information about available assets corre-
lates to the maturity of the venture. Investors in later-, and growth-stage companies
determine the company’s valuation according to accounting standards and elements
include sales revenue, product quality, customer retention, intellectual property (IP),
brand, real estate, equipment, accounts payable, and liquidity. An ESV has at best
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little defensible IP, an early prototype, and few customers (Gompers and Lerner,
2001b; Campbell, 2003; Gupta et al., 2004; Brealey et al., 2014; Gompers and Lerner,
1999; Audretsch and Link, 2012). Huang and Knight (2017, p. 92) states that “[a]s
a venture progresses from an early to a late developmental stage, the knowledge-to-
assumption ratio increases, thus reducing ambiguity.” Figure 2.5 depicts the increas-
ing availability of measurable quantitative data with increasing venture maturity.
Early-stage Growth-stage Late-stage
Maturity of the firm
100% assets
Soft/intangible (unmeasurable)
Hard/tangible (measurable)
Figure 2.5: Measurable and unmeasurable assets with increasing venture maturity,
own schematic illustration.
This approach of assessing later-stage firms based on hard and tangible assets, how-
ever, is not applicable for ESVs. Campbell (2003, p. 169) further states that “[t]he
earlier the stage, the less any sort of metric can apply”, which confirms that purely
quantitative financial analysis in an ESV context is impossible (Dusatkova and Zi-
necker, 2016).
By definition, ESVs have no financial history and engage in the discovery of a new
product (Miloud et al., 2012). Hence, the required parameters to build models does
not yet exist and would be purely speculative (Campbell, 2003; Audretsch and Link,
2012).
(c) Traditional (e)valuation approaches
The term “valuation” in the venture context has two meanings. First, to describe
the present financial value which an investor is willing to pay if they were to acquire
the entire company and second, as well the process of determining this value.
By contrast, “evaluation” is the process vetting of an investment opportunity from
multiple different perspectives, which can also include a valuation component (By-
grave and Zacharakis, 2010). Investors developed several evaluation methods which
find application in different stages of VC funding. On a higher level, traditional
evaluation approaches are divided into market-, asset-, and income-based approaches
and can make use of qualitative and quantitative metrics (Anderson, 2013)2. In their
application to ESVs none of these valuation procedures are immune to criticism be-
2 A summary of traditional valuation approaches is presented by Table B.1 in Appendix B on
page 239.
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cause these models predict the future development of a company based on existing
metrics. Predicting future development based on past metrics can cause problems
for instance when analysts use quantitative metrics designed to model post-revenue
companies to evaluate pre-revenue companies, or when forecasting revenues with
multiple year horizon based on vague assumptions. Such practices are very specula-
tive and therefore highly criticised (Audretsch and Link, 2012; Miloud et al., 2012;
Festel et al., 2013). Consequently, traditional quantitative valuation is reserved for
mature companies, and common examples include discounted cash flow analysis,
leveraged buyout and recapitalisation analysis, or risk analysis (Kumar, 2015; Gom-
pers et al., 2020).
A mixed qualitative and quantitative method which finds application in ESV assess-
ment is the comparable method (Freeman and Engel, 2007; Bygrave and Zacharakis,
2010; Sievers et al., 2013). This method relies upon the fact that a similar business
which transitioned through the current stage of the ESV exists and can be identified.
Applying the model means drawing parallels to the reference business, assuming the
investigated and reference business develop in tandem, which then allows predic-
tions to be made. Audretsch and Link (2012) criticise the comparable method,
since assuming parallel development of two companies could be unreliable. Au-
dretsch and Link state that especially when considering a genuinely entrepreneurial
venture, the pursued idea must by definition not have a predecessor which would
invalidate the core assumption of the comparable method. Because ESVs do not
mature in controlled conditions, but from a process driven by chance and serendip-
ity, “[t]he practice of startup valuation by venture capitalists remains a ‘guess’ and
‘alchemy’.”(Miloud et al., 2012, p. 152). The result of an evaluation is primar-
ily dependent on the VC’s perception, because the evaluation through traditional
metrics entails making speculative assumptions. Therefore, the evaluation through
traditional metrics and the usefulness of the result is debated (Audretsch and Link,
2012).
(d) Non-traditional evaluation approaches
Partly as a consequence of the limited financial information available and partly as
a means of differentiating their investment strategy from that of other funds, VCs
attempt to find alternative evaluation methods (Gompers et al., 2020). Some non-
traditional evaluation models have been disclosed to the public3, however, research-
ing these methods is challenging as most VCs keep their data-models confidential. In
contrast to the traditional models described above, non-traditional models measure
the firm-internal, soft and intangible assets as well as the firm-external character-
istics. Several of these metrics are only available in qualitative form, and reliable
3 A summary of non-traditional valuation approaches is presented by Table B.2 in in Appendix B
on page 240.
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quantifying metrics have yet to be identified. In most cases, the formulation of
quantitative metrics follows that of qualitative metrics (Bernard, 2012).
An exemplary evaluation method which transitioned from employing qualitative to
quantitative metrics are environmental, social, and governance factors (ESG). Today
ESG factors are the primary method to quantify the sustainability, ethics, and soci-
etal impact of any undertakings, for instance, investments (Knoepfel, 2004; Lehner,
2016; Vo¨ro¨smarty et al., 2018). Two decades ago, ESG concepts, both qualitative
and quantitative, were not known in practice. Since then, corporations adopted
ESG factors, and investors created one of the fastest-growing investment categories,
“impact investing” (Kell, 2018; Bass et al., 2018). Some researchers argue ESG met-
rics were a contributing factor to the rise of the investment class since they allowed
to benchmark investments in an environment which aims to optimise for measurable
societal impact while achieving financial returns. (Orsagh, 2019; Tett et al., 2019).
In VC such standardised quantitative metrics comparable to ESG factors have not
yet been established. Nonetheless, VC literature contains multiple studies which
argue for the adoption intangible and soft assets as evaluation criteria specifically
for ESVs. Stuart et al. (1999, p. 315) states that “[b]ecause the quality of young
companies often cannot be observed directly, evaluators must appraise the company
based on observable attributes that are thought to covary with its underlying but
unknown quality.” Table 2.2 shows a categorisation of literature that argues for
intangible and soft assets into six categories.
Table 2.2: Qualitative and quantitative ESV investment criteria.
Category Investment criteria Source
Entrepreneur Parents and family Lindquist et al. (2015)
and ESV team Leadership
capabilities
Wales et al. (2013); Haynes et al.
(2015); Renko et al. (2015)
Commitment and
ownership
Erikson (2002); Robson et al. (2006);
Bygrave and Zacharakis (2010);
Busenitz et al. (2005)
Team completeness
and heterogeneity
Amason et al. (2006); Hmieleski and
Ensley (2007); Franke et al. (2008);
Visintin and Pittino (2014); Klotz
et al. (2014)
Social competence Chandler and Hanks (1994); Baron
(2000); Baron and Markman (2003)
Founding experience Flynn (1991); Van Gelderen et al.
(2006); Hsu (2007); Gompers et al.
(2010); Gimmon and Levie (2010)
Industry experience Mitteness et al. (2012); Cassar (2014)
Continued on next page
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Category Investment criteria Source
Technical knowledge Chorev and Anderson (2006); Franke
et al. (2006); Mueller and Murmann
(2016)
Education Backes-Gellner and Werner (2007);
Dickson et al. (2008); Quan (2012)
Creativity Ko and Butler (2007)
Business and
marketing experience
Brinckmann et al. (2011); Elmuti et al.
(2012); Staniewski (2016)
Employee growth Davila et al. (2003)
Product Novelty and
innovation
Leutner et al. (2014)
Patents Baum and Silverman (2004); Mann and
Sager (2007); Hoenig and Henkel (2015)
Differentiation Mason and Stark (2004); Miloud et al.
(2012)
Business
model
Uniqueness Zott and Amit (2007); Spiegel et al.
(2016)
Market and Volume and growth Macmillan et al. (1985); Zider (1998)
industry Timing Schlichte et al. (2019)
Match VC’s
investment thesis
Muzyka et al. (1996); Clark (2008);
Mitteness et al. (2012)
Financial
metrics
Return on investment Mason and Harrison (2002b); Gompers
et al. (2020)
Exit possibilities Streletzki and Schulte (2013);
Bernstein et al. (2016)
Social
network
Inter-firm networks,
prestige, and
reputation
Stuart et al. (1999); Baum et al.
(2000); Shane and Cable (2002);
Fischer and Reuber (2007)
Affiliation with VC Hsu (2004); Pollock and Gulati (2007);
Alexy et al. (2012)
Alumni networks Nann et al. (2011)
Online social
networks
Gloor et al. (2013); Yang and Berger
(2017)
Advisers, directors,
and board
Certo (2003); Deutsch and Ross (2003);
Lehtonen and Lahti (2009); Higgins
et al. (2011); Wincent et al. (2014);
Amornsiripanitch et al. (2019)
Customers Franke et al. (2006); Wang et al.
(2014); Meiseberg (2015)
Suppliers Bru¨derl and Preisendo¨rfer (1998);
La Rocca et al. (2019)
It is important to note that the evaluation categories above encompass the core
features of ESVs and identify potential upside and downside of investments. As a
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consequence of the intangible nature of ESV assets, valuations are rather negotiated
between entrepreneurs and VCs than determined by calculation. Entrepreneurs who
signal credible features in these categories, will be perceived and evaluated more
favourably (Hsu, 2004; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). A relevant observation for this
thesis is that the non-traditional evaluation categories remained similar for decades
(Macmillan et al., 1985), however, the level of attention regarding the social network
increased only in the last two decades (Hsu et al., 2014; Ko and McKelvie, 2018).
The description of evaluation criteria, specifically focused on ESV investments, that
are utilised by VCs, concludes the review of literature on the investors’ perspective.
2.3 Entrepreneurs’ perspective
“Venture: to risk going somewhere or doing something that might be dangerous or
unpleasant, [...] [such] as an activity or plan of action, often in business, that
involves risk or uncertainty.” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019)
Nacent firms can be differentiated into new ventures and new small businesses (Mur-
phy et al., 1996; Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Ireland et al., 2005). This study focuses
on new ventures. Gompers and Lerner (1999) stress that early-stage VC funded
businesses and their characteristics differ strongly from new small businesses and
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the one end, and late-stage private
equity and public markets on the other end. A categorical difference of the new ven-
tures compared to SMEs can be attributed to the information asymmetry between
entrepreneurs and VCs at the point of investment, high levels of uncertainty and
risk, unproven technology, volatile and unsaturated markets, and the illiquidity of
the asset class (Ramsinghani, 2014).
For this thesis, the definition of ESVs is adopted from the British Venture Capital
and Private Equity Association (BVCA, 2012; for fundraising stages confer Sec-
tion 2.2 (b)):
Definition 2: An “ESV” is a venture investable firm, less than five years
old that has not yet achieved the growth stage.
During early phases, the initial business concept is developed, first research and
development conducted, a prototype or first iteration of a product product built,
PoC4 take place, and the first customers acquired as the product reaches the market.
Before the growth stage starts, the product is not yet sold at scale, and the aim is
to reach product-market fit (Ries, 2011; Ramsinghani, 2014).
For an ESV to succeed, it must have access to collaborators and partners (Pollock
and Gulati, 2007), customers (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003), financing (Gulati and
4 A PoC, is an initial test run of the early product on a client’s site or system.
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Higgins, 2003), and media coverage (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Once access is
established, ESVs must procure and allocate the relevant resources (Alvarez et al.,
2001), convince VC to fund their business (Bruno and Tyebjee, 1985) and execute
on their plan and reach milestones (Steier and Greenwood, 1995) before they seek
funding to repeat the cycle (Murray, 1999; Zheng et al., 2010). In her seminal work
on the theory of the growth of firms Penrose states:
“New, small, and unknown firms do not have the same facilities for
raising capital as do established, large, and known firms. [...] successful
fundraising of capital depends on an entrepreneur’s ability to create con-
fidence. [...] [This] entrepreneurial ability is required to launch a new
firm successfully on a shoestring or to keep up the rate of net new invest-
ment required to enable it to reach a size and position where its general
credit standing is well established.” (Penrose, 1959, p. 38)
Multiple theories are used to describe the success of young firms in this quasi-cyclic
process. Of these theories, (1) resource-based view describes the procurement of
resources, (2) dynamic capabilities explain how founders must constantly adapt to
new challenges, and (3) signalling theory models the process of convincing VCs. Ad-
ditionally, these theories help understand how ESVs can reduce the VCs’ perceived
information asymmetry. Research over the past decades has shown that firms can
no longer be viewed in isolation but rather through a networked, stakeholder per-
spective, which affects ventures from ideation through to phases of maturity (Street
and Cameron, 2007; Freeman, 2010). Palmer and Richards claim that in the 21st
century, organisations ought to evolve by:
“[a]dapting to the new environment of network-based business models,
[which] necessitates a move away from familiar organisational behaviour
to a new behaviour network behaviour. Network behaviour requires a
different mind-set, a mind-set that transcends boundaries and realises
our aptitude for connecting with others, whether at personal, group or
enterprise levels.” Palmer and Richards (1999, p. 192)
The concept of a networked organisation and social network resources are an integral
element of this research. Thus, Section 2.4 later presents a dedicated review of ESVs’
social capital, which frames resources embedded in the social networks around the
ESVs.
Procuring and allocating resources, learning new skills to adapt to challenges, and
signalling these qualities to external entities to ESVs can be summarised as over-
coming the “liabilities of newness and smallness” (Freeman et al., 1983, p. 706;
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Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The literature on liabilities of new-
ness and smallness describes an interesting tension: the more unconventional and
novel an ESV’s innovation, the higher the potential upside but also the difficulty in
convincing stakeholders to support or join their mission (Baker et al., 2003; Navis
and Glynn, 2011). The following section presents a review of literature on the re-
source position of ESVs.
2.3.1 Resource-based view
Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) defines a firm’s resources as “tangible and intangible assets
which are tied semi-permanently to the firm”. Those resources can be categorised
in financial, material, intellectual, or human resources (Ng et al., 2014). Resources,
both material and immaterial, are indispensable for firms to operate, an idea concep-
tualised by the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Venkataraman, 1997; Ng et al.,
2014). Past empirical research showed that resources can serve as a source of com-
petitive advantage for ESVs (Florin et al., 2003; Lavie, 2006). The notion that
firms competitiveness can stem from resources in addition to their products and
intellectual capital was a novel idea in the 1980s. Later, Wernerfelt’s research and
subsequent studies found these insights particularly relevant for ESVs who in their
first years have hardly any tangible products and output at all (Ng et al., 2014).
Previous studies found that depending on the industry, among financial, human, and
social capital the latter can be the most important resource for ESVs, as illustrated
in Figure 2.6 (Ostgaard and Birley, 1994; Greene et al., 1997; Shane and Delmar,
2004; Bosma et al., 2004; Khaire, 2010; Unger et al., 2011; Stam et al., 2014).
Early-stage Growth-stage Late-stage
Maturity of the firm
Value of
social resources
for ESV growth
Value of
financial resources
for ESV growth
Figure 2.6: Value of social and financial resources with increasing venture matu-
rity, modified from Huang and Knight (2017).
Huang and Knight (2017) state that social resources are better suited to address
vaguely defined problem settings, whereas financial resources are better for well-
defined ones. One direct benefit of social embeddedness is more direct access to
capital. VCs see strategic alliances both as directly beneficial to the ESV and
the presence of alliances also demonstrates to VCs that other entities trust the en-
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trepreneurs long-term (Das and Teng, 2000; Shane and Stuart, 2002; Hochberg et al.,
2007). Gulati (1998, p. 293) defines strategic alliances to network partners as “vol-
untary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development
of products, technologies, or services”. Podolny (2001) best describes the benefits
derived from such special ties to stakeholders, stating that ties have not only a trans-
ferring but also a perceptual effect, respectively referred to as “pipes” that carry
resources and information, and “prisms” that differentiate market participants. Such
informational clues about the ESV’s quality can help ESVs to overcome growth bot-
tlenecks (Podolny, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). The majority of research
focuses on the benefits of resource procurement through a social network (Alvarez
et al., 2006), the main caveat mentioned in literature is that an overdependence
on few partners can have negative effects (Street and Cameron, 2007; Knoben and
Bakker, 2019).
One of the most common characteristics found in ESVs, is that they are notori-
ously resource-scarce (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007; Lehtonen and Lahti, 2009; Zheng
et al., 2010; Khaire, 2010) and struggle for access to capital (Bruno and Tyebjee,
1985; Cassar, 2004; Martens et al., 2011). Previous research has shown that the
process of creating value from few resources, also known as “bricolage” is a cue for
a skilled entrepreneur (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Multiple studies which focus on
resolving this problem find that social ties to VCs and stakeholders who lend the
ESV their reputation and enhance credibility, both of which are features firms that
are absent in early stages, and aid the fundraising process (Batjargal and Liu, 2004;
Denis, 2004; Cassar, 2004; Zhang, 2015; Wang, 2016). Some researchers criticised
work on the procurement of resources and sustained competitive advantage for fo-
cusing too much on firm-internal capabilities. The critics emphasised that most
“resources inhere not so much within the firm but reside in the inter-firm networks
in which firms are placed.” (Gulati, 1999, p. 397; Lavie, 2006). With their studies,
Gulati (1998), Dyer and Singh (1998), and Lavie (2006) extend the resource-based
view by integrating social network theory and thereby make the adapted theory
suitable to explain how ESVs can gain competitive advantage by leveraging their
networks. The main advantage of this perspective is that it captures resources re-
quired for entrepreneurship, such as emotional support (Bru¨derl and Preisendo¨rfer,
1998), reputation (Shane and Cable, 2002; Fischer and Reuber, 2011), and third-
party endorsements (Stuart et al., 1999), which the traditional perspective does not
include. As a result, entrepreneurs increased awareness of the wealth of resources
that existss beyond their company’s borders and calibrated their focus to include
strategic alliances with network partners (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003).
Subsequent research taking a social-network perspective on firm-resources shows two
benefits which further improve the ESV’s perceived value. First, ESV can enhance
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their performance when they have the necessary capabilities to harness resources
made available by external entities (Lee et al., 2001; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Hochberg
et al., 2007; Wu, 2007; Neyens et al., 2010; Ng et al., 2017). Second, through em-
beddedness in larger networks resource dependency can be de-risked (Pangarkar
and Wu, 2013). These mentions link the resource-based network view with the skills
and dynamic capabilities of entrepreneurs while demonstrating their the social net-
work’s contribution to entrepreneurial success (Wu, 2007; Augier and Teece, 2009;
Srec´kovic´, 2018).
The previously discussed fast-paced environment in which ESVs are nurtured re-
quires organisational and managerial changes to adapt. An overview of such adjust-
ments is discussed in the next section.
2.3.2 Dynamic capabilities
Dynamic capabilities can be used as a theoretical construct to explain how path-
dependent, managerial and organisational adjustments have to be performed by
ESVs as the mature, especially in fast-paced environments (Rothaermel and Deeds,
2006). In his research on dynamic capabilities, Teece (1997; 2007; 2010) states that
firms have to constantly adapt across all business functions. Besides changes in ex-
ecution, also the input factors, such as required resources, change as ESVs mature
(Huang and Knight, 2017).
Research mentions specific capabilities that ESVs must develop, including absorp-
tive capacity, innovative capability, and alliance management capabilities (Gulati
et al., 2000; Lee et al., 2001; Zheng et al., 2010). These three capabilities relate
to the above-mentioned network resources of ESVs. To harness pecuniary or non-
pecuniary influx from external entities, ESVs must absorb and implement learnings
and products of collaborations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). An additional element
of dynamism is introduced through the fact that social network resources are not
“solid, durable, and independent” of their use and, therefore, require constant atten-
tion (Steen, 2010, p. 326). Coping with the instability of ESV’s environments and
rapid growth can be facilitated through knowledge transfer with network partners
and interorganisational learning (Hagedoorn, 2002; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003).
Benefits of such interorganisational exchange can help ESVs to innovate their busi-
ness model and product, or with international expansion (Laursen and Salter, 2004;
Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Han, 2006; Masango and Marinova, 2014). Coordinating
and maintaining a social network is relatively costly for ESVs given the small team
size among which duties can be shouldered (Witt, 2004; Huizingh, 2011). Hence,
alliance management capabilities are required by firms to manage large numbers of
strategic partners efficiently (Zheng et al., 2010). Consequently, the mere existence
of a social network is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion and requires skilled
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entrepreneurs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Teece, 2007).
Superior resource situations and organisational advantages can be communicated
from entrepreneurs to VCs through a process academics call “signalling” which is
discussed in the following section (Freeman, 2010).
2.3.3 Signalling
Signalling theory has established a central position in management and entrepreneur-
ship literature to frame informational exchange (Connelly et al., 2011). For this the-
sis, signalling is defined as the voluntary or involuntary communication of positive
or negative information by one party (the emitter) to another party (the receiver)
which interprets the signal (Spence, 2002; Bird and Smith, 2005; Connelly et al.,
2011). Figure 2.7 illustrates this communication mechanism.
ESV
(Signal emitter)
VC
(Signal receiver)
Signal
Feedback (optional)
Figure 2.7: Signalling process, own illustration.
Entrepreneurship and finance literature understands signalling as a process of com-
munication with the purpose of reducing information asymmetry between mar-
ket participants (Spence, 2002). Such information asymmetry occurs between en-
trepreneurs who reveal information and VCs who receive and interpret signals, alto-
gether fundamental aspects of pre-investment evaluation processes (Plummer et al.,
2016; Kim and Wagman, 2016; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). In their review of signalling
literature Connelly et al. (2011, p. 43) found that most studies are concerned with
the communication of “quality as the distinguishing characteristic, [whereby] the
notion of quality can be interpreted in a wide range of relevant ways [and] quality
refers to the underlying, unobservable ability of the signaller to fulfil the needs or
demands of an outsider observing the signal.” Translated into the thesis context,
entrepreneurs are insiders who possess information, VCs are outsiders who wish to
obtain information about an entrepreneur and their business (Connelly et al., 2011;
Ko and McKelvie, 2018). Signals which ESVs send, convey firm reputation, current
and future firm performance, firm value, and trustworthiness (Stuart et al., 1999;
Fischer and Reuber, 2007; Pollock et al., 2010). Several researchers state that the
signals sent by ESVs are one of the most valuable data points when assessing a
venture (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Busenitz et al., 2005; Plummer et al., 2016).
Effective signalling can reduce information asymmetry, which lowers the perceived
uncertainty and makes VCs decision-makers more confident (Maxwell et al., 2011;
Connelly et al., 2011; O¨zman, 2017). These signals are most important in early
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stages, under conditions of information asymmetry and even more so when dealing
with novel technology and unproven market (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Plummer
et al., 2016; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). In many cases, proxies which VCs use to
assess ESVs, match the signals ESVs can send to VCs5. Thus, effective signalling
can increase ESVs’ likelihood to receive funding (Busenitz et al., 2005). ESVs are
well advised to constantly emit these signals as VCs ingest the information at all
stages of the investment process, but particularly during screening, evaluation, and
due diligence (Busenitz et al., 2005). The signalling process can further be dissected
into different components, the (a) signal emitter and content as well as (b) recipients
and the issues which can occur during the transmission.
(a) Signal emitter and content
The content of ESV signals can be interpersonal or informational (Zott and Huy,
2007; Chen, 2009; Kirsch et al., 2009). Interpersonal signalling conveys qualities of
entrepreneurs, confidence, and authenticity (Kim and Aldrich, 2005; Lee and Jones,
2008; Gedajlovic et al., 2013; Huang and Knight, 2017), whereas information sig-
nalling conveys the venture’s economical value, performance, and interorganisational
relations (Shane and Cable, 2002; Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Zott and Huy, 2007; Ko
and McKelvie, 2018). Definitions of these first-, and third-party signals are fluid
in the literature (Connelly et al., 2011; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). Signals are often
ill-defined and have multiple underlying theories, such as social capital and human
capital theory (Connelly et al., 2011). As the borders of an ESVs are fluid, this
could result in inconsistent signal definitions, due to a lack of clarity on who is an
external stakeholder (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Farsi et al., 2013; Milanov and
Fernhaber, 2014; Eftekhari and Bogers, 2015). To avoid such confusion, for this
thesis, the company perimeter is drawn around the core entrepreneurial team, com-
prising of the founders, and their employees who can signal collectively as an ESV,
or individually. All affiliates beyond this imaginary border count towards the ESV’s
social network which receives the signals.
Existing research on interpersonal signalling from the entrepreneurial perspective
mentions founder’s education, patents, awards, and grants as possible ESV signals
(Baum and Silverman, 2004; Graham and Sichelman, 2008; Pollock et al., 2010;
Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Islam et al., 2018). The signalling literature explains how
efficient signalling can help ESVs to remove bottlenecks and hurdles. An example
for such a signal are teams, comprising of first-time founders which fight against
a significant bias being statistically more likely to fail than repeat founders. This
situation could be mitigated through interpersonal signalling (Hsu, 2007; Levie and
Gimmon, 2008; Gompers et al., 2010; Gimmon and Levie, 2010).
5 The proxies which are referred to can be revisited in Table 2.2 on page 22.
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Existing research on informational signalling from the entrepreneurial perspective
mentions third-party connections, strategic alliances, endorsements, and affiliations
can help ESVs to overcome their liabilities of newness and smallness (Stuart et al.,
1999; Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). This idea combines signalling theory with social
capital theory as these interorganisational ties exist in the form of a social network
around the ESV (Liang and Yuan, 2016). Plummer et al. (2016, p. 1598) highlights
that “third-party signals can unlock the value of signals that might otherwise go
unnoticed, [allowing external parties] to make sense of the firm’s characteristics and
action signals, reducing uncertainty, resolving ambiguity, and overcoming a noisy
signalling environment.” Islam et al. (2018) adds that some signals can overcompen-
sate the lack of other signals, such as an ESV having received a government grant,
which overcompensated a weak patent portfolio. Among those affiliations which
ESVs can signal are advisers (Certo, 2003; Lehtonen and Lahti, 2009) who cannot
only mentor founders but also make introductions to investors and help during ne-
gotiation. Previous research also mentions the value of signalling strategic alliances
with large corporate partners (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Alvarez et al., 2006), and
existing, prestigious investors (Hsu, 2004; Pollock and Gulati, 2007; Alexy et al.,
2012).
A special form of signalling occurs for university spin-outs, which can signal two ad-
ditional, interpersonal and informational signals. Firstly, the founder’s educational
pedigree gained by the affiliation with the university. Secondly, the fact that the
ESV already existed as an entity in a university department, retains a tie to the
university, and technology is often based on peer-reviewed research, before it was
taken out as an independent business (Ko and McKelvie, 2018; Huynh, 2016; Gu-
bitta et al., 2016; Sousa et al., 2011).
Although most research is concerned with the signalling towards potential investors,
signals can also be sent to potential hires (Davila et al., 2003; Ouimet and Zarut-
skie, 2014; Becker-Blease and Sohl, 2015), existing and new customers (Gupta et al.,
2004; Meiseberg, 2013; Wang et al., 2014) and existing and new suppliers (Certo,
2003; Huynh, 2016). When analysing signals picked up by investors, Huang and
Knight (2017) found that angel investors rely more on interpersonal signalling, as
opposed to VCs who rely heavier on informational signals.
(b) Signal recipients and issues
Existing research also explains how signalling efforts must be structured to be con-
sidered credible and effective. For an external entity to appreciate a signal, the
content that is signalled has to be costly or difficult to achieve (Stuart et al., 1999;
Lee et al., 2001; Bird and Smith, 2005; Fischer and Reuber, 2007). An example of a
difficult to achieve signal is a degree from a university with strict entry requirements
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which signals a founders relative academic and intellectual ability (Connelly et al.,
2011). Furthermore, signals have to be sent regularly, with high frequency, and re-
main consistent or improving to convincingly demonstrate value of a venture to VCs
(Prasad et al., 2000; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). Signals, especially for those ESVs op-
erating in dynamic environments, must be developed over time to show momentum,
differentiation among competitors, and thus reduce information asymmetry (Janney
and Folta, 2003; Jonsson, 2015). Research showed that timely signals, embedded in
observable actions and people, weigh stronger than promises and “name-dropping”
(Busenitz et al., 2005).
In contrast to the literature on ESV resources and dynamic capabilities which mainly
focuses on positive notion of social networks, studies on signalling are ripe with men-
tions on possible deception and even fraud (Nitin and Eccles, 1992; Bird and Smith,
2005; Connelly et al., 2011; Barone and Coscia, 2018). As one recent example, the
positive signalling through high-profile advisers and board members spectacularly
proved to be a fallacy in the case of Theranos (Certo, 2003; Pollock et al., 2010;
Higgins et al., 2011; Carreyrou, 2015, 2018). Theranos, a bankrupt Silicon Valley
firm which was valued at $9bn before it folded, had a high calibre board, deco-
rated former Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), former US secretaries of state, and
respected medical professors, which blindfolded investors. This fraud is an example
for signalling being a double-edged sword. Another example of a detrimental sig-
nalling effect can be found in the behaviour existing investors. Continued follow-on
investments from existing investors send a strong, positive signal because it demon-
strates trust of existing partners whos information asymmetry is considerably lower
than that of prospective investors. The reverse effect occurs for existing investors
who, although an investment would be within their investment focus, decide not to
follow-on invest, which can seriously harm the fundraising abilities of a venture and
lower the valuation (Kim and Wagman, 2016).
It is noteworthy that signals are non-linear and different stakeholders require dif-
ferent marginal signalling strength (Pollock et al., 2010). Furthermore, signals are
unstable and their strength decays over time. Islam et al. (2018) found that the
signal following a grant award lasts six months. Ko and McKelvie (2018) found that
certain signals are effective for certain fundraising stages, while others found that
releasing additional information can dilute existing signals and succeeding or failing
to reach a milestone can overwrite existing signals (Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Zheng
et al., 2010; Pahnke et al., 2015). Entrepreneurs have to be aware of the signals
they emit, as well as the signals they do not emit. Janney and Folta (2003) found
that failure to emit signals and unawareness about negative signals can harm ESVs
funds-raising efforts.
More recently, with the emergence of social media platforms, online signalling has
Chapter 2. Literature review 33
come to the centre of academic attention (Fischer and Rebecca Reuber, 2014; Keat-
ing et al., 2014). Signalling online can be attractive for ESVs due to the low entry
barrier, low costs, wide reach, and high engagement with communities (Kaplan and
Lerner, 2010). In their study of entrepreneurs’ use of social media, Fischer and
Rebecca Reuber (2014) found that signals can be categorised into conveying qual-
ity, relational orientation, or differentiation. Their research also determined that
firms which signal a combination of these three categories are more likely to receive
venture funding. In accordance with Janney and Folta’s (2003) findings about the
effects of not-signalling, Fischer and Rebecca Reuber (2014) mention that unaware-
ness about non-signalling through social media or negative mentions on blogs and
news can out-weight the benefits (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Fischer and Rebecca Reu-
ber, 2014).
In summary, ESVs who successfully reduce information asymmetry though sig-
nalling, online and offline, may receive more favourable terms by investors, achieve
higher valuations (Certo et al., 2001; Shane and Cable, 2002), and increase their
performance and chance of survival (Bru¨derl and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998; Delmar and
Shane, 2004). Hitherto, the review has mentioned the concept of social networks
and value of social capital in multiple occasions, both from the entrepreneurial and
investor perspective. These concepts are fundamental theoretical foundations of
this thesis. The next section presents an in-depth review of these concepts with
particular focus on their role for ESVs.
2.4 Social capital theory
This section reviews social capital literature at the intersect with entrepreneur-
ship. Historically entrepreneurship and the success and performance of ESVs have
predominantly focused on individual entrepreneurial abilities, human capital, and
financial capital (Zhao et al., 2010; Unger et al., 2011). By contrast, the under-
standing of entrepreneurial performance from a social capital perspective is scarce
(Stam et al., 2014).
Social capital is a disputed theory and probably one of the most ill-defined con-
cepts used in this thesis (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Researchers count between six
and two dozen different definitions and argue whether social capital is a resource
itself or merely the way to access resources (Putnam, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002;
Anderson et al., 2007). Researchers hold an ongoing debate about whether social
capital is a form of capital comparable to human and financial capital (Coleman,
1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Lin, 2001; Robison et al., 2002; Adler and Kwon,
2002; Kane et al., 2014; Spiegel et al., 2016). To achieve a clear definition of social
capital for this thesis, it is important to draw the lines between human, and social
capital which are often convoluted (Coleman, 1988; Adler and Kwon, 2002).
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Human capital theory, which describes a third form of capital besides financial and
social capital, was developed mainly in the 1960s (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961). The
concept of human capital allowed to separate a form of organisational capital which
is embodied in skills, knowledge, and capabilities of people (Piazza-Georgi, 2002;
Mosey and Wright, 2007; Grichnik et al., 2014; Milosevic, 2018). Coleman (1988)
and Robison et al. (2002) make a distinction between social and human capital dif-
fering in that social capital requires a relationship between people, whereas human
capital can reside in individuals.
The majority of research agrees that social capital, like the other forms of capital,
is a long-lived asset which can grow through investments (Adler and Kwon, 2002;
Kwon and Adler, 2014). Furthermore, capital-like qualities of social capital are its
appropriability (Coleman, 1988) and convertibility (Bourdieu, 1986) which means
it can be exchanged, for instance into human capital, or can replace or support
other forms of capital (Kim and Aldrich, 2005). If left unattended, social capital,
as other forms of capital deteriorates (Kwon and Adler, 2014). Social capital can
yield potential as well as threats, and it can therefore be considered both a utility
and dis-utility (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
This thesis adopts Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998, p. 243) definition of social capital:
Definition 3: “[S]ocial capital is the sum of the actual and potential re-
sources embedded within, available through, and derived
from the network of relationships possessed by an individ-
ual or social unit.”
Nahapiet and Ghoshal add that “[s]ocial capital thus comprises both the network and
the assets that may be mobilised through that network.” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal,
1998, p. 243). Over the past decades, research demonstrated the importance of
networks for ESVs. Granovetter (1985) promotes the idea of entrepreneurship as
a socio-economic process which is supported by Vesper (1990) who states that no
venture is built in isolation but rather as an inherently collaborative effort. To
understand how social capital evolved over time and appreciate why it is becoming
increasingly relevant today, it is instructive to review the history of social capital
theory in literature.
2.4.1 Evolution of social capital theory
The theory of social capital has ripened for a long time with first mentions dat-
ing back to the 19th century. Early political scientist De Tocqueville (1835) intro-
duced the idea, after observing American citizens gathering to discuss political and
economical matters (Nolla, 2010). De Tocqueville discovered that the formation
of relationships facilitates information and opinion exchange. Five decades later,
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Von Bawerk (1884), an influential Austrian economist, coined the term Sozialkapi-
tal6 in his work ‘Kapital und Kapitalzins’ 7 and his understanding of social capital
differs fundamentally from earlier works as he first mentions an economic interpre-
tation.
The two different notions of De Tocqueville and Von Bawerk demonstrate how sev-
eral definitions coexisted already in early days, with only a few scholars engaging
in the discussion. Before the turn of the 20th century, Veblen faults: “[i]t is not
too much to say that the controversy has owed much of its bitterness and steril-
ity to inadequate definition of the terms employed, especially to a lack of accuracy
in the concept of capital.” (Veblen, 1892, p. 249). The disagreement continues in
more recent years, since adoption in the economic community increased (Granovet-
ter, 1985; Adler and Kwon, 2002). French sociologist Bourdieu (1980, 1986) was
the first to draw the connection of social capital which resides in the form of social
networks Putnam (2000). In doing so, he provided an explanation why the social
network of a firm can be assigned an economic value. Putnam (2000) summarises
his predecessors’ contributions as follows:
“The core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value. Just as a
screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase
productivity (both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the
productivity of individuals and groups. Whereas physical capital refers to physical
objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to
connections among individuals.” (Putnam, 2000, p. 16)
Social capital research increasingly found entrepreneurial processes to be embedded
in social networks (Granovetter, 1985). Consequently, concept social capital had
a significant impact on entrepreneurship literature as it led to a re-thinking of the
structure of firms, which included the stakeholders around a firm (Jarillo, 1989;
Florin et al., 2003; Freeman, 2010). The emergence of graph theory and social
network theory, a structures to describe social capital were found (Gulati, 1999;
Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jansen, 2003; Huber, 2009; Khaire, 2010; Semrau and
Werner, 2014). Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 19) found that economists and social
network researchers started combined social capital and social network research,
“bridging views, focus[ing] primarily on social capital as a resource that inheres in
the social network tying a focal actor to other actors.”. The recent advances in
computing and feasibility to replicate large scale real world networks, such as online
social networks, have opened up new avenues for research, particularly in the domain
of SNA (Borgatti et al., 2009; Baraba´si, 2016).
6 The German term ‘Sozialkapital’ translates to ‘social capital’.
7 The German title of his work ‘Kapital und Kapitalzins’ translates to ‘capital and interest.’
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2.4.2 Social network theory
“Behind each complex system, there is an intricate network that encodes the
interactions between the system’s components.” (Baraba´si, 2016, p. 23)
Social network theory is based on graph theory which allows mathematical descrip-
tions of complex networks (Newman, 2014). Leonard Euler’s work in 1736 on the
“seven bridges of Ko¨nigsberg problem” marks the first mathematical description of
a network graph. According to Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Newman (2014), it
was Moreno (1934) who’s pioneering work in human interaction, modelled as network
graphs, marks the beginning of social network studies. Since then, social network
research contributed significantly in the field of sociometry, the quantitative study
of social, interpersonal relationships (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Together with
further notable works such as Granovetter’s (1973) seminal paper on the strenght
of weak ties, mark the beginning of modern social network research, which later be-
came the foundation for SNA (Burt, 1982, 2005; Gulati et al., 2011; Newman, 2014;
Baraba´si, 2016). In the second half of the 20th century, sociologists and economists
moved away from atomistic models of individuals and organisations, towards an in-
tegrated, networked understanding (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Among the first to
research the impact of social networks on entrepreneurship were Birley (1985) and
Aldrich et al. (1986) who described the process of founding a new business from a
network perspective.
Although graph theory emerged in the 18th century, it took until the 21st century
for the technology to be available to map these complex systems and enable modern
network science (Baraba´si, 2016). Research in the last two decades has demon-
strated that networks across domains can be described by the same fundamental
mathematical principles (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; Baraba´si, 2016).
The most recent increase in recognition can be explained by the technological ad-
vance of online social media, which like other forms of ESV networks can be mod-
elled as a network graph (Shepherd, 2015; Baraba´si, 2016). Figure 2.8 illustrates
how rapidly academics embraced the concept.
This thesis adopts Newman’s (2014, pp. 36) definition of social networks:
Definition 4: “Social networks are networks in which the vertices are peo-
ple, or sometimes groups of people, and the edges repre-
sent some form of social interaction between them [whereby]
edges might represent friendship between individuals, but
they could also represent professional relationships, ex-
change of goods or money, communication patterns, [...] or
many other types of connection.”
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Figure 2.8: Journal publications with keywords “social capital”, “social network”,
and “social network analysis” from 1970 to 2019, based on Scopus.
Adding to the definition, Borgatti and Foster (2003) state that vertices can be or-
ganisations of any size and be modelled as one vertex, which is important in the
context of this thesis. The economic relevance of social networks is based on the
assumption that relationships are important as long as they facilitate exchange of
information, knowledge, and resources. The direct impact of a superior information,
knowledge, and resource position on ESVs were discussed in Section 2.3.1 (Wasser-
man and Faust, 1994; Baraba´si, 2016). Another assumption is that the values of
networks exceed that of the sum of the parts because of their emergent properties,
i.e. features and abilities which a collective exerts but each individual lacks (New-
man et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2011). These emergent properties positively influence
organisational behaviour and economic outcomes (Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Jansen, 2003;
Florin et al., 2003).
Research suggests that there is high awareness of the importance of social net-
works among market participants, but little understanding of their optimisation
and economic consequences for business (Smith et al., 2017; Shepherd et al., 2019).
Knowledge of concrete approaches to, and successful implementation practices of
networking are not uniform among market participants. Thus, there is strong evi-
dence that conscious networking activities conducted by ESVs yield potential and
might positively influence their development and valuation (Das et al., 1998; Teece,
2010; Festel et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2017). Such potential gives rise to a “network
success hypothesis” (Bru¨derl and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998, p. 213).
SNA enables research into complex social networks and the mathematical descrip-
tion thereof (Baraba´si, 2016). Such complex social networks can consist of millions
of vertices and structuring large networks requires a thoroughly defined array of
social networks components. Table 2.3 shows a summary of those components and
metrics which are later used in this thesis to describe ESV networks.
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Table 2.3: Social network terminology in the social sciences merged from Newman
(2014), Wasserman and Faust (1994), and Scott (2017).
Terminology Definition
Sub-network Sub-networks are independent networks and part of a larger net-
work (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Vertex An actor, node, or vertex is an entity in a social network which
represents a person, a group of individuals, or an organisation
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Scott, 2017; Baraba´si, 2016). Here-
after this network component will be referred to as a vertex.
Edge A connection, tie, or link, in a network graph connects two ver-
tices and represents their interaction or flow of goods, which can
be material or non-material (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Ties
can further be differentiated into dichotomous states of directed
and undirected, present and absent, and weighted or unweighted
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Newman, 2014; Butts, 2009). Di-
rected indicates a one-directional or bi-directional flow from one
vertex to another, undirected analysis the latter disregards direc-
tion. Isolated vertices are not connected to the network graph.
Weighted edges have quantitative strength attribute, for instance
an investor who invested twice compared to a one time investor.
Henceforth the element connecting vertices will be referred to as
an edge.
Network
constellation
A network graph, or network map is a mathematical or visual
representation of the pattern in which vertices are connected by
edges is called network (Baraba´si, 2016). For the purpose of this
thesis the construct is referred to as a network constellation.
Network size The total number of vertices in a network (Wasserman and Faust,
1994; Carpenter et al., 2012).
Degree The number of direct edges to other vertices, also called degree
centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Newman, 2014).
Centrality Degree divided by the total number of nodes in a network. Cen-
trality is a measure for the achieved connectedness of a ver-
tex compared to the maximum achievable connectedness (Scott,
2017). It is therefore considered the primary measure for a ver-
tex’s importance in a network (Newman, 2014). In directed net-
works, where the direction (emitting or receiving a signal) is im-
portant, in-degree (incoming signal), and out-degree (outbound
signal) can be differentiated (Carpenter et al., 2012; Marsden,
2015).
Eigenvector
centrality
Eigenvector centrality considers second-tier connections. A ver-
tex with high eigenvector centrality is linked to many other ver-
tices which have a high degree centrality. (Borgatti et al., 2009;
Newman, 2014).
Continued on next page
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Terminology Definition
Betweenness
centrality
Betweenness centrality is a measure for a vertex’s ability to bridge
network gaps, also called structural holes, and facilitate and con-
trol communication across a network (Wasserman and Faust,
1994; Burt, 2005). Betweenness is defined as the number of short-
est geodesic paths between any two vertices which route through
the focal vertex divided by the number of shortest paths that
exist (Freeman, 1979; Newman, 2014).
Density The ratio of edges in a network compared to the maximum
achievable number of edges if each vertex was connected to all
vertices (Carpenter et al., 2012; Scott, 2017).
Similarity This measure denotes the extent to which vertices are compa-
rable regarding their attributes and is therefore a measure of
heterogeneity in a network (Newman, 2014; Burt, 1995).
Essential to social network research is that the researcher determines the appro-
priate unit of analysis by defining boundaries of otherwise near-infinite networks
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Creswell, 2014; Newman, 2014; Baraba´si, 2016). In de-
scribing ESVs’ social networks, researchers can either focus on the network around
a single focal vertex, a few focal vertices, or the entire network (Kilkenny and Fuller-
Love, 2014; Crossley et al., 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2016). Figure 2.9 illustrates the
distinction between (a) egocentric and (b) whole network analysis.
Legend:
Vertex: , Edges: Undirected , Directed
Ego
Alters
(a) Egocentric network
Absent edge
(b) Whole network
Figure 2.9: Juxtaposition of egocentric and whole network analysis, own illustra-
tion.
The analysis of an individual vertex’s network is called “ego-network” or “egocentric
network” analysis. In an egocentric network one central vertex (ego) is either di-
rectly or indirectly connected to the surrounding vertexes (alter) while unconnected
vertexes are removed (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Carrington et al., 2005; Newman,
2014). A whole network analysis considers every vertex, including unconnected ver-
tices. Therefore, it allows an analysis of every network detail, such as multiple
ego-networks in the context of to the entire network. For some research settings,
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only small parts of the entire network are of interest. Similarly, the analysis might
focus on vertices which are unconnected, highlighting network gaps, called “struc-
tural holes” which represent potential to grow the network (Burt, 1995, 2005).
Few studies with notable exceptions such as Liang and Yuan (2016) used social
network analysis for empirical studies of early-stage investment decisions. Some
research has been undertaken to map investor syndication, i.e. the co-investment
of several investors (Alexy et al., 2012; Gloor et al., 2013; Wang, 2016; Luo et al.,
2019; Yang et al., 2018). The role of social media in ESV fundraising was empirically
researched, however, without a social network perspective (Yang and Berger, 2017).
As a consequence, there is a notable gap in academic literature and practitioner un-
derstanding of the intersection of social networks and ESV evaluation. This thesis
addresses this gap.
2.4.3 Summary and literature gap
This chapter synthesised three literature streams and identified a gap in the lit-
erature. While theoretical and qualitative empirical knowledge about benefits of
social networks are abundant in literature, there is a dearth of knowledge on net-
work compositions and structures which maximise benefits for ESVs regarding their
fundraising and growth performance (Pangarkar and Wu, 2013). Practitioners have
not adopted the social network perspective. Neither do VCs include SNA in their
evaluation of ESVs, nor do entrepreneurs have a methodical understanding of lever-
aging their networks to boost their private market position. Consequently, the
effects of social networks on fundraising have received little attention (Stuart and
Sorenson, 2007; Lee et al., 2010; Miloud et al., 2012; Audretsch and Link, 2012;
Heuven and Groen, 2012; Festel et al., 2013; Dusatkova and Zinecker, 2016; Ko and
McKelvie, 2018; Gompers et al., 2020). For entrepreneurs and investors, a lack of
understanding of social networks in fledgling ESVs and their economic effects rep-
resent unrealised potential by bringing more clarity to an inherently uncertainty
driven process.
Reasons for the lack of adoption are not evident in the literature especially as both
groups, VCs and entrepreneurs, are very aware of the power of networks and the
positive effects networks have on the financial outcome of ventures.
For VCs themselves embeddedness in networks and aptness in leveraging them plays
an important role (Hsu, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007; Cumming and Dai, 2011; Gom-
pers et al., 2020). Some VC funds refer to their portfolio as a “keiretsu”, the
Japanese term for a strategically interlocking conglomerate of firms (Landstro¨m,
2007; Greve et al., 2014). Extensive social networks surrounding VC funds helps
appoint better board members (Amornsiripanitch et al., 2019), increases the suc-
cess of their portfolio companies to fundraise (Ter Wal et al., 2016). Studies also
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suggest that social networks strengthen the ESV’s visibility and brand image (Hsu,
2004), and help attract external talent (Hellmann et al., 2002). Overall VCs are
often found to leverage their social network for specialist tasks they cannot fulfil
themselves by working with head-hunters, patent attorneys, lawyers, or journalists
(Hochberg et al., 2007).
From the entrepreneur’s perspective, only a few empirical studies considering social
networks were conducted. The results suggest that ESVs with strong social net-
works find it easier to get an introduction to a VC (Heuven and Groen, 2012), have
an increased likelihood of being funded (Baron and Markman, 2003), can raise more
capital (Yang and Berger, 2017), and achieve higher valuations (Zheng et al., 2010).
There have been repeated calls for more research on how entrepreneurs manage an
ESV by leveraging their social network (Martens et al., 2011; Zachary and Mishra,
2013; Keating et al., 2014; Islam et al., 2018). Participation of outsiders in firm-
level management and the amplifying role of stakeholder voices is neglected in the
literature (Fischer and Rebecca Reuber, 2014).
Researchers criticise that the entrepreneurship and investor perspective are not in-
tegrated sufficiently which disregards the dyadic dynamics between the two groups
and thus call for research to bridge that gap (Huang and Knight, 2017). Further-
more, concepts such as signalling of ESVs and the technological feasibility to map
large networks are not jointly explored. Additional research to uncover more types
of ESV signals at the early founding stages is required (Plummer et al., 2016) with
particular focus on those which can be measured quantitatively (Lee and Jones,
2008; Connelly et al., 2011; Stam et al., 2014).
The recent advance of VC funds with a data-driven investment, or crowdfunding
campaigns that allow participation of unaccredited, inexperienced investors increases
the demand for rigorous models (Kupor, 2019; Gompers et al., 2020). While the
number of funds employing data-driven strategies is more than doubling each year,
SNA as a critical element is not considered sufficiently in their models (Yang and
Berger, 2017; Ko and McKelvie, 2018). Research into other industries has demon-
strated that circumstances dominated by non-linearity and serendipity can be better
understood when looking at them through a social network lens (Baraba´si, 2016;
Hvistendahl, 2018).
Hitherto, studies have analysed social networks around ESVs both as the dependent
and independent variable, which raises the issue of endogeneity as well as a corre-
lation versus causation debate. The debate around repeat founders is an example
of such correlation versus causation questions. In the UK, 13 of 18 unicorns8 were
founded by repeat founders (PitchBook, LinkedIn). However, it is difficult to deter-
mine how instrumental the repeat founder attribute is compared to other attributes.
8 A “unicorn” is a company with its financial valuation exceeding $1bn.
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Ramsinghani (2014) faults, “[e]ven as we live in the era of big data, nothing about
venture capital investments is predictable or persistent. The correlation/causation
debate continues.” This research can contribute to the debate by studying whether
and how social networks can serve as a proxy to infer cues about an underlying
quality (Connelly et al., 2011). Existing research suggests that unrealised potential
could reside in systematically evaluating ESV networks, which presents a significant
research problem.
The next chapter illustrates the design of subsequent studies which aim at shedding
light on the understudied ESV environment.
3. Research foundation
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This chapter explains the research design process and positions of the studies in
the broader philosophical context. The identification of the philosophy underlying
the research is an essential procedural step and requires the researcher’s awareness
and reflective attitude (Van de Ven, 2007). A reflection on philosophical positions
contrasts their inherent ontological and epistemological assumptions and evaluates
the implications. Striving for responsible research also involves understanding how
the researcher’s predisposition and the problem under investigation predetermine
and restrict the use of methods, which ultimately influence the results.
Thereafter follows the formulation of a theory-building strategy. The higher-level
strategy for theory-building leads to an executable research methodology to conduct
the studies. The research methodology includes a choice of enquiry methods, a
definition of the research problem, identification of research questions and objectives,
and a plan to collect suitable evidence and the analysis thereof.
3.1 Philosophical stance
The philosophy of science studies the assumptions and relationships between theory,
methods, and data which has long been a controversial topic among philosophers and
methodologists (Van de Ven, 2007). An example for a central question is whether
researchers should begin research by selecting a theory first and subsequently col-
lect data, or vice-versa (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Through such reflections,
researchers can fulfil their obligation to correctly gauge and limit their influence on
research results. Overall, this section does not engage in a philosophical discussion
but instead introduces key concepts which later reflect on methods in this research
and their underlying limitations. It is further worth noting that nomenclature in
philosophy is non-uniform (Van de Ven, 2007). The adopted nomenclature in this
thesis follows the mainstream of the social sciences and is excerpted from multi-
ple works on research methodology (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Van de Ven, 2007;
Creswell, 2014; Easterby-Smith et al., 2015; Robson and McCartan, 2016).
Figure 3.1 shows an analogy of a tree trunk cross-section to explain the philosophy
of science, the relationship between the philosophical position and the researcher’s
actions.
Ontology
Epistemology
Methodology
Methods
Figure 3.1: Tree trunk cross-section resembling philosophies of science, modified
from Easterby-Smith et al. (2015, p. XIV).
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Herein, four nested layers represent the four essential components of research de-
signs and their relationship. Serving the same purpose as inner liners of a tree
trunk, providing steadfastness, (1) ontology and (2) epistemology, underpin the re-
search and represent the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions, but remain invisible
characteristics and are covered in Section 3.1.1. The more visible research charac-
teristics illustrated by the two outer slices of the cross-section (3) methodology and
(4) methods, are outlined by Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2.
3.1.1 Ontology and epistemology
As mentioned above, the selection of ontology and epistemology, determine the po-
sition within the philosophies of science. This thesis adopts the following definitions
of ontology and epistemology.
Definition 5: Ontology summarises a researcher’s assumptions about the
existence of an observable reality and truth (Crotty, 1998;
Van de Ven, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).
Definition 6: Epistemology encompasses the philosophical implications of
the chosen enquiry methods when understanding the nature
of a phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015; Williams,
2016).
Philosophers distinguish several positions, whereby realism and nominalism mark
the ends of the spectrum (Van de Ven, 2007). Realism suggests the existence of a
single, observable truth, whereas nominalism rejects the conception of an objective,
observable truth and understands all facts as created by humans (Blaikie, 2007).
The guiding paradigm selected for this thesis is “engaged scholarship” (Van de Ven,
2007). Constitutive for Van de Ven’s engaged scholarship paradigm is the involve-
ment of the researcher and engagement of practitioners during every stage of the
research process. This paradigm was chosen after observing a wide literature gap
between established evaluation methodologies for ESVs and an alternative social
network perspective. At the same time there is a wealth of knowledge to be har-
nessed from stakeholders, and therefore the decision was made to include them.
Van de Ven (2007, p. 284) argues that “researchers can make more penetrating and
insightful advances to science and practice by obtaining the perspectives of relevant
stakeholders in problem formulation, theory building, research design, and problem
solving than when they perform these research activities alone.” With regard to this
research, the engaged scholarship paradigm reflects the parallel perspectives gleaned
by the entrepreneurship and VC literature review as well as those of entrepreneurs
and VCs as relevant practitioner groups.
Positioning the engaged scholarship paradigm in the philosophical context, Van de
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Ven (2007, p. 37) explains that “[e]ngaged scholarship adopts a critical realist per-
spective, [...] takes an objective ontology, [...] and a subjective epistemology.”
Figure 3.2 illustrates how realism and relativism bracket engaged scholarship which
takes elements from both.
Realism Relativism Nominalism
Legend: Philosphical positions Research enquiry method
Engaged scholarship
Figure 3.2: Spectrum of philosophical positions in relation to selected research
method, own illustration.
The relativist perspective suggests that truth exists but only within a confined con-
text (Baghramian and Carter, 2019). Precisely locating the engaged scholarship
paradigm’s philosophical position allows the researcher to understand the implica-
tions on the study that result from his beliefs.
(a) Ontological stance of this research
Table 3.1 lays the cornerstones of ontological assumptions of the realist, relativist,
and nominalist positions, and illustrates the position of this research among them.
Table 3.1: Ontology of the realist and relativist position, merged from Easterby-
Smith et al. (2015, pp. 47) and Van de Ven (2007, pp. 36).
Realism Relativism
Ontology Objective, positivist. An ob-
servable, external social world
exists independently of human
beliefs.
Subjective, interpretivist. The social
world is not exterior but construed
by people, and knowledge is concep-
tual.
Truth Single truth, static Multiple truths, dynamic
Facts Facts exist and can be revealed. Facts depend observer’s viewpoint
and are too rich to be fully observed.
Van de Ven’s guide reconciles the contrasting philosophical stances. He emphasises
that a researcher can take the view that:
“there is a real world out there, but our attempts to understand it are
severely limited and can only be approximated. This perspective argues
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that all facts, observations, and data are theory-laden and embedded in
language. Moreover, most phenomena in the social world are too rich
to be understood adequately by any single person or perspective. Con-
sequently, any given theoretical model is a partial representation of a
complex phenomenon that reflects the perspective of the model builder.
No form of enquiry is value-free and impartial. Instead, each model and
perspective is value-full.”(Van de Ven, 2007, p. 14)
Regarding ontology, the belief in and recognition of a singular truth, this research
takes a critical realist position which accepts a single truth but rejects the notion
that truth can be attained. Given the study’s context, for the first group of study
subjects, the VCs, perfect information is unattainable. Consequently, the researcher
accepts that the true evaluation, is unattainable and, therefore, assumes that social
networks only proxy1 the holistic evaluation of an ESV while also recognising the rai-
son d’eˆtre of alternative proxies. The literature review and pilot studies conducted
before the actual studies indicated alternative approaches to conduct an evalua-
tion, which would yield different results and consequently, truths. The analogous
assumption of multiple truths similarly applies to the second practitioner group, the
entrepreneurs. Among entrepreneurship researchers the feasibility to make sense
of the inherently serendipitous and chaotic entrepreneurship processes is controver-
sially discussed. Steyaert (2007) suggests that entrepreneurship can be viewed as a
replicable practice of successful opportunity recognition and entrepreneurial execu-
tion, which he calls “entrepreneuring”. Sarasvathy (2001) theorises in her work on
principles of effectuation2 that successful entrepreneurship creates opportunities and
adapts to situations and is an open-ended process with multiple potential outcomes
(Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). This stance aligns with the researcher’s presupposition,
thus, a critical realist position, which allows for realist and relativist tendencies, is
adopted for this thesis.
Revisiting the tree-trunk analogy, the ontology forms the primary basis for research
as it begins with the researcher’s beliefs and the assumptions about what truth re-
search can find. The second layer, the epistemology, captures how primary beliefs
translate into the choice of an enquiry method, which is the strategy to encounter a
research problem. The choice of such methods predetermines the results, therefore,
the researcher ought to be aware of the consequences for the studies results.
1 A proxy is a “measurable variable that is used in place of a variable that cannot be measured.”
Upton and Cook (2014, p. 470). Thus, in this thesis the use of social network metrics (proxy
variables) is examined for its applicability of inferring an ESV’s value and future performance
(unmeasurable variables).
2 Sarasvathy (2001, p. 245) defines effectuation as the opposite of causation whereby causation is
the “processes take a particular effect as given and focus on selecting between means to create
that effect“ and “Effectuation processes take a set of means as given and focus on selecting
between possible effects that can be created with that set of means.”
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(b) Epistemology of this research
In pursuit of objectivity, Van de Ven advocates the use of several data sources
and mixed-method approaches since every perspective adds towards a better under-
standing and is subject to different biases. The discussion about biases due to the
researcher’s influence does only persist in philosophy or social sciences but also in
the natural sciences perspective.
The discussion might be easiest to understand by taking the natural sciences per-
spective, empiricism, which is the strictest form of epistemology (Bogen, 2017).
Researchers who observe naturally occurring or experimentally generated phenom-
ena take measurements and aim to minimise their influence on the results. However,
even empiricists who believe in a single, perfectly attainable truth have to admit
that even the most precise instruments and careful researchers will influence results,
and call it the “observer effect” (Franklin and Perovic, 2019). The underlying idea is
that no matter how carefully and passively a phenomenon is studied, measurements
cause irreducible impact and manipulation. Understanding the observer effect as
part of the engaged scholarship paradigm is important as the results are achieved
through active involvement with the study subjects and are inherently exposed to
the researcher’s biases. To appropriately identify, understand, and mitigate the ef-
fects of the researcher’s actions, the epistemological assumptions of the philosophical
stance need to be revised (Van de Ven, 2007). Table 3.2 lists the epistemological
cornerstones of the realist and relativist position and translates them into concrete
research characteristics and strategies.
Table 3.2: Epistemology of the realist and relativist position, merged from
Easterby-Smith et al. (2015, pp. 47) and Van de Ven (2007, pp. 36).
Realism Relativism
Epistemology Objective. A social world ex-
ists which can be objectively
measured and tested through
inductive verification or deduc-
tive falsification. There is one
appropriate way of measuring
and one correct result.
Subjective. Search for mean-
ing rather than truth. Knowl-
edge can be derived from in-
ductive reasoning. Predeter-
mined methodologies do not
exist. Several approaches to
find truth are feasible.
Aims Discovering, confirming theory Converging, generating theory
Starting point Hypotheses Questions
Execution Hypothesis formulation and
testing, deductive reasoning
Active enquiry, “let the data
speak”, inductive reasoning
Sampling Large n, randomly selected Small n, deliberately selected
Analysis Verification or falsification Triangulation and comparison
Continued on next page
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Realism Relativism
Observer Subjectivist, passive, de-
tached, and independent of
the empirical world, and has
no prior cognitive frameworks
Constructivist, active, en-
gaged, part of the observation,
creator of cognitive frame-
works
Observer’s
interest
Must be concealed and should
not be considered
Is the source of data and
knowledge
Explanations Demonstrate causality Increase understanding
Unit of analysis Reduced to minimum Entire situation or system
Generalisation Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction
Since the epistemology follows the premises of the ontology, the cornerstones listed
in Table 3.2 are jointly set by the ontological and epistemological positions. These
assumptions are now connected to the given research context of this thesis.
As previously mentioned, the literature review identified multiple relevant perspec-
tives, stakeholder groups, and potential approaches. Consequently the research
problem is formulated to include several perspectives which require dedicated re-
search enquiry methods. The resulting five research questions are addressed through
five separate sub-studies and are described in separate chapters as illustrated in Ta-
ble 3.3.
Table 3.3: Chapters and sub-studies
Chapter number Sub-studies
Chapter 4 (1) ESV signalling study, (2) ESV stakeholder study
Chapter 5 (3) ESV social network function study
Chapter 6 (4) ESV evaluation experiment study
Chapter 7 (5) ESV evaluation tool study
Of the four chapters, Chapter 4 contains two sub-studies using a similar methodol-
ogy, the following Chapters 5, 6, and 7 each contain a single study with dedicated
methodologies. The four methodologies for the four chapters vary the research en-
quiry from qualitative and quantitative elements, employing inductive and deductive
reasoning, intending to either discover phenomena or testing hypotheses, while us-
ing small or large samples. Table 3.4 classifies the four chapters with regard to
their epistemological position across important research design and study execution
elements.
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Table 3.4: Epistemological position by chapter
Epistemological stance Realism Relativism
Aims Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Starting point Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Execution Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Sampling Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Analysis Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Observer Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Human interest Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Explanations Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Unit of analysis Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
Generalisation Chapter 6, Chapter 7 Chapter 4, Chapter 5
As encouraged by the engaged scholarship paradigm, the philosophical position is
slightly altered across chapters. Allocating the individual studies to the relevant
philosophical position brings the section on ontology and epistemology to a conclu-
sion. The following methodology Section 3.1.2 and subsequent methods Section 3.2
describe in detail how the chosen enquiry methods vary regarding their aims, start-
ing points, execution, etc., and prepare for the critical evaluation of methods in
Section 3.2.5.
3.1.2 Methodology
The research methodology translates the philosophical stance into a practical guide
for research, and justifies the use of certain methods with the goal of building theory
(Van de Ven, 2007; Robson and McCartan, 2016). A primary goal of this research
project is to explain the phenomenon of growth and performance of ESVs, and their
subsequent evaluation by the private market, more specifically the VCs, through
a social network perspective. A secondary outcome of the study is an improved
understanding of this phenomenon and expanding of theories to make them more
applicable for practitioners. Van de Ven (2007, p. 19) defines a theory as “the
mental image or conceptual framework that is brought to bear on the research prob-
lem.” For this research, such theories are understood as applicable constructs which
can be used by theorists and practitioners. Devising a plan for theory develop-
ment, and thereby the contribution, is an essential step before creating a research
strategy which, when executed, yields the final results. The theory development
process entails crucial decisions which influence research design and questions, con-
cepts, propositions, predictions, and results (Van de Ven, 2007). Figure 3.3 shows a
schematic depiction of the model as suggested by the engaged scholarship paradigm.
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Figure 3.3: Engaged scholarship theory building model, modified from Van de Ven
(2007, p. 10).
During each step in the cyclical theory-building model, researchers seek engagement
with stakeholders to hone the research problem formulation, research questions, and
research design. For this thesis, the procedure adopted was as follows:
• Identifying a real-world problem faced by a stakeholder through communica-
tion with ESVs or VCs.
• Formulating the research problem, research questions, and sub-research ques-
tions
• Exposing the stakeholders to the research problem formulation, research ques-
tions, and sub-research questions and incorporation of their suggestions
• Deciding which method of enquiry to use
• Proposing questions, measures, and models to capture the complexity of the
problem
• Piloting the study with stakeholders and making modifications allowing to
calibrate and initialise the questions, measures, and models
• Gathering and analysing data
• Evaluating results, communicating to stakeholders, and refining the proposed
measures allowing application in a subsequent study
As noted earlier, the nature of the research problem that this thesis seeks to address
requires the use of multiple complementary methods. After the literature review,
and exploratory qualitative signalling and stakeholder sub-studies in Chapter 4, the
research studies branch out into parallel qualitative and quantitative approaches.
Chapter 5 represents an in-depth successive study of ESVs’ business functions that
can be assisted by social networks and is based on Chapter 4, while Chapter 6 quan-
titatively tests ESV evaluation in an experimental setting by using constellations
identified in Chapter 4. Chapter 7 builds onto Chapter 6 and gathers large amounts
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of real-world data to develop an ESV evaluation tool and tests metrics derived in the
previous chapters. Conducting the studies in succession allowed results to inform
subsequent steps. Each study with its dedicated methodology was supported by the
decision matrix shown in Figure 3.4 during the planning phase.
Linear Cyclical . . . iteration
Descriptive Predictive Exploratory . . . enquiry
Inductive Deductive Abductive . . . reasoning
Building Enhancing Testing . . . theory
Figure 3.4: Theory building decisions, own illustration based on Blaikie (2009).
Theory. Scholars can contribute to theory in one of three ways, either by intro-
ducing new theories or through enhancing or testing existing ones (Blaikie, 2009).
Chapter 4 with its two sub-studies aims at enhancing the theory about signalling
between entrepreneurs and VCs as well as relevant stakeholders for ESVs, whereas
Chapter 5 builds new theory by observing archetypical approaches of ESVs to lever-
age their networks for specific business functions. Chapter 6 enhances existing theory
by analysing pre-defined social network metrics and their effect on ESV evaluation
in an online survey, whereas Chapter 7 tests theory and a set of metrics from the
previous chapter with real-world data.
Reasoning. Abduction, induction, and deduction are the three main forms of rea-
soning identified by philosophers (Pierce, 1877; Van de Ven, 2007). Inductive reason-
ing is a bottom-up approach of deriving a generalisation from empirical observations
(Van de Ven, 2007). By contrast, deductive reasoning is a top-down approach which
begins with a generalisation and tests its applicability to individual cases (Mounce,
1997; Van de Ven, 2007). Abduction is a hypothetical inference which is tested, then
altered by newly generated understanding, and exposed to further testing (Mounce,
1997). Across the four studies conducted in this thesis, the reasoning is inductive in
Chapter 4 and 5, deductive in Chapter 6, and abductive in Chapter 7. The forms of
reasoning were chosen to reflect the increased focus as studies proceed. The initial,
inductive studies take empirical evidence from practitioners, “allows the data to
speak”, and aims to increase understand while building a foundation for subsequent
studies. A deductive study described in Chapter 6 tests how existing theories apply
to the established context. The final study follows abductive reasoning as it takes a
new form of evidence while aiming to apply the previously established theories in a
probabilistic description of the data.
Enquiry. Three different forms of enquiry which yield exploratory, descriptive, and
explanatory results can be differentiated (Van de Ven, 2007; Buchanan and Bryman,
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2011). The exploratory theory-building process starts by observing and gathering
empirical data through the perspective of either a pre-defined or entirely new the-
ory and ends with a description of the observations (Christensen, 2006; Van de Ven,
2007). The study in Chapter 4 follows an exploratory process to lay the founda-
tion for subsequent research. By contrast, descriptive forms of theory can build
onto an exploratory theory by gathering larger amounts of data and verifying it
through testing of hypotheses or recognising reoccurring patterns (Easterby-Smith
et al., 2015). The studies in Chapter 5 and 6 are descriptive enquiries, the former
identifies patterns whereas the latter tests theory based on hypotheses. To advance
descriptive theories, a construct can be abstracted to allow an explanation of a new
phenomenon through a revised theory. Such an explanatory study is performed in
Chapter 7. The the step-wise consolidation process along the sequence of studies
in this work, increases the descriptive potential increases from exploratory, over de-
scriptive, to explanatory research (Christensen, 2006; Blaikie, 2009).
Iteration. Additional studies can refine newly built, enhanced, or tested theory
through a linear or a cyclical iteration with the aim of further generalisation (Van de
Ven, 2007). A cyclical iteration makes minor controlled changes to the theory and
models upon repetition of the study in the same context. The results are subse-
quently compared (Van de Ven, 2007). In contrast, a linear model can make con-
trolled changes, but applies the revised theory to a different context and compares
the results (Blaikie, 2009). In all studies from Chapter 4 to 7, theories are iterated
linearly, changing models between studies and subjecting them to different sources
of data, and involving new stakeholders.
Henceforth, after the extensive discussion of the thesis’s philosophical stance and
the methodology, the research design and strategy can be developed.
3.2 Methods and research design
The next section explains the higher-level considerations for the research design of
the studies described in Chapters 4 to 7. Developing a research design results in “a
plan for collecting and analysing evidence that will make it possible for investigators
to answer whatever question he or she posed.” (Ragin, 1994, p. 194).
As mentioned before, this thesis applies multiple methods in sequence. Before select-
ing appropriate methods, the research questions have to be defined. Onwuegbuzie
and Leech (2006, p. 475) state that “research questions in mixed-methods studies
are vitally important because they, in large part, dictate the type of research design
used, the sampling strategy and sample size, and the type of instruments admin-
istered as well as the data analysis techniques”. Of the following Sections, 3.2.1
states the research questions, Section 3.2.2 explains and justifies the mixed-methods
approach, and Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 differentiate between qualitative and quanti-
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tative methods.
3.2.1 Research questions
The following summary shows the five research questions that are answered across
the Chapters 4 to 7:
Research Question 1: How do ESVs signal to VCs and how do VCs eval-
uate the signal?
(Chapter 4 - signalling study)
Research Question 2: Which stakeholders are present in ESVs’ social
networks?
(Chapter 4 - stakeholder study)
Research Question 3: How and in support of which business functions
can ESVs leverage their social networks?
(Chapter 5 - social network function study)
Research Question 4: Which social network constellations are perceived
most favourably by VCs and entrepreneurs?
(Chapter 6 - ESV evaluation study)
Research Question 5: Which social network data can proxy the fundrais-
ing success and fundraising frequency of ESVs?
(Chapter 7 - ESV evaluation tool)
The development of individual research questions will be discussed in the respec-
tive chapters and follows the gradually increasing focus on social network signals
in the ESV evaluation context. To answer the research questions, suitable research
methods were selected allowing for multifaceted perspectives on the topic of ESV
evaluation. Fittingly, a mixed-method approach reflects the process of ESV evalua-
tion, which can comprise of a multifaceted analysis, as was identified in the literature
review.
3.2.2 Methods: a mixed-methods approach
Mixed-method research deploys a combination of qualitative and quantitative meth-
ods (Robson and McCartan, 2016). Mixing methods is a relatively recent method-
ological advance starting in the 1980’s (Creswell, 2014). To the present day, method-
ologists argue about the combination of methods which entails implementing con-
trasting ontological and epistemological positions into the research design (Tashakkori
and Teddlie, 2010).
On the critics’ side, researchers state that “because the two paradigms do not study
the same phenomena, quantitative and qualitative methods cannot be combined”
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(Sale et al., 2002, p. 43). Moreover, accepting one paradigm “precludes the other
just as surely as belief in a round world precludes belief in a flat one” (Guba, 1987,
p. 31). Opponents further criticise the practicability of using mixed-methods be-
cause researchers might lack the breadth of skills, face timing issues when gathering
and analysing data, and fail to balance and integrate the qualitative and quantita-
tive findings (Bryman, 2006, 2012).
Proponents of mixed-methods counter that only mixed-methods facilitate triangu-
lation and effective capturing of multiple perspectives. Additionally, biases of the
researcher, data, model, or method can cancel out if mixed methods are used (Math-
ison, 1988). Furthermore, advocates insist that while triangulation may not lead to
converging results but instead to inconsistencies and even contradicting results, this
should be seen as a strength of the approach for it better represents the real-world
phenomenon (Denzin, 1978; Van de Ven, 2007). Consequently, the study of particu-
larly complex, multidimensional phenomena warrants the introduction of additional
methods (Robson and McCartan, 2016).
In the context of the thesis, the constellations of ESV networks are best represented
by quantitative metrics, whereas the communicative element and signalling process
between ESVs and VCs can be better captured qualitatively. Table 3.5 summarises
benefits of the mixed-method approach.
Table 3.5: Benefits of mixed-method approaches, modified from Creswell (2014)
and Robson and McCartan (2016)
Terminology Benefit
Triangulation Conducting studies based on multiple sources allow the re-
searcher to moderate and increase the validity of results
by partially or entirely confirming or disconfirming findings
across studies.
Completeness Researching a phenomenon through qualitative and quanti-
tative perspectives more accurately capture its complexity.
Offsetting
weaknesses
Each method has strengths and weaknesses which re-
searchers can mitigate by drawing on the strengths of both
methods.
Different and more
refined research
questions
Exercising multiple methods allows answering and honing
in on a broader set of research questions.
(1) How ...? → (2) How much ...?
Explaining findings Subsequent answering of qualitative and quantitative re-
search allows researchers to not only learn from previous
research but also stress-test earlier results.
Continued on next page
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Terminology Benefit
Illustration of data Qualitative and quantitative findings can augment each
other and paint a more colourful picture. Bryman (2006,
p. 106) refers to this mechanism as putting “meat on the
bones”.
Instrument
development and
testing
Through immersing in research, the researcher learns about
the details which are most likely invisible to an outsider.
Hence an exploratory qualitative study might find a mea-
sure or instrument which can inspire a future study to test
the measure.
Interdisciplinarity Often, a method gradually establishes as a gold-standard.
Challenging existing perspectives, and even using methods
commonly applied in other fields, can yield richer and un-
expected results.
As a consequence of the benefits, methodologists have started embracing mixed-
methods and defined an array of research methods which can be combined. Table 3.6
lists a sample of such methods.
Table 3.6: Overview of research methods and data sources merged from Easterby-
Smith et al. (2015, pp. 47), Yin (2013, p. 9), and Van de Ven (2007,
p. 30, p. 187).
Easterby-Smith et al. Yin Van de Ven
• Action research • Direct observation • Direct observation
• Archival research • Archival records • Archival records
• Ethnography • Interviews • Interviews
• Narrative method • Participant observation • Questionnaires
• Case study method • Case studies • Web analysis
–Longitudinal • Online survey • Third party-records
–Comparative • Physical artefacts
• Grounded theory • Documentation
Combinations of the methods and sources mentioned in Table 3.6 have been pre-
viously used in social science contexts and literature (Bryman, 2006). This thesis
leverages three methods, case studies (Chapter 4 and 5), a quasi-experiment survey
(Chapter 6), and an archival, secondary data analysis (Chapter 7).
Creswell (2014) and Robson and McCartan (2016) emphasise that correct timing
and sequence of studies is important for research that exercises mixed-methods,
whereby Creswell differentiates between six designs as summarised in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Mixed-method designs, summarised from Creswell (2014).
Design Explanation
Concurrent/
parallel
A single-phase project which conducts qualitative and quantita-
tive studies at the same time and converges to one interpretation.
Explanatory
sequential
A two-phase project which starts by collecting quantitative data
and a subsequent qualitative study follows up to explain.
Exploratory
sequential
A two-phase project and the opposite of an explanatory design.
A qualitative study scopes a phenomenon and the subsequent
quantitative study tests generalisability of initial findings.
Embedded A single- or two-phase method which gives priority to one form,
either qualitative or quantitative, and at some point gathers the
other form of data which can occur concurrently (single-phase)
or sequentially (two-phase).
Transformative A two-phase design conducted in a sequence based on a pre-
defined “transformation framework” answering of qualitative and
quantitative research allows researchers to not only learn from
previous research but also stress-test previous results.
Multi-phase A multi-phase design can use a combination of concurrent and
sequential data gathering phases across individual projects which
can both explore and or explain previous results.
According to Creswell’s terminology, this study employs a multi-phase design, as
illustrated by Figure 3.5.
Chapter 4: ESV signalling and stakeholders (RQ 1&2)
Chapter 5: ESV social network function (RQ 3)
Chapter 6: ESV evaluation experiment (RQ 4)
Chapter 7: ESV evaluation tool (RQ 5)
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
informs builds to
builds to
converge converge
Legend: Review and summary chapters Quantitative Qualitative
Note: Research question (RQ)
Figure 3.5: Mixed-method design, own illustration.
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After two exploratory sub-studies in Chapter 4, the results act as the foundation
for Chapter 5 (same method, sequential). Results in Chapter 5 inform Chapter 6
(different method, exploratory sequential) which in turn suggests the metrics to be
used in Chapter 7 (same method, sequential) after which point the results converge
with Chapter 5.
Three considerations influenced the decision to use mixed-methods for this research.
Firstly, evaluating research methodology literature and weighing the benefits men-
tioned above against the introduced complexity warrant the use of multiple meth-
ods. Secondly, mixed-methods are thoroughly embedded and encouraged by the
engaged scholarship paradigm. Lastly, the common use in existing social network
studies demonstrates the feasibility of the approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010;
Williams and Shepherd, 2017). Nonetheless, the criticism of mixed-method ap-
proaches was taken into consideration when choosing the specific qualitative and
quantitative methods.
Hereafter, the concrete qualitative and quantitative methods are briefly outlined,
and further details of the study design are mentioned at the beginning of each re-
spective chapter to avoid confusion across studies.
3.2.3 Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods include all those enquiries which gather non-numerical data
(Van de Ven, 2007). For this research, the selected enquiry method for the quali-
tative studies is the case study method, which is an empirical enquiry suitable for
exploratory studies (Yin, 2013; Robson and McCartan, 2016). Yin (2013, p. 15) de-
fines the case study method as an “empirical enquiry that investigates a particular
contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context, es-
pecially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly
evident.” Case studies allow application in situations where there are “many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources
of evidence” (Yin, 2013, p. 16). Yin’s guide suggests that researchers can structure
the enquiry as a single case study or multiple case studies and based on single or
varying units of analysis. Figure 3.6 visualises the decision-space.
Multiple units of analysis
Single unit of analysis
Type 3 Type 4
Type 1 Type 2
Single-case design Multiple-case design
Figure 3.6: Design variations of case studies, modified from Yin (2013).
Both studies in Chapter 4 and 5 focus on ESV’s social networks from an en-
trepreneurial and VC perspective whereby the former study has exploratory and
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the latter explanatory tendencies.
The researcher’s expectation before conducting the exploratory signalling study is
that ESVs employ a broad array of different strategies, warranting a multiple-case
design, which can capture differences through cross-case comparison. For the sig-
nalling study in Chapter 4, case study interviews with founders concentrate on the
ESVs’ signalling strategy as the unit of analysis and determine how ESVs signal to
investors. VC case study interviews use the signal reception of VCs (first unit of
analysis) and aim to understand how VCs receive and evaluate signals they receive
from ESVs (second unit of analysis). According to Yin’s case study variation matrix
in Figure 3.6, the signalling study is of Type 4.
The stakeholder study is inspired by the initial results of the signalling study, which
shows that social networks are an important component of the signalling process.
The stakeholder study uses case study interviews with multiple founders to under-
stand how ESVs form social networks and who inhibits positions in these networks
(single unit of analysis). According to the case study matrix the study is of Type 2.
As the results of the exploratory signalling and stakeholder sub-studies confirm the
preconceived notion of a variety of approaches undertaken by ESVs, the multiple-
case nature is maintained for the subsequent social network function study in Chap-
ter 5. As for the stakeholder study, the focus is solely on the ESVs’ perspective,
and identifies which business functions can leverage social networks (single unit of
analysis). Thus, those business functions which can be augmented or performed by
social networks are considered social network functions. According to Yin’s case
study variation matrix, the social network function is of Type 2.
(a) Interviews
The researcher gathers data for the sub-studies in Chapter 4 through interviews with
entrepreneurs and VCs. The interview follows a semi-structured format, based on a
pre-fabricated questionnaire. For Chapter 5, unstructured interviews are conducted
in the form of a pitch to the researcher by the entrepreneur which is common practice
in the VC industry (Kupor, 2019). The sampling is explained in the respective
chapters and Appendix C includes a complete list of interviewed participants3.
(b) Document content analysis
For the sub-studies in Chapter 4 founders are asked to share documentation they
would usually share with VCs, such as slide decks, and other supplementary docu-
ments such as business plans, academic and white papers, industry reports, letters
of intent, news and media articles, and financial forecast. Beyond that, during the
interview, founders create a document, a visual representation of their social net-
work containing the relevant stakeholders. For the study in Chapter 5 in addition
3 Appendix C can be found on pages 241 to 247.
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to the the interviews in the form of a pitch, further supplementary documents are
requested from the founders, as in the studies described in Chapter 4. A detailed
description of the sampling strategy, data gathering, coding, and analysis procedure
follows in Section 5.3.
(c) Qualitative data analysis
One approach to reduce large volumes of textual data to a manageable level is to
use a coding method. Coding classifies raw data into categories of incidents (Van de
Ven, 2007). The “Gioia method” summarises raw data into first-order concepts,
second-order themes, and aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013). The Gioia
method is adopted for the studies in Chapter 4 and 54. The first step involves
sorting the obtained information to the relevant questions. This measure ensures
thematic order among the answers as the semi-structured approach allows intervie-
wees to change, revise, or reiterate answers throughout the interview. The second
step summarises duplicate or similar mentions within a case study. The third step
involves a cross-case comparison which identifies overarching topics that were re-
labelled and categorised by the researcher. The final step creates an overview of
all the gathered data to allow for statistical evaluation. Since the coding procedure
involves making conscious modification of the raw data the resulting codes were re-
viewed by the stakeholders interviewed for the studies to maintain a balance between
simplification and and oversimplification
3.2.4 Quantitative methods
Quantitative methods include all methods which gather numerical data, including
those that convert from qualitative into quantitative formats (Van de Ven, 2007).
Methodologists differentiate non-experimental and experimental research designs
(Creswell, 2014; Mertler, 2015). The ESV evaluation experiment study in Chapter 6
follows an experimental design. In Chapter 7, the ESV evaluation tool development
study, has a non-experimental design. As experimental designs are more complex,
this section first explains non-experimental designs and builds up to the experimental
designs.
(a) Non-experimental research designs
In non-experimental designs, variables are not manipulated but instead measured
as they naturally occur (Gay et al., 2012). Non-experimental designs differentiate
in descriptive research, correlational research, and causal-comparative research. A
misconception of such studies, especially the predictive studies, is that results imply
a causation which is incorrect, correlation 6= causation (Mertler, 2015). Table 3.8
4 The exact coding procedure is schematically illustrated by Figure D.1 in Appendix D on page 247
and demonstrated for an exemplary code in Appendix D.2 on page 248.
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summarises descriptive research, correlational research, and causal-comparative re-
search designs.
Table 3.8: Non-experimental research designs
Design Description
Descriptive
research
In descriptive studies, a researcher observes a phenomenon and
does not influence the study subjects, but instead observes and
interprets. Two common forms of descriptive research are ob-
servational research, which count occurrences of a phenomenon,
and survey research which administers a questionnaire to partic-
ipants. Survey research can be conducted through face-to-face
interviews, handouts, via telephone, via e-mail, or web-based
(Mertler, 2015). An example in the studies context could be
to count how many VCs engage with an entrepreneur during a
demo day and observe the near term fundraising success of the
ESV.
Causal-
comparative
studies
Causal-comparative studies compare differences that occur across
two or more groups and aim to find causes for observable conse-
quences based on one treatment variable (Gay et al., 2012). This
design retrospectively analyses situations and is therefore referred
to as “ex post facto” or “after-the-fact” design. (Mertler, 2015,
p. 122). An example in the studies context could analyse ESVs
with headquarters either in the UK or US and their fundraising
success measured in fundraising amount.
Correlational
studies
The third type of non-experimental design aims to discover re-
lationships between one or more independent variable and a de-
pendent variable based on existing data or own measurements
obtained from a single group. The focus is on the direction and
magnitude of the relationship, whereby a relationship exists if
variables covary or corelate (Gay et al., 2012). The two con-
crete forms of correlational studies are explanatory correla-
tional studies and predictive correlational studies. Both
designs explain past events, measurements, or behaviours, and
aim to predict these based on separate events, measurements,
or behaviours (Mertler, 2015). An example in the studies con-
text could be an entrepreneur’s experience measured in years and
fundraising success measured in fundraising amount.
According to Mertler’s terminology, the study in Chapter 7 follows an explanatory
correlation design. It aims to find correlations between social network characteristics
(multiple independent variables) of ESVs belonging to one industry (single group)
and their fundraising success measured in frequency of fundraises and fundraising
amounts (two dependent variables). Understanding the evolution of ESVs’ social
networks requires gathering longitudinal data from a social media platform, private
company databases, and websites to infer correlations. A detailed description of the
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data sources, software used for data mining, cleaning, analysis, and visualisation
follows in Section 7.3.5.
(b) Experimental research designs
In experimental studies, the researcher applies a treatment and studies its effect on
participants or systems. Four different designs, pre-experimental, quasi-experimental,
true-experimental, and single-subject, can be distinguished (Mertler, 2015). Con-
trary to non-experimental designs, experimental designs can reveal causation, a true
cause and effect relationship. In these studies, the researcher selectively applies the
independent variable, also referred to as causal, experimental, or treatment vari-
able5 and measures the dependent variable, also called effect or post-test variable6.
Table 3.9 summarises the four different experimental research designs.
Table 3.9: Experimental research designs
Design Description
Pre-
experimental
design
This study design does not control for extraneous variables and
participant characteristics or predisposition before the treatment.
Furthermore, a control group and is not required and conse-
quently the study design is not considered as reliable (Mertler,
2015).
Single-subject
design
In this form of design, one study subject is exposed to treatments
while controlling for extraneous variables (Creswell, 2014).
(Quasi-)
experimental
design
These forms of designs control for extraneous factors and have
at least one control group. Quasi-experimental and experimen-
tal designs, both sample randomly but differ in the assignment.
Sampling denotes the process of choosing participants, and it is
random if every member of the population has equal chances of
being selected. Random sampling is a condition for both types of
design. Assignment occurs after the sampling and describes the
process of assigning participants to different study-groups which
is classified as random if every participant has equal chances to
be in any group (Mertler, 2015). In their influential work, Camp-
bell and Stanley (1963, p. 2) define a quasi-experiment as “[a]
research design involving an experimental approach but where
random assignment to treatment and comparison groups has not
been used”. Thus, experimental designs require random assign-
ment, whereas quasi-experimental designs do not (Mertler, 2015).
The study in Chapter 6 is quasi-experimental survey for, entrepreneurs, VC, and
a control group which tasks participants to evaluate ESVs based on social network
constellations (treatment variables). The details of the sampling strategy and the
5 For this study, the independent variable is referred to as treatment variable.
6 For this study, the dependent variable is referred to as effect variable.
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data analysis are mentioned in Section 6.3.2. The final considerations on the design
of quantitative studies are the types of measurement scales and the data analysis.
(c) Quantitative measurement scales
Robson and McCartan (2016) recommend researchers to chose measurement scales
before gathering data as scales must reflect the nature of the available data and
the required level of detail to make inferences. As scale choice directly impacts the
results, a dedicated review section for each study first defines metrics and variables
and second justifies the selection and discusses implied limitations. Such scales
can be differentiated in nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales (Stevens, 1946).
Table 3.10 explains the scales in use across the studies and provides examples.
Table 3.10: Fundamental levels of quantitative measurement scales, based on
Stevens (1946) and Creswell (2014).
Scale Description Example Studies (Chapters)
Nominal Named, categorical variable
scale, no implicit order
Munich, Lon-
don, Boston
Evaluation experiment (6)
Evaluation tool (7)
Ordinal Named, categorical variable
scale, implicit order
High, medium,
low
Evaluation tool (7)
Interval Numerical, ordered scale,
known distances
Likert-scale,
dates
Evaluation experiment (6)
Evaluation tool (7)
Ratio Numerical, ordered scale,
known distances, true zero
Rational num-
bers, prices
Evaluation experiment (6)
Evaluation tool (7)
(d) Quantitative data analysis
The quantitative data analysed for the ESV evaluation study in Chapter 6 and ESV
evaluation tool in Chapter 7 used measures of central tendency, distributions such
as the normal distributions, and regression models such as ordinary least squares
(OLS). Moreover, additional measures of nominal association such as “Crame´r’s V”
(Crame´r, 1946, pp. 31-42; Blaikie, 2003, pp. 101) and “Theil’s U” (Theil, 1958,
pp. 31-42; Bliemel, 1973) were used to analyse the binary variables across the stud-
ies. These measures of association are already introduced in Chapter 4 where they
were used to quantitatively evaluate the obtained codes.
This section concludes the research development description, which hereafter is crit-
ically reviewed for its limitations.
3.2.5 Research strategy evaluation
This section evaluates the trustworthiness of the research design, the quality of the
execution, and limitations of the chosen research methods. The concept of research
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validity and reliability were first introduced by Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 76)
who collected “aspects of trustworthiness” of studies which were later complemented
by Cook and Campbell (1976, 1979) and Guba and Lincoln (1981).
As shown in Table 3.11, Guba and Lincoln (1981) find similar criteria for the realist
and relativist position but dissimilar nomenclature.
Table 3.11: Aspects of trustworthiness, modified from Guba (1981, p. 80).
Aspect Realist term Relativist term
Truth value Internal validity Credibility
Applicability External validity, Transferability
generalisability
Consistency Reliability Dependability
Neutrality Objectivity Confirmability
For the purpose of the assessment of the research design the realist terminology is
adopted.
Internal validity. The criterion measures the confidence in the plausibility of find-
ings drawn from an enquiry. If the research enquiry follows a correct cause-and-effect
relationship, it achieves credibility and internal validity (Van de Ven, 2007). The
stakeholders commented on study designs before the researcher conducted the actual
research to ensure the internal validity of this work. Metrics which the researcher
introduced to quantify ESVs’ social network characteristics have either been pre-
viously used in the same context or were borrowed from separate industries where
their applicability has been tested. However, a conflict was identified, which results
from a side-effect of the engaged scholarship paradigm. While contradicting stake-
holder views can enrich the understanding of the phenomenon, such opposing views
can be hard to reconcile. The disagreement of stakeholders and partially inconclu-
sive results present a challenging task for the researcher. Nevertheless, Van de Ven
emphasises that advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and in this thesis, areas of
disagreement are highlighted and contrasting views mentioned.
External validity. This criterion evaluates the possibility to apply models or
results in different contexts, such as studies with other participant groups, firms
with different maturity level, geography, or industry association (Yin, 2013). A
direct benefit of the mixed-method approach and sequential study design, which
alters participants, methods, and geographies, is that results can inform subsequent
research. The mixed method approach also highlights inconsistencies or inapplica-
bilities which are uncovered during the study (Van de Ven, 2007). Such multi-stage
research which scrutinises previous results with each study can enhance external
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validity. Nonetheless, the results may have limited applicability to other finance or
entrepreneurial domains. After all, a primary motivation for this research lies in the
inapplicability of evaluation methods which are not specifically designed for ESVs.
Thus, it is questionable how much insight models developed in this thesis are, for
instance, in later-stage firms or SMEs.
Dependability. A dependable research design features construct validity and yields
reliable results. For the purpose of this research, dependability is the extent to
which chosen metrics operationalise7 ESV evaluation (Cook and Campbell, 1979;
Gay et al., 2012; Robson and McCartan, 2016). This research design aims to proxy
ESV evaluation. As the ESV’s value and future performance cannot be measured
directly, the method is vulnerable to dependability issues since, by definition, the
proxy never perfectly describes reality (Van de Ven, 2007). This issue is mitigated by
employing a mixed-method approach and by triangulating the phenomenon. Con-
stant engagement with experienced stakeholders ensures the dependability of results.
Confirmability. If future research could replicate results by repeating the study,
the research design is confirmable. For the studies in this thesis, specific measures
were taken to enhance confirmability by documenting and standardising the research
procedure. Firstly, before conducting the studies, the interview procedure for the
sub-studies described in Chapters 4 and 5 were piloted. Similarly, the online survey
described in Chapter 6 was tested in dry runs with a variety of candidates. As a
result, alterations can be performed before, instead of during individual studies. Sec-
ondly, the qualitative surveys are conducted by following an interview protocol and
questionnaire, which includes a summary of the participants’ position, experience,
and other information. Asking participants for such information allows to better
control for factors such as their profession, industry, or demographics. Documenting
the data gathering during the enquiry is important as the study participants retro-
spectively self-report potentially biased recollections. By relaying the gathered data
back to participants and giving them the chance to clarify, misunderstandings can
be avoided, however, potentially biased reporting remains an issue. Consequences
could be found in common-method variance that occurs when a study subject repre-
sents the endogenous and exogenous parameter at the same time which is often the
case in social network research (Posakoff et al., 2003; Aral and Walker, 2011; Hogg,
2010). The research design intends to study multiple cases and reveal inconsistencies
7 Operationalisation is the “process of strictly defining variables into measurable factors. The
process defines fuzzy concepts and allows them to be measured, empirically and quantitatively”
(Shuttleworth, 2008, p. 1). To better understand the dependability of an operationalisation, an
analogy can be found in the natural sciences. In natural sciences, researchers’ results depend on
the use of the appropriate measuring device, a thermometer to measure temperature, a ruler to
measure distances, etc. Measuring with inappropriate equipment might yield results, however,
the results are not dependable.
66 Chapter 3. Research foundation
through cross-case comparison. Lastly, the programming code of the tool developed
in Chapter 7, the code to mine and clean data for the tool building study, as well as
all of the statistical analysis scripts, are referenced in full where used. This ensures
confirmability as it allows future researchers to confirm the study in other settings.
3.3 Chapter summary
In summary, five sub-studies across four chapters have been planned according to
the engaged scholarship paradigm. The resulting research designs equip a reflective
researcher with the tools to execute the research. The mixed-method approach incor-
porates typical VC industry practices and focuses exclusively on ESVs to precisely
address the identified research gap. As demonstrated by previous studies, using
guidance from the engaged scholarship paradigm in conjunction with a comprehen-
sive literature review helps bridge the theory-practice gap and yields practitioner-
oriented, tangible results (Aguinis et al., 2014; Williams and Shepherd, 2017). The
extensive considerations of the researcher’s philosophical stance, paired with incor-
porating external stakeholder input mitigated biases, whilst exploring fundamental
research gaps.
4. ESV signalling and stakehold-
ers
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4.1 Chapter introduction
This chapter describes the first exploratory study which is comprised of two sub-
studies; firstly a signalling study and secondly a follow-on ESV stakeholder study.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the position of the study in the context of this thesis.
Chapter 4: ESV signalling and stakeholders (RQ 1&2)
Chapter 5: ESV social network function (RQ 3)
Chapter 6: ESV evaluation experiment (RQ 4)
Chapter 7: ESV evaluation tool (RQ 5)
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
informs builds to
builds to
converge converge
Research objectives:
Increase the understanding of ESV signal emitting and VC receiving
process; increase the understanding of the rationale and effectiveness
of ESV signalling, and identify the relevant stakeholders in ESVs’
social networks
Signalling study, data set 1:
34 ESV and 31 VC case studies giving two perspectives on the
signalling process between ESVs and VCs
Research Question 1
Research Question 2
ESV stakeholder study, data set 2:
Eight case studies researching ESV social network stakeholders
time
Figure 4.1: Data, research questions, and research objectives of Chapter 4, own
illustration.
The following two research questions are answered as illustrated in Figure 4.1 by
analysing two separately gathered data sets.
Research Question 1: How do ESVs signal to VCs and how do VCs eval-
uate the signal?
Research Question 2: Which stakeholders are present in ESVs’ social
networks?
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4.2 Conceptual development and literature review
The next section provides the conceptual background of the two sub-studies and in-
troduces the specific literature, building on the foundation provided by the broader
review given in Chapter 2. The signalling literature describes the existing knowledge
on signalling processes, including the signalled content, between ESVs and VCs. As
the literature review will demonstrate, little empirical evidence exists upon which a
study could build. Thus, an exploratory study approach was chosen. Furthermore,
during this initial study of the signalling process and content, ESVs’ social networks
are identified as one significant component. As social network signalling is a sub-
category of the entire content which ESVs can signal, the literature review hones in
further on this particular signalling component.
The identification of social network signalling in the first study thus inspired a sec-
ond sub-study. Moreover, the signalling literature lacks substance on social network
signalling. Drawing on separate literature streams on ecosystems and strategic al-
liances, ESVs’ social networks can be understood better, as the literature streams
describe ESVs’ engagement with affiliated stakeholders. ESVs, in turn, can signal
these affiliations to VCs. For the second sub-study, applied methods are similar in
research design and yield convergent results. Hence the literature reviews, study
designs, and analyses are presented in parallel for both studies, albeit this does not
reflect the precise chronological order in which the studies were conducted.
4.2.1 ESV signalling
To answer Research Question 1, this section sheds light on the existing literature,
which describes the signalling process from the first contact between an entrepreneur
and a VC until receiving the investment. A “warm” or “cold” introduction initiates
the signalling process between the parties. A warm introduction requires a third
party, a common acquaintance, and can be facilitated in-person or electronically
via email, LinkedIn, or other communication platforms. In contrast, “cold” intro-
duction does not involve a third party and can occur in-person for instance during
the event, or getting acquainted serendipitously, e.g. “sitting next to each other on
a plane”, or via electronic outreach (Zhang et al., 2008; Wang, 2016; Miles, 2017;
Kupor, 2019). Ramsinghani (2014) states that initiating contact is not only under-
taken by ESVs who seek the investment, but it is similarly common for VCs to reach
out to promising investment candidates. From the VCs’ perspective reaching out
creates outbound deal-flow, whereas entrepreneurs reaching out to a VC is known
as inbound deal-flow (Ramsinghani, 2014).
As soon as contact between ESV and VC is established, the founder can signal in-
formation by sending documents for review and “pitching” to the VC. The pitch can
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take place during a phone or video call, face-to-face meeting, or a presentation to a
broader audience (Brooks et al., 2014)1. The main purpose of the initial pitch is for
the entrepreneur to introduce the investment opportunity to the VC to attract in-
terest and rebut the VC’s concerns and uncertainty (Clark, 2008). To communicate
their message, entrepreneurs can use verbal and non-verbal presentation elements,
the latter by a slide-show or product presentation and public relations (PR) material
(Brooks et al., 2014). After the pitch, and in case both parties are interested in con-
tinuing the conversation, the entrepreneur often provides supplementing documents
for review, and schedules further conversations (Croce et al., 2017).
Once VCs receive the information, a due diligence process begins, which VC funds
usually structure as a stage-gate process (Roberts and Barley, 2004; Baker et al.,
2018). The multi-phased process begins with “light” analysis during which addi-
tional information can be gathered for instance through online-searches and further
discussions with ESV’s founders, employees, or collaborators. During the initial
analysis by the VC, often an Associate-level employee of the VC firm will gather in-
formation and present the findings during a regular meeting with colleagues known
as the “investment meeting” (BVCA, 2012; Ramsinghani, 2014; Huang, 2018). A
positive response during the investment meeting means passing a stage-gate in the
investment process, which leads to further, deeper due diligence. For subsequent
investment-decision stages, thorough due diligence is performed which could, for in-
stance, entail contacting existing clients of the ESV, technical analysis of the product
or patents, or background checks (Campbell, 2003; Ramsinghani, 2014). Based on
the due diligence, VCs decide about the investment opportunity and contractual
work begins, at which point the scope of this study ends. It goes to show that
throughout the pre-investment diligence active and passive signals are emitted by
the prospective investment, the ESV, which are evaluated by everyone at the VC
fund who is involved in the process.
The review of past empirical studies revealed that the focus of the signalling process
is on the communication and sentiment in the engagement process between en-
trepreneur and VC (Yusuf, 2011; Spinuzzi et al., 2014; Galbraith et al., 2014). Few
studies have been conducted which focus on the exchanged verbal and non-verbal
content during pitches and the pre-investment due diligence phase (Clark, 2008).
Notable exceptions are Douglas et al. (2014), Spinuzzi et al. (2014), and Croce et al.
(2017) who found signal elements that match the investment criteria outlined in
Table 2.22. Some of these studies analysed the importance of the signalled content
1 Equity and product crowdfunding campaigns might involve only “online” signalling. Moreover,
investors and investee are not necessarily introduced in person. However, these small finan-
cial contributions, often made by private, unaccredited investors, have fundamentally different
underlying dynamics which are beyond the study’s scope (Ahlers et al., 2015).
2 Table 2.2 on page 22 summarised qualitative and quantitative ESV investment criteria.
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compared to its delivery; their results emphasised the importance of the quality of
the delivery (Clark, 2008; Spinuzzi et al., 2014). During the signalling process, VCs
rely primarily on experience and “gut-instinct” and use few tools (Huang, 2018;
Pitchbook, 2018). Consequently, the process is unstructured, mainly supported by
spreadsheet and word processing software (Huang, 2018; Gompers et al., 2020).
A negative side-effect of the lack of structure paired with the uncertainty is slow
decision-making, as VCs, who can become overwhelmed by the complexity, might
“drag their feet” (Marks et al., 2009, p. 132). For the entrepreneur, slow decision-
making implies direct risk, having to deal with multiple VCs at a time, and non value
adding request of sometimes arbitrary information by VCs in search for conviction
(Ramsinghani, 2014). Previous studies have investigated problems in the signalling
process from a communication perspective (Galbraith et al., 2014). However, an
analysis of the precise content of what entrepreneurs are signalling to VCs remains
a gap in the literature (Drover et al., 2017).
As the results of the signalling study indicate a social network component that is
signalled, multiple literature streams are reviewed to identify details.
4.2.2 ESV stakeholders
To answer Research Question 2, this section introduces additional literature which
focuses on the stakeholders in ESV networks which make up the content to be sig-
nalled during a pitch and subsequent due diligence. As Section 2.3.1 has shown,
ESVs are known to engage with their social networks to procure financial, human,
and social resources. Hitherto, empirical studies focus on one or at most a few
types of strategic partnerships and the respective stakeholders of ESVs. To date,
there is no comprehensive study which identifies an exhaustive set of stakeholders
which occur in ESV networks. Furthermore, the constellation of stakeholders around
the ESVs from a social network analysis perspective is unclear. Extant literature
presents reasons for ESVs to engage with stakeholders including procuring resources,
attaining formal and informal advice, and growing the ESV’s network through in-
troductions to additional stakeholders (Lerner and Malmendier, 2013; Armanios
et al., 2017; Chatterji et al., 2019). Through stakeholder engagement, ESVs seek
to complement their business functions such as strategy, finance, marketing, human
resource management, sales, and R&D (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Gulati et al.,
2011; Huang et al., 2012; Spender et al., 2017; Chatterji et al., 2019). As Table 4.1
shows, literature also describes a wide, although incomplete, set of the stakeholder
entities.
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Table 4.1: ESV social network stakeholders
Design Reference
Accelerators & corpo-
rate accelerators
Cohen (2013); Hochberg (2016); Kohler (2016); Brown
et al. (2019)
Incubators Bruneel et al. (2012); Albort-Morant and Oghazi (2016);
Bandera and Thomas (2017)
Investors Hsu (2004, 2006); Large and Muegge (2008); Ivanov and
Xie (2010); Alexy et al. (2012); Croce et al. (2018)
Mentors & advisers Waters et al. (2002); Lehtonen and Lahti (2009)
Board members Feld and Ramsinghani (2014); Amornsiripanitch et al.
(2019)
Technology transfer
offices
Siegel et al. (2003); Markman et al. (2005); Gubitta et al.
(2016)
University research
institutes
Wright et al. (2006); Hsu et al. (2007)
Friends & classmates Lerner and Malmendier (2013)
Suppliers Huang et al. (2012); Neyens et al. (2010)
Users & customers Chorev and Anderson (2006); Baron and Shane (2007);
Laage-Hellman et al. (2018); Kuester et al. (2018)
Although reasons for collaboration and engagement with stakeholders have been
widely researched, the actions entrepreneurs and their stakeholders undertake as
part of the engagement remain unclear. Empirical studies give insufficient advice to
the involved parties on how to exchange resources and knowledge. The next section
clarifies the details of the methodological approach for both sub-studies beyond the
overview given in the methodology Section 3.2.3.
4.3 Method and research designs
Two studies, of which the former (signalling study) inspired the latter (stakeholder
study), are devised to answer Research Questions 1 and 2. The studies first examine
both perspectives of the signal emission of ESVs and the reception by VCs. Further-
more, the ESVs’ affiliation with stakeholders via their social networks is analysed as
a subset of the signalled content. The signalling study uses multiple cases and mul-
tiple units of analysis to reflect the dual ESV and VC perspective. The stakeholder
study uses multiple cases and a single unit of analysis as only the ESV perspective
on social networks is considered. Before the case studies were conducted, a ques-
tionnaire was designed (4.3.1), and case study participants were identified (4.3.2 and
4.3.3). The data was gathered during interviews with the case study representatives
(4.3.4), guided by questionnaires, and subsequently analysed (4.4).
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4.3.1 Questionnaire designs
Examples of the questionnaires used for both the signalling study and stakeholder
study can be found in Appendix E3. Existing literature, as well as themes which
emerged during the pilot phase, form the basis of the questionnaire. Piloting the
draft questionnaires with five participants for the signalling study and three partici-
pants for the stakeholder study ascertained the interviews could be completed in the
allocated time and questions were clear to the participants. The interviewer asked
open-ended questions to capture the opinions of both participant groups. Applying
a semi-structured interview format allowed the researcher to be both structured and
produce data that is comparable across cases while remaining opportunistic and in-
clude topics which emerge during the interview. After designing the questionnaire,
the sampling criteria for ESVs (4.3.2) and VCs (4.3.3) were defined for both studies.
4.3.2 ESV Samples
To be considered as a relevant case study for the signalling and stakeholder studies,
the ESVs had to fulfil the following criteria:
1. ESV matches Definition 2 as shown on page 24
2. A current C-suite level co-founder is available to interview
3. The interviewee has more than one year experience in his/her current position,
which implies that the ESV has been incorporated for at least one year
The first criterion ensures that the gathered data focuses on the ESV’s core team
opinions and do not fall victim to some existing studies’ shortcomings of mixing and
not sufficiently controlling for ESV maturity. The second criterion guarantees that
participants have witnessed the formation of the ESV’s social network since the ven-
ture’s incorporation and are responsible for external perception and communication
of the ESV. The rationale for the last criterion is that participants in ESV have
gathered significant experience and the ESV has matured beyond the merely con-
ceptual phase. The participants included CEOs, Chief Technology Officers (CTOs),
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), and Chief Operating Officers (COOs)
An overview of the resulting ESV samples for the signalling and stakeholder study
are presented in Table 4.24.
3 Appendix E can be seen on pages 255 to 261.
4 The details of each ESV case study interviewee are shown in Tables C.1 and C.3 in Appendix C
on pages 242 and 245.
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Table 4.2: Signalling and stakeholder study ESV samples
Study Signalling (RQ1) Stakeholder (RQ2)
Invited participants 51 12
Recruited participants 34 (69%) 8 (75%)
Participant’s position
CEO 31 (91%) 6 (75%)
CTO 2 (6%) n/a
CFO 1 (3%) 1 (13%)
COO n/a 1 (13%)
Tenure:
Mean yr./σ 3.4 (2.5) 8.3 (6.6)
ESV info
Headquarter location:
England 25 74% 5 (63%)
US 5 15% 3 (38%)
Scotland 1 3% n/a
Wales 1 3% n/a
Israel 1 3% n/a
Singapore 1 3% n/a
Customer segment:
B2B 25 74% 5 (66%)
B2C 9 26% 3 (38%)
Investment stages
Current:
Unfunded 6 18% n/a
Angel 8 24% 3 (38%)
Seed 12 35% 2 (25%)
Series A 4 12% 3 (38%)
Series B 4 12% n/a
Number fundraises:
Mean/σ 1.3 (1.1) 1.8 (1.2)
1 Includes multiple mentions
Note: Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100%
For the signalling study, 51 ESV founders were contacted in a convenience sampling
approach. Of the contacted candidates 34 were recruited to participate in the study
which equals a response rate of 69%. The interviewees were comprised of a mix of
the researcher’s personal contacts, referrals, as well as founders in the researcher’s
local ecosystem, Cambridge, United Kingdom (UK), who were recruited in person
or via LinkedIn to participate in the study.
For the in-depth ESV stakeholder study, 12 ESV founders were contacted in a con-
venience sampling strategy. Of the contacted candidates eight participated. The in-
terviewees were asked to participate via LinkedIn. Geographically, the interviewed
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ESVs are spread across six countries with a bias towards the UK and US. The
majority of the ESVs in the sample sell to business customers. Such business to
business (B2B) ESVs have other businesses as end-customers in contrast to business
to consumer (B2C) ESVs who sell to consumers as end-customers.
4.3.3 VC Sample
To be considered a relevant case for the signalling study, the VCs who were invited
to participate had to fulfil the following criteria:
• VC matches Definition 1 as shown on page 14
• VC whose responsibility includes the evaluation of investable ESV candidates
• The interviewee has more than one year experience in the current position
The first criterion ensures that the gathered data focuses on VCs who concentrate on
early-stage investments which match the ESV criteria. The second criterion guar-
antees that participants have a responsibility as part of their position to evaluate
investment opportunities. The rationale for the last criterion is that participants
should have a significant amount of experience and have undergone full training.
A pre-study pilot focusing on ESV stakeholders made clear that VCs are not suf-
ficiently aware of the details of ESV networks, thus VCs were not interviewed for
the stakeholder study. Table 4.3 presents the resulting VC sample for the signalling
study5.
Table 4.3: Signalling study VC sample
Study Signalling (RQ1)
Invited participants 42
Recruited participants 31 (74%)
Participant’s position
Partner 4 (13%)
Director 6 (20%)
Principal 1 (3%)
Senior Associate 3 (10%)
Associate 8 (27%)
Tenure [years/(σ)] 5 (3.7)
Headquarter location
England 18 (58%)
US 9 (29%)
Germany 2 (6%)
China 1 (3%)
France 1 (3%)
Continued on next page
5 The details of each VC case study interviewee are shown in Table C.2 in Appendix C on page 244.
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Study Signalling (RQ1)
Investment criteria
Investment stages1:
Angel 14 (24%)
Seed 25 (42%)
Series A 15 (25%)
Series B 5 (8%)
Customer segment focus:
B2B 6 (19%)
B2C 1 (3%)
Both 24 (77%)
1 Includes mentions of multiple investment stage foci
Note: Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100%
The participating VCs were recruited in person or via LinkedIn to participate in the
study. The interviewed VCs were located in five countries with a bias towards the
UK and US. The majority of the VCs invest at the Pre-seed or Seed-stage B2B and
B2C ventures.
4.3.4 Data gathering
The data gathering took place from November 2016 until April 2018. The interviews
for the signalling study were between 27 and 65 minutes long and conducted either
face-to-face, via video, or conference call. The interviews for the stakeholder study
were conducted face-to-face and lasted between two to three hours.
During the case study interviews, data was captured by taking notes as participants
preferred to share sensitive information only when interviews were not recorded.
Taking notes as opposed to recording the interviews sufficed for the study as it
aimed to find topics rather than analyse details. To ensure important direct quotes
were also captured, rigorous, often word-for-word notes were taken by the researcher
and additions from memory completed promptly after the interview. The survey
participants were promised anonymity including that names they mentioned would
be omitted. All identifiable names were anonymised before being included in this
thesis to comply with the promise. At the end of the interview, the notes were
shown and discussed with the interviewees to avoid miscommunication.
(a) ESV cases: signalling and stakeholder study
The data gathering procedure for ESV case studies was comparable for both the
signalling study and stakeholder study. Founders were asked which information and
documents they could share with VCs and to make these documents available for the
study. Specifically during the signalling study, interviewees were questioned about
the primary challenges they face as part of their job. Furthermore, the founders
explained the ESV and how they convince VCs to invest, including what they believe
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is the ESV’s “unfair advantage” or “unique proposition”. In this context, unfair
advantage or unique proposition are understood as characteristics of the ESV which
cannot be easily imitated or copied by competitors. Moreover, the founders rated
their familiarity with VCs’ decision-making criteria and issues that occur during the
engagement process with VCs.
A unique part of the stakeholder study, in addition to the interview guided by the
questionnaire, was that participants created a paper drawing to visualise the ESV’s
social network. While completing the drawing, the interview partners discussed the
relative importance of stakeholders in ESVs’ social networks.
(b) VC cases: signalling study
The data gathering procedure for VC cases in the signalling study involved capturing
which part of the job they perceived as most challenging, and how they overcome in-
vestment uncertainty to make decisions. Furthermore, VC participants commented
on the software they used and explained the use-cases. Moreover, VCs elaborated
on problems that occur in the engagement process with founders, and which infor-
mation they would ideally obtain.
First, founders and VCs commented on their biggest individual challenges, and sub-
sequently on challenges they face when engaging with each other. By asking the
same questions to both groups, entrepreneurs and VCs, the questions produce a
reference for potential issues of the signalling process compared to other challenges.
The second question discriminates the problems of entrepreneurs and VCs with the
signalling process.
4.4 Data analysis
After completing the interviews, the transcripts and notes were subjected to three
post-processing steps following the Gioia et al. method6. To identify associations
between different topics that emerged from the coded data, statistical tests were
performed. These statistical tests were performed to show variation within the
sample rather than to draw inferences on the population. An example of such a
statistical test is the Chi-squared (χ2) test as described in Formula 1 which identifies
whether a series of observations deviate significantly from the expected observation
(Blaikie, 2003).
6 The detailed description including an example can be seen in Section 3.2.3 (c) and Figure D.1
on pages 247 to 248.
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Formula 1:
χ2 =
n∑
k=1
(Ok − Ek)2
Ek
where:
• n number of observations
• Ok is the observed frequency
• Ek is the expected frequency
The second statistical test derives from the χ2 test and identifies associations be-
tween nominal data. For instance, an association tested as part of the analysis was
whether a founder did (1) or did not (0) reveal a piece of information and subse-
quently faced (1) or did not face (0) miscommunication issues with a VC. Using the
Crame´r’s V test calculates as according to Formula 2 (Blaikie, 2003)7
Formula 2:
V =
√
φ2
min(c− 1, r − 1)
with
φ2 =
χ2
n
where:
• n is the number of observations
• c is the number of columns
• r is the number of rows
The third statistical test is the entropy coefficient, also called Theil’s U test, which
tests association between nominal data8. The threshold values for nominal associa-
tion vary in literature (Cohen, 1988). Table 4.4 states the thresholds used for this
thesis.
The supplementary documents which founders shared with the researcher were cross-
checked for consistency with the statements made by the participants. For the
stakeholder study, the drawings were analysed by listing all mentioned stakeholders,
counting the total number of vertices and edges, and identifying the central vertex,
i.e. the vertex with the highest degree. Lastly, the number of edges among the
stakeholders were counted. After explaining in detail the methodology for both
studies, the results of the studies are presented.
7 The adapted bias-corrected version of Crame´r’s V was used when tables exceeded dimensions
of 2x2 (Bergsma, 2013). The programming code for the bias-corrected Crame´r’s V is shown in
Appendix D on page 249.
8 Appendix D describes Theil’s U as well as the programming code used for the association test
and is shown on pages following 251.
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Table 4.4: Threshold values for nominal association, as excerpted from Blaikie
(2003, p. 100)
Association Value/range
None 0.00
Negligible 0.01 - 0.09
Weak 0.10 - 0.29
Moderate 0.30 - 0.59
Strong 0.60 - 0.74
Very strong 0.75 - 0.99
Perfect 1.00
4.5 Results: signalling study
The purpose of undertaking the signalling study was to answer Research Question 1
and thereby identify both ESV and VC perspectives on signalling. The former
investigates how ESVs signal their investability both through providing tangible
documentation as well as through convincing VCs by mentioning favourable features.
The latter investigates the VCs’ perspective on how effective the signalling process
is to them. The results of the ESV case studies are presented first.
4.5.1 ESV’s perspective on signalling
This section presents the results gathered by interviewing founders for their per-
spective on signalling. After coding, five topics were identified. Firstly, the founders
commented on general challenges they face (a). Secondly, they outlined their strat-
egy for disclosing certain information to VCs (b). Thirdly, founders laid out their
strategy to convince VCs to invest (c). Fourthly, founders rated their familiarity
with VCs’ investment criteria (d). Finally, the founders discussed issues they per-
ceived during the engagement with VCs (e).
(a) ESVs’ challenges
Founders reported on the the challenges faced by ESVs. Table 4.5 shows the themes
that emerged from the coded data.
Table 4.5: ESVs’ challenges
Theme Mentions
Financing 23 (68%)
Finding talent 9 (26%)
Affordable office space 5 (15%)
IP 4 (12%)
Managing clients/PoC 4 (12%)
Time management 2 (6%)
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The results show that financing of the ESV is the biggest concern for more than two
thirds of founders. Around one quarter of founders find it difficult to hire talented
employees for their ventures. The remaining problems such as renting affordable
office space, IP, client relationship, and time management are of a concern for less
than one sixth of founders.
Across the sample there is an indication that the problems faced are contingent on
the interviewee’s role. The two CTOs both mentioned that identifying and hiring
talent are their biggest challenges, however, the sub-sample of CTOs is too small
for a reasonable statistical investigation of the role’s influence.
(b) ESVs’ information sharing strategy
When asked what information founders share with VCs, they answered as docu-
mented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: ESVs’ information sharing
Theme Mentions
Pitch deck 28 (82%)
Financial forecast 20 (59%)
Client feedback 16 (47%)
Partners/ social network 14 (41%)
Paper/ report 14 (41%)
Letter of intent 8 (24%)
Product demo 7 (21%)
Investor feedback/ FAQ1 4 (12%)
1Frequently asked questions
To analyse whether the choice to share certain information is made consciously, the
χ2 test was used.
Hypothesis 4.1: ESVs randomly share information (H0).
ESVs consciously decide what information to share (H1).
Under the assumption that the topics are independent and randomly chosen, i.e. fol-
low a Bernoulli distribution (p = 0.5) with the two equally likely outcomes, shared
(1) and not shared (0), the statistical significance can be shown by using Formula 1.
The χ2 value of the eight topics is χ2 = 29.35. The threshold for a significance
level p = 0.01 and a degree of freedom df = 7 is χ27 = 18.48. The comparison with
the threshold value χ27 = 18.48 < 29.35 = χ
2 of suggests the Null-hypothesis (H0)
can be rejected, assuming the data follows a χ2 distribution. Thus, founders make
conscious decisions on which information to share.
A noteworthy point, although it occurred infrequently, is the sharing of other in-
vestors’ questions and feedback. The following account of a founder illustrates how
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the transparency in the conversation with investors can streamline the communica-
tion. A founder interviewed for the thesis mentioned that:
“We spoke with more than 50 VCs which takes up a lot of time. It’s
pretty much Pareto, every chat has 80% in common and even the last
20% don’t differ that much after a few times. By writing the questions
and our answers up, and making them available, we avoid questions that
just waste everyone’s time. In a short summary we’re also much clearer
than if you ask me right now.” (SigF13)
Another founder-team interviewed for the study shared a 20-page summary in ad-
dition to their pitch-deck which even contained points that criticised the ESV and
revealed sensitive information. A VC, who had an advisory role for the signalling
study, said that openly sharing commonly asked questions demonstrates founders’
confidence, reflection, and openness to taking advice. This coachability can be seen
as a very important character trait (AdVC1).
Questioning founders about their convincing strategy allowed deeper and more nu-
anced analysis of the themes rather than merely reviewing their fundraising docu-
ments.
(c) ESVs’ unfair advantages and convincing VCs
To convince VCs to invest, founders mentioned several factors that give them an
advantage such as the team composition, strategy, and their social network partners.
Furthermore, they mentioned supporting factors such as size of existing markets,
or good timing for example when their development coincides with an emerging
trend. Founders also benchmark their products’ performance or technology portfolio
against competitors’ solutions. Table 4.7 summarises the frequency of the mentions
with which founders demonstrated investability to VCs.
Table 4.7: ESVs signalling investability
Theme Mentions
Internal
Team/pedigree 16 (47%)
Industry experience 13 (38%)
Go-to-market strategy 3 (9%)
External
Market size 25 (74%)
Differentiated technology 19 (56%)
Social network 15 (44%)
Timing, trend, market growth 9 (26%)
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Among the internal factors, it is notable that the team composition and pedigree
play an important role compared to the market strategy. The third most frequent
mention, concerning almost half of all interviewees, are social network signals to
investors. As mentioned in the methodology in Section 4.4 the Gioia et al. method
was applied to translate direct participant accounts into themes. Examples of such
theme summaries were that several founders pointed out that mentioning their
scientific advisers and earliest customers seemed to resonate well with VCs. The
two following direct quotes illustrate founder’s perspective on external advisers and
“name-dropping”. One founder blatantly put it as:
“dropping a few names and saying we’re working with [two companies
anonymised] and [company anonymised] is knocking on our door makes
us look even stronger than we are. However, it’s the same when I ask
investors ‘what can you do for us?’. They tell me ‘I could introduce you
to this person and that person and kick in doors for you’ - who knows if
they really could? At [company anonymised] we sometimes joke, ‘fake it
until we make it’.” (SigF22)
A case study founder of a life-science venture explained why they leverage the affil-
iation with their adviser:
“We’re in a pretty niche [market] segment so VCs reaching out to us
have often heard of Prof. [name anonymised] and only find us through
him. That’s why we put Prof. [name anonymised] in our deck, on the
website, and asked him to update his LinkedIn with our info. [...] If
we have the UK’s guru as one of our advisers that means a lot. Also
Prof. [name anonymised] has been part of a couple of successful exits as
an adviser, which shows he’s not just bright but wants to make money.”
(SigF24)
Next, interviewees were asked what they believe is unique about their ventures and
where the ESV has an “unfair“ advantage. Table 4.8 lists the identified themes that
founders mentioned in regards to the topic of the ESV’s uniqueness.
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Table 4.8: ESVs’ signalling of unfair advantages
Theme Mentions
Data access 9 (26%)
Industry experience 9 (26%)
Brand/reputation 8 (24%)
Collaboration with incumbent 8 (24%)
Partnership with university 7 (21%)
Channel access 6 (18%)
Following trend 5 (15%)
Education experience 4 (12%)
Member of a group 3 (9%)
On the topic of unique characteristics of the ESV, the prevalence of themes is evenly
balanced. It should be noted that several themes such as the university affiliation,
brand, channel, data access, collaboration and membership in a group directly or
indirectly involve a social network. The frequency of these mentions first highlighted
the presence of social network signals and most founders mentioned a broad array
of stakeholders with whom they regularly engage. One founder stated:
“Our space is crowded and we have strong competitors. Their products
are great and some features are better than ours. In such a situation,
with like-for-like comparisons, the only aspect that can’t be replicated is
who’s first to market and which customers decide to work with you. If
you want to stay at the top, you have to work with the big guys like
[company anonymised].” (SigF32)
As the next quote illustrates as an example, several founders pointed out that other
than building a product which can be accelerated through increased funding and hir-
ing developers, it can take years to assemble such “hard-won” connections. Founders
also reported that being fortunate and having a timing advantage can create a sus-
tainable moat which sends a strong signal to VCs. For instance, a founder of a
mental health software ESV mentioned that
“the news are featuring mega [financing-] rounds and acquisitions worth
hundreds of millions of dollars. The market is clearly reaching its first
peak as digital mental health applications became such a big trend - I
mean look in the app store on your phone - there are dozens of apps.
Because we were early, we have been lucky to ride that first wave. If you
set up shop now you missed out on that advantage - you might be too
late to the party.” (SigF25)
Thirteen founders highlighted that their industry experience cannot be easily repli-
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cated by other entrepreneurs who establish themselves as competitors. As a con-
sequence of this sustained advantage interviewed founders see themselves uniquely
positioned. AdVC2 who advised the researcher for the study mentioned the term
“founder-problem fit” for this scenario, further pointing out that it can give ESVs
a strong competitive advantage if they are the ”best-in-class“ team who dedicates
their attention to solving a problem.
Two founders emphasised that their previous careers in VC helped them at vari-
ous steps along the ESV journey, particularly with the fundraising efforts, as the
founders have an increased awareness of VCs’ preferences of (SigF9, SigF13).
The majority of founders communicate these unfair advantages verbally instead of
including it in the documentation. Some founders rationale was that these unique
advantages are difficult to formalise in a pitch deck and require more context (SigF1,
SigF4, SigF15), while others want to ensure better control about spreading of some-
times highly sensitive commercial, or joint development agreements (SigF7, SigF29).
Hence, when comparing the results of both the information and document sharing
strategies in Section (b) and the mainly verbally communicated unfair advantages
covered by this section, there is a clear difference of the delivered content in verbal
and non-verbal communication.
During the pilot phase of the signalling study, a founder mentioned that his previous
experience from working at an accelerator program impacted his information sharing
behaviour (AdF1). He explained that as VCs’ investment theses and industry sector
foci can differ substantially, having individually tailored pitch-decks and communi-
cation strategies is essential to increase the odds of successful fundraising. “There
is no one-fits-all approach to pitching” (SigF2). As a consequence, of the wealth of
potential information that could be conveyed there could be merit to being familiar
with VCs’ preferences. This aspect of founders’ knowledge was investigated by the
next interview topic.
(d) ESVs’ familiarity with VCs’ criteria
As part of the study, founders were asked to rate their familiarity with VC decision-
making criteria for ESV investments. The interviewer presented the founders with
the statement: “I am familiar with VC investment criteria and preferences”. Founders
then rated whether they (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor dis-
agree, (4) agree, or (5) strongly agree and their answers are captured by the variable
f criteria familiar. In summary, the 34 interviewees rated their familiarity with a
mean = 3.15, which means that they are somewhat familiar with the criteria. The
standard deviation was σ = 1.33, the median = 3, and mode = 3. Table 4.9 shows
the case study founders’ and their ventures characteristics which were investigated
for their influence on the variable f criteria familiar.
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Table 4.9: ESVs’ characteristics and familiarity with VCs’ investment criteria
Variable Measure (unit) Interpretation
tenure1 integer (years) Founder’s experience in position
no funding rounds integer ESV’s completed funding rounds
unfunded binary ESV is unfunded
angel binary ESV currently Angel funded
seed binary ESV currently Seed funded
series a binary ESV currently Series A funded
series b binary ESV currently Series B funded
1 Includes previous founding, ESV, or VC experience
The variables were used for an OLS regression, the results are shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: OLS regression of founders’ familiarity with VCs’ investment criteria
Dependent variable: f criteria familiar R2 = 0.568
Independent variables: Coefficient Std. deviation σ
constant 2.589 n/a
tenure 0.163∗ 0.097
no funding rounds -0.223 0.265
unfunded -0.766∗∗ 0.380
angel 0.048 0.347
seed 0.270 0.274
series a 1.338∗∗ 0.539
series b 1.699∗∗∗ 0.596
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
With regards to the limited number of participants, the explanatory power of the
statistical analysis should not be overestimated. However, the results of the regres-
sion indicate that founders have a base-line familiarity (2.589 of 5) regardless of their
previous fundraising experience. The tenure positively correlates with the reported
criteria familiarity which seems reasonable given that the criteria are nondescript
and founder confidence might increase over time. Interestingly, the regression shows
that the number of previous financing rounds is not statistically significant. A trend
of increased familiarity can be observed with founders towards later fundraising
stages (Series A and B). This finding is also to be expected as interviewees were co-
founding members and gained experience over subsequent fundraising rounds which
also correlated with tenure. To ensure sufficient confidence in the validity of the
analysis, the results were cross-checked as shown in Table 4.11 and yielded compa-
rable results by using Crame´r’s V and Theil’s U which are suitable statistical tools
for categorical, and in this case, binary data (Blaikie, 2003).
The Crame´r’s V values for the analysed binary variables and supports a mod-
erate association for the variables unfunded (0.45), max funding stage (0.34),
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Table 4.11: Crame´r’s V and Theil’s U test of founders’ familiarity with VCs’ in-
vestment criteria
Participant/ESV Crame´r’s V Theil’s U
tenure 0.24∗∗ 0.31
no funding rounds 0.16 0.30
max funding stage 0.34∗∗∗ 0.32
unfunded 0.45∗∗ 0.33
angel 0.00 0.11
seed 0.13 0.13
series a 0.42∗∗ 0.41
series b 0.37∗∗ 0.39
Crame´r’s V p-values: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
series a (0.42), and series b (0.37) as well as weak association for seed (0.21) and
none for angel (0.00).
Theil’s U values support the previous findings as they identify moderate associations
for unfunded, series a, and series b, weak association for seed and angel.
Founders also reported that VCs expectations can differ widely which might result in
criticism of different elements of the ESVs (SigF13; SigF21). SigF13 who previously
discussed the rationale for sharing the most frequently asked questions with VCs
who show interest, elaborated that the strategy helps to preempt questions and
quickly respond to the wealth of VC’s questions and preferences.
The final question posed to founders aimed to capture issues that occur during the
engagement process with VCs.
(e) ESVs’ perceived issues with VC engagement process
During the study’s pilot phase, the consulted stakeholders also tested the ques-
tionnaire. One VC pointed out that the engagement between founders and VCs
can be accompanied by significant friction (AdVC3). Hence, the questionnaire was
amended to capture this topic of engagement issues, and Table 4.12 lays out the
coded themes.
Table 4.12: ESVs’ issues in their engagement with VCs
Theme Mentions
Miscommunication 18 (53%)
Lack of interest 16 (47%)
Request unnecessary information 16 (47%)
Time intensive 14 (41%)
Unstructured due diligence 14 (41%)
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Every case study’s ESV founder mentioned at least one issue that occurred in the
engagement process with investors. Five themes were identified that were prevalent
in over 40% of the case study ESVs. Most frequently reported were instances in
which miscommunication occurred. Concrete examples which were derived from the
Gioia et al. method are different understanding of the fundraising timeline, targeted
customer segments, or growth and exit expectations. Almost half of the interviewees
witnessed a lack of interest from VCs which manifested in the VCs becoming increas-
ingly unresponsive, unwilling to commit or take next steps towards an investment.
Moreover, founders criticised that VCs often seek to obtain metrics, or customer tes-
timonials and product details prematurely. These interviewees mentioned that the
information sought by the VCs is so far unknown to the founders themselves, and
time and effort is wasted on speculating. Finally, founders complained about the
inefficiency, intransparency and lack of structure imposed by VCs on the fundraising
process. One interviewee admitted that:
“the [engagement] process involves strong gamesmanship. If you push
[VCs] too much, you look desperate and get bad terms9, if you don’t push
and tell VCs the [financing-] round is coming to a close, nothing happens.
We‘re in the comfortable situation that there’s still cash in the bank and
we see quite a lot of interest from investors. It allows us to stall the
communication with a less prestigious VC a bit and let others catch up
with their due diligence process and finally settle for the best option.”
(SigF1)
Another founder pointed out how detrimental the fundraising process can be to the
ongoing business.
“I can’t figure out why they [the VCs] take so long to decide whether
to invest or not. Instead of being transparent, they keep asking for in-
formation we simply don’t have. It annoys me how much time I waste
fundraising instead of working with customers and creating actual value.”
(SigF32)
To identify whether the information shared with the VCs can be associated with a
reduced perception of issues that occur, Crame´r’s V and Theil’s U were applied to
the data as summarised in Table 4.13.
9 Terms are jargon for a term-sheet, which is the contract which outlines the contractual framework
of the funding round.
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Table 4.13: Association of ESV information sharing, signalling, and communi-
cated unfair advantages with engagement issues
Theme Issue Crame´r’s V Theil’s U
Sharing
pitch deck miscommunication 0.11 0.09
letter of intent lack of interest 0.02 0.06
letter of intent request unnecessary info 0.02 0.06
letter of intent miscommunication 0.02 0.06
client feedback unstructured process 0.18 0.07
investor feedback miscommunication 0.24∗ 0.27
social network lack of interest 0.33∗∗ 0.14
social network request unnecessary info 0.33∗∗ 0.14
social network miscommunication 0.15 0.06
paper reports request unnecessary info 0.18 0.07
paper reports unstructured process 0.22∗∗ 0.09
paper reports miscommunication 0.15 0.06
Signalling
traction unstructured process 0.18 0.08
differentiated tech time intensity 0.22∗ 0.09
differentiated tech lack of interest 0.24 0.09
Team/pedigree lack of interest 0.17 0.07
Industry experience lack of interest 0.51∗∗∗ 0.28
Industry experience request unnecessary info 0.38∗∗ 0.17
Industry experience unstructured process 0.20 0.08
trend market growth time intensity 0.17 0.08
market size time intensity 0.17 0.08
social network lack of interest 0.52∗∗∗ 0.29
social network request unnecessary info 0.65∗∗∗ 0.43
social network unstructured process 0.28∗ 0.11
social network miscommunication 0.24∗ 0.09
Unfair advantage
university partnership time intensity 0.11 0.08
university partnership lack of interest 0.20 0.12
industry experience lack of interest 0.41∗∗∗ 0.24
education experience lack of interest 0.19 0.23
education experience miscommunication 0.24∗ 0.27
following trend timeintensity 0.17 0.13
Crame´r’s V p-values: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The analysis yielded moderate to weak associates for all variables. Sharing informa-
tion about the ESV’s social network was found to reduce the requesting of informa-
tion by the VC which the founders deem unnecessary. Social network information
in the hands of VCs is also associated with a decline in instances where VCs show
a lack of interest and miscommunication occurs. Sharing feedback and commonly
asked questions by VCs with other VCs is associated with less miscommunication.
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Furthermore, founders’ decision to share peer-reviewed papers or reports was asso-
ciated with more structured engagement, requesting more relevant information, and
better communications with VCs. Lastly, sharing client feedback and pitch-decks is
moderately associated with a reduction of issues stemming from unstructured en-
gagement.
The analysis of founders information sharing behaviour and the associated perceived
issues concludes the results obtained from the ESV case studies. The next section
presents the VC case study results.
4.5.2 VCs’ perspective on signal reception
The findings of the VC case studies were categorised into four topics. First, VCs
summarised their main challenges (a). Second, VCs’ strategies to overcome invest-
ment uncertainty, build conviction, and blueprint for a more solid information basis
were discussed (b). Third, interviewed VCs explained which software they use and
elaborated the use-cases (c). Last, VCs explained common issues that occur in the
engagement process with founders (d).
(a) VCs’ challenges
The interviewed VCs reported on the challenges they faced. These accounts were
coding using the Gioia et al. method and are summarised in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Challenges faced by VCs
Theme Mentions
Due diligence 19 (61%)
Technology 7 (23%)
Customers 5 (16%)
Team 4 (13%)
Extent 4 (13%)
Competition 3 (10%)
Sourcing 7 (23%)
Quantity 4 (13%)
Quality 4 (13%)
Post-investment value-add 4 (13%)
Sales/hiring introductions 3 (10%)
Competitor awareness 3 (10%)
Fundraising 3 (10%)
The results show that conducting due diligence presents the biggest challenge (61%),
followed by sourcing investment opportunities (23%), assisting portfolio companies
post-investment (13%), and raising own funds (10%).
Within the due diligence theme, assessing an ESV’s technology was reported the
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most frequent, followed by the assessment of the ESV’s customers, team, and com-
petitors. A smaller fraction of the surveyed participants mentioned that the extent
of the due diligence is overwhelming and overly time-consuming.
Around one quarter of participants mentioned sourcing of investment opportunities
presents a challenge, whereby achieving high quality investment leads and working
to maintain a high quality deal-flow were the two prominent sub-themes.
The sub-themes within the post-investment challenges were introductions of the
portfolio company to potential clients as well as assisting with the hiring process of
the ESV. Finally the fundraising process for the VC fund itself was discussed as a
challenge.
Across the sample Crame´r’s V and Theil’s U were tested to reveal associations be-
tween the participant’s characteristics and the challenges they face. The results yield
few patterns as most associations are negligible or weak. Table 4.15 summarises the
notable exceptions. The Crame´r’s V test helped identify moderate associations be-
Table 4.15: VCs’ characteristics and associations with challenges
VC characteristic Challenge Crame´r’s V Theil’s U
tenure postinvestment valueadd 0.57 0.13
B2B/B2C/both due diligence competition 0.52 0.15
V C partner fundraising 0.32 0.24
tenure sourcing quantity 0.28 0.09
series b due diligence extent 0.23 0.11
tween the tenure of VCs and an increasingly perceived challenge to add value to
portfolio companies. This result is substantiated by the fact that more experienced
VCs’ attention, such as Partners and Principals, is directed more at fundraising
and portfolio company management, whereas Associates conduct the majority of
the due diligence. This could explains why Partners found fundraising challenging,
whereas Associates did not. Furthermore, a weak association was found between
junior Associates and the perceived challenge of sourcing a high volume of deals.
Lastly, VCs focusing on Series B investments reported the amount of due diligence
to be performed as challenging. As was seen in previous examples, the strength of
association Theil’s U is more moderate than Crame´r’s V as outliers are weighted
stronger.
(b) VCs’ overcoming uncertainty and building conviction
The study participants discussed the uncertainty during the investment process and
how to build conviction to fund an ESV. Table 4.16 lists the most frequently reported
strategies.
The Gioia et al. method helped to derive several clear themes, most prominently
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Table 4.16: VCs’ dealing with pre-investment uncertainty
Theme Mentions
References 14 (45%)
Competitive landscape 12 (39%)
Professional advisory services 11 (35%)
Customer’s opinions 10 (32%)
Database, comparable companies 8 (26%)
Getting to know founders over time 7 (23%)
Warm introductions 7 (23%)
Serial founder ESV team 6 (19%)
ESV team’s academic or industry pedigree 5 (16%)
Permanent technology or general advisers 5 (16%)
Own experience with industry and technology 4 (13%)
the overcoming of uncertainty for VCs by obtaining external references (45%) on the
founding team and staff from a trustworthy external source such as former employers
or academic supervisors. A VC reported that:
“a quick chat, [...] with a founder’s former boss or supervisor adds an
invaluable perspective. We tend to ask for such introductions late in the
diligence process because we are mindful that founders cannot introduce
every VC that comes around, but we always require references at some
point. Ideally, the person who provides the reference has a relation to
the startup and the founders but is not biased or invested.” (SigVC8)
Another element of the diligence process that helps to build conviction stems from
a VC’s broad understanding of the competitive landscape (39%) which can either
be achieved through paid professional services advisers (35%), a permanent network
of advisers to the fund (16%), or own experience with technology and industries
(13%). Speaking to experts was widely reported to be an effective tool to de-risk
investment opportunities. One VC stated that they
“invest in more than a dozen different industries and cannot possibly
be an expert in every niche. That is why we use a network of experts,
some of them through services like [name anonymised]. These advisers
have their finger on the pulse of an industry and we ask them ques-
tions around the competition etc. Competition is important, one of the
worst VC nightmares is to invest in a company and three months later
you find out that [company anonymised] is doing the same thing. If a
startup is running up against the big tech-firms it gets even more diffi-
cult.” (SigVC31)
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Another means for VCs to overcome uncertainty are customer testimonials (32%).
Across both B2B and B2C verticals, VCs often enquire about the ESV’s first cus-
tomers. VC said they sometimes see customers being actively involved in the devel-
opment process (SigVC9; SigVC20). SigVC8 emphasised the importance of under-
standing the ESV by taking the customer’s perspective:
“Maybe even more so than a strong team, customers telling me ‘I need
that’ trumps everything else. The voice of the customer does not lie.
They have no incentive to lie. But you need to spend a significant amount
of time with customers to understand their problem and the value propo-
sition of the startup. Only that way you find out whether they will be
sustained customers. Our team refers to this as ‘need to have versus
nice to have’ which is the difference of being cut or not should the econ-
omy turn sour.” (SigVC8)
The study participants also reported the use of private market databases (26%).
SigVC30 mentioned that the fund maintains a proprietary database which merges
several data sets with 30 years of historical deal-data. He added that the tool, which
is used firm-level wide, reduced the due diligence time by up to two thirds.
Seven VCs reported that they aim to build a relationship with the founding team
before committing to an investment. One of them explained that at some point dur-
ing the due diligence, the VC fund offers the ESV teams to join their entrepreneur
in residence program for up to two months. The main reason is to be able to confirm
whether the ESV has the momentum they claim and see with their own eyes the
team dynamics and commitment (SigVC4).
Warm introductions play an important role (23%). Introductions can originate from
a variety of sources such as customers, and industrial representatives (SigVC3), the
VC’s existing portfolio companies (SigVC9), friends or ex-colleagues of the founders
(SigVC16), the VC’s LPs (SigVC20), or advisers to the ESV (SigVC31).
Around one-fifth of the interviewed VCs stated that they feel more comfortable
investing in serial founders. Especially when the team remained in a similar con-
stellation and embarked on a new ESV journey, VCs perceived a strong positive
signal (SigVC7). Two VCs who prefer backing serial founders mentioned that first-
time founding teams often fall apart (SigVC2; SigVC16) while another stated that
some first-time founders underestimate the challenges of being a founder. The VC
phrased it as “if you have been there before you know what you are getting yourself
into” (SigVC14).
Lastly, the ESV team’s academic pedigree or industrial experience, especially when
it is directly relevant to the venture (SigVC13), can be considered a substantial moat
in helping to sustain defensibility.
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In addition to the identified themes that help alleviate investment uncertainty, the
interviewer asked a follow-up question also regarding the topic of uncertainty, sug-
gesting potential additions to improve the information basis. Table 4.17 shows the
results for such an improved information basis for decision-making.
Table 4.17: VCs’ ideal information reception
Theme Mentions
Details on the team 13 (42%)
Existing investors opinions 10 (32%)
ESV’s potential to attract talent 10 (32%)
Technology/ science details 8 (26%)
R&D/ science risk 7 (23%)
Incumbents and their actions 6 (19%)
ESV customers 5 (16%)
Market size and trends 4 (13%)
Most frequently suggested were additional details on the founding team (42%) and
its ability to attract and retain high profile talent (32%). Another piece of important
information which is often not available to VCs is the attitude of previous investors
in the ESV. Existing investors’ opinions were said to be very valuable since they
contain an insider’s perspective and information. Therefore, the actions of exist-
ing investors can substantially influence the behaviour of VCs who are interested
to invest (SigVC2; SigVC4). Around one quarter of respondents would want more
information on the ESVs’ technology, underlying science (26%), and the risk of un-
successful completion of product development (23%). The remaining suggestions
were put forth by less than a fifth of the interviewees and included suggestions such
as more information on the ESVs’ customers, incumbents, and competitors, as well
as the market size and trends.
The combined results of Table 4.16 and 4.17 show that VCs employ a wide array of
measures to reduce investment uncertainty, while it also surfaces areas of improve-
ment especially around technology and social network details.
(c) VCs’ tools and their use-cases
As the VCs reported challenges across all duties of a VC, including gathering and
evaluating a significant amount of evidence regarding the investment opportunities,
the use of decision-aiding tools and software was discussed with the interviewees.
Table 4.18 lists the tools which case study VCs reportedly used.
The analysis shows that several different software solutions are in use, however,
few of them could be considered broadly adopted. Many VCs mentioned that even
across VCs in the same firm the use of software is non-uniform. One VC emphasised
that the venture investing process is dominated by personal preference and taste
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Table 4.18: VCs’ use of software
Theme Mentions
Spreadsheet and word processing 16 (52%)
Social media 15 (48%)
Private market databases 10 (32%)
Proprietary tools/metrics 5 (16%)
Fund management software 4 (13%)
Web analytics 3 (10%)
Valuation calculator 3 (10%)
Market research tools/reports 3 (10%)
Internal communications tools 2 (6%)
which translates in the adoption of software rather individually than on a fund-
level (SigVC15). According to the interviewees, over half of them used spreadsheet
and word processing software, and one third used information from private market
databases and social media platforms such as LinkedIn, Twitter, or Instagram. One
sixth of VCs reported using self-defined metrics or proprietary tools. Around one
tenth of participants used fund-management software, web analytic tools, valuation
calculators, market research tools, and internal communication tools. The categori-
cal association metrics Crame´r’s V and Theil’s U helped to investigate associations
between the use of software and the perceived challenges of VCs.
Table 4.19: VCs’ software and challenges associations
Software/tool Challenge Crame´r’s V Theil’s U
private market databases fundraising 0.31∗∗ 0.19
social media due diligence 0.25∗∗∗ 0.10
market research tools/reports due diligence 0.22 0.16
private market databases due diligence team 0.17 0.09
private market databases due diligence 0.14 0.07
proprietary tools/metrics due diligence team 0.13 0.11
social media competitor awareness 0.10∗ 0.10
Crame´r’s V p-values: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Apart from a moderate but statistically significant association between the use of
private market databases and less perceived challenges of fundraising, the remaining
associations were moderate to weak. The use of social media is statistically signif-
icant and associated with a reduction of due diligence challenges and an increased
awareness of competitors. Private market databases, market research tools, and
market reports are associated with reduced challenges of due diligence in general
and the ESV teams in particular.
In addition to listing the software, its use-cases were elaborated by interviewees as
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summarised in Table 4.20.
Table 4.20: VCs’ software use-cases
Theme Mentions
Use for due diligence 27 (77%)
Use for sourcing 9 (29%)
Use for post-investment 4 (13%)
Use for exit 3 (10%)
The majority of tools in use aided the due diligence process followed by applying
software to source of investment opportunities. For post-investment activities and
exiting investments, software was used by only one tenth of the VC sample.
Theil’s U was used to investigate associations between perceived issues and the re-
ported use of tools for certain use-cases. Moderate associations were found between
the use of tools for sourcing resulting in lower perceived challenges with sourc-
ing (Crame´r’s V = 0.38, Theil’s U = 0.20). A stronger association exists between
use of software for sourcing and managing the extent of the sourcing activities
(Crame´r’s V = 0.47, Theil’s U = 0.31), however, no association was found for the
quality of the sourced investment opportunities. Regarding the post-investment ac-
tivities, VCs who reportedly used software mentioned fewer perceived challenges
(Crame´r’s V = 0.13, Theil’s U = 0.13).
(d) VCs’ perceived issues with ESV engagement process
The last topic discussed with interviewees were issues that occur during the pre-
investment engagement with ESVs. Table 4.21 lists the identified themes.
Table 4.21: VCs’ issues in their engagement with ESVs
Theme Mentions
Timing of fundraise
Too early, unprepared founders 6 (19%)
Too late, rushed process 8 (26%)
Lengthy due diligence process 5 (16%)
Failure to communicate
Stakeholder network 7 (23%)
Technology to a non expert 5 (16%)
Differentiation/defensibility 5 (16%)
Momentum, reaching milestones 5 (16%)
Commercial traction 4 (13%)
Competitive landscape 4 (13%)
Customer needs and market size 4 (13%)
Product and value proposition 2 (6%)
Trust, verifiable claims 2 (6%)
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Coding the VCs’ mentions revealed numerous issues which compared to the issues
perceived by their ESV counterparts, were less uniform across the sample. Few of
the interviewed VCs reported more than one perceived issue, whereas most ESVs
had reported several issues. The issues faced by VCs followed two overarching
themes. Firstly, bad fundraise timing on behalf of the founders which manifests in
two ways. Either the fundraising begins too early and founders seem unprepared. In
addition, the lack of pressure to close the deal could lead to a lack of interest from
the investor. Or, fundraising is initiated too late which creates a hasty environment
and discomfort for both founders and VCs as founders risk running out of liquidity
and VCs must rush to make decisions.
Secondly, VCs’s criticised founders for a lack of clarity regarding the stakeholders
involved in the ESVs, the technology and its differentiation from competitors, the
momentum with which milestones are currently achieved, and how this translates
into commercial traction in the form of customers and revenues. Furthermore, a
small number of participants reported issues of trust and discomfort with unverifiable
claims made by entrepreneurs.
This concludes the results of the signalling study, the next section summarises the
results of the stakeholder study.
4.6 Results: stakeholder study
The results of the signalling study highlight the importance of ESV stakeholders in
multiple instances. As stakeholder importance was not identifiable this prominently
in existing literature, a more in-depth study of the ESVs’ social networks was in-
spired. The resulting stakeholder study was conducted with eight ESVs and the
purpose to identify main characteristics and differences across the social networks of
case study ventures. As mentioned in the Section 4.3 on research design, the setup
of the signalling and stakeholder study were similar. The main difference between
the studies was the sample, which only consisted of founders, and the additional
task for participants to sketch a visual representation of their ESV’s social network.
A comparison of the social network constellations visualised in the drawings, ex-
amined the elementary building blocks of networks, i.e. vertices (stakeholders) and
edges (ESV and stakeholder connections), as well as constellation patterns that can
be described through social network metrics introduced in Section 2.4.210.
4.6.1 ESVs’ stakeholders
The social network drawings from eight case study interviews were gathered and
dissected. Table 4.22 lists all identified classes of stakeholders.
10An overview of social network metrics can be revisited in Section 2.4.2 and Table 2.3 on page 38.
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Table 4.22: ESV social network stakeholders
Stakeholder Mentions Stakeholder Mentions
Accelerator 5 (63%) Supplier 1 (13%)
Adviser 5 (63%) Journal editor 2 (25%)
Competitor 2 (25%) Journalist 3 (38%)
Contract researcher 1 (13%) Lawyer 4 (50%)
CRO 1 (13%) Industry expert 3 (38%)
Customer 6 (75%) Mentor 3 (38%)
Consultant 1 (13%) Policy maker 1 (13%)
Corporate (buyer) 5 (63%) PR firm 2 (25%)
Corporate (user) 4 (50%) Media analyst 2 (25%)
Former employee 2 (25%) Publisher 2 (25%)
Former employer 3 (38%) Recruiter 4 (50%)
Incubator 2 (25%) Technology expert 3 (38%)
Investor 7 (88%) University 5 (63%)
Other ESV 3 (38%) Uni. researcher 3 (38%)
Other SME 1 (13%)
The results indicate, in accordance with existing literature, that certain groups such
as investors, customers, accelerators, advisers, corporate partners, and universities
are prevalent. Besides, other stakeholders are found, however, these are not cov-
ered sufficiently by the reviewed literature. Examples include press and media,
professional services such as legal, industry and technology consulting, recruiting,
or contract research organisations (CROs).
While visualising the ESV’s networks, the founders of the case study ESVs were
also asked to indicate whether stakeholders are directly important for the ESV or
instead only mentioned to VCs to demonstrate an affiliation with stakeholders, in
which case the importance would be indirect. In summary, whether founders of
ESVs appreciate the direct or indirect contributions by stakeholders to the venture
depends on the class of stakeholders11.
The case studies revealed that founders appreciate but hardly communicate affilia-
tion to professional services from lawyers, contract researchers, consultants, market
and industry experts. The services are more important to ESVs than mentioning
their affiliation to VCs except for industry and technology experts and recruiters.
Furthermore, ties to former employers and employees, or collaboration with other
ESVs, SMEs, and direct competitors are important to some ESVs but mentioned
less frequently to VCs. Also, stakeholders in publishing and media such as journal-
ists and journal editors are more directly important than indirectly.
In turn, stakeholders who advise, and mentor the ESV, including affiliations with
11Table F.1 in Appendix F on page 267 gives a complete overview of the founder’s perceived
importance of stakeholders for the ESVs and VCs.
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accelerators, incubators, and university programs are reported as more indirectly
than directly important. Consumers and business customers are reported as impor-
tant both directly and indirectly. Likewise, an affiliation with CROs or regulators
and policy-makers are infrequent but both directly and indirectly important.
A surprising finding was the fact that founders reportedly established access to or-
ganisations, especially corporate stakeholders through multiple independent chan-
nels. The approach was explained as a response to the siloed nature of large firms
in which buyers of technology are usually not the users and centres have individ-
ual responsibilities and budgets (StaF3). Depending on the organisation, and what
ESVs seek form of engagement with the corporate different decision-makers, the
organisation has to be approached differently. Founders reported of stakeholders
who turned into clients, joint development partners, financiers. Such stakeholders
often allowed ESVs to benefit from corporate’s brand-image (StaF2, StaF4, StaF7).
Another parameter of the engagement with corporate stakeholders was the choice of
a top-down or bottom-up introduction, StaF7 mentioned the ESV successfully tried
both strategies, first getting introduced to a large software firms Chief Information
Officer (CIO) and in another case through a junior employee.
Another stakeholder group which plays an important role for ESVs are lawyers.
The contractual work between founders and VCs can be complex with different
stock-vesting provisions, liquidation rights, and other legal hurdles. Therefore, most
founders seek professional advice. In response to that, some large legal firms have
altered their approach as one specialist lawyer consulted for this study revealed (Ad-
Law1). Similar to early-stage VCs motivation to fund ESVs early in hopes for higher
returns, legal firms scout for ESVs in a comparable manner. AdLaw1, a Partner at
a London-based law firm explained that the ESVs’ costs for switching legal advisers
can be high, especially when lost time and the necessity to rebuild trust with a new
legal representation is factored in. Thus, the lawyer advising founders on their first
term sheet and fundraise, might be the same one who later helps to file for an IPO.
This trend leads to a situation where even top legal firms in ecosystems battle to
represent top founders. The Partner explained that legal firms reduce their hourly
rates to a bare minimum or even provide free legal advice during board-meetings,
and assist with international expansion of the ESV - again with the goal to be the
attorney of choice for late-stage, high-fee, transactions.
As the identification of relevant stakeholder groups was complete, the social net-
works of the case study ESVs were further analysed regarding their structure as the
drawings illustrated notably different constellations.
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4.6.2 ESVs’ social network constellations
Figure 4.2 shows representative social network drawings of two case study ESVs,
ESV1 in Figure 4.2(a), and ESV3 in Figure 4.2(b).
Legend:
Adviser
Corporate
Customer
Former employee
Former employer
Incubator
Initiative
Investor
Journal editor
Journalist
Lawyer
Media analyst
New employee
Other ESV
PR firm
Publisher
Recruiter
Researcher
University
ESV1
(a) Social network ESV1
ESV3
(b) Social network ESV3
Figure 4.2: ESV social networks drawings, own illustration, anonymised and digi-
tised from original drawing.
The two social networks differ both in their network size (15 to 28 vertices) and the
number of edges (29 to 23). The degree, i.e. the number of first-order edges varies
significantly for the two ESVs (4 to 17) especially when compared to other vertices’s
degrees (max. 9 to max. 5). This ESVs’ centrality metric indicates how connected
the ESV is to all stakeholders in the network. Looking at the centrality measure,
ESV3 can be considered a “hub” as it takes a central position being the most densely
connected vertex. By contrast, the “incubator” is the hub and spans ESV1’s social
network, leaving ESV1 in a peripheral position. Ten different stakeholder categories
exist in ESV1’s network, the more heterogeneous network of ESV3 comprises of a
more diverse set of 15 stakeholder categories. Also, the stakeholders in the social
network drawings are interconnected to a different extent. ESV1’s stakeholders are
densely interconnected through 19 edges, ESV3’s stakeholders are dispersed and
connected by only twelve edges. Table 4.23 shows an overview of the different
network constellations measured with social network metrics.
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Table 4.23: Metrics of case study ESVs’ social networks
Social network ESV Stakeholder
Case study Vertices Edges Degree Centrality Density Diversity
ESV1 15 23 4 28.6% 9.0% 37.9%
ESV2 21 26 9 45.0% 4.0% 41.4%
ESV3 28 29 17 63.0% 1.6% 69.0%
ESV4 18 14 7 41.2% 2.3% 34.5%
ESV5 31 16 10 33.3% 0.6% 17.2%
ESV6 37 30 15 41.7% 1.1% 48.3%
ESV7 26 25 14 56.0% 1.7% 13.8%
ESV8 51 19 10 20.0% 0.4% 34.5%
mean 28 23 11 41.1% 2.6% 37.1%
σ 12 6 4 14% 2.8% 17.4%
max delta 36 16 13 43% 8.7% 55.2%
During the analysis of the ESV’ social networks, notable differences were found
between the ESVs’ degree. As mentioned before, the degree defines the position
within the network as a central hub or peripheral vertex. The analysed networks
also differ in the diversity of stakeholders, and their connectedness among each
other. The stakeholder connectedness, i.e. density of edges between stakeholders
varies more than 50% across the case studies. The ESVs’ centrality was calculated
by dividing the ESV’s degree by the maximum number of possible connections if
it was connected directly to all stakeholders (Marsden, 2015). The stakeholder
density was derived by removing ESV from the network and dividing the number
of interconnections among remaining stakeholders with the total possible number
of connections. The maximum total number of connections of n vertices, thereby
calculates according to Formula 3.
Formula 3:
max no edges = n ∗ (n− 1)
where:
• n is the sum of a network’s vertices
The final metric to be analysed for the case study ESVs’ networks is the stakeholder
diversity. It was calculated by dividing the number of stakeholders represented in
each network with the aggregate number of identified stakeholders categories across
all case studies networks (29)12.
12A commonly used alternative to the applied diversity calculation is the Herfindahl index of
heterogeneity Baum et al. (2000); Zheng et al. (2010). As the sample size for this study did not
permit for any statistical evaluation, a complex calculation of the network diversity was deemed
not meaningful.
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4.6.3 Social network support of ESVs’ business functions
As the founders finished drawing the social networks, the interviewer asked under
what circumstances networks could be relied on to support certain business func-
tions. Coding the interviewees’ answers yielded six themes of business functions.
First and foremost, founders relied on their networks for fundraising (100%), re-
cruiting talent (63%), and legal advice (63%). To a lesser extent, entrepreneurs
depended on their social networks for PR (38%), sales (25%), and research and
product development (25%). Overall, founders mentioned most social network part-
ners can be a substitute or complement the ESV’s internal business function. The
analysis of business functions, which social network can fulfil, concluded the stake-
holder study. The next section discusses the results together with the signalling
study and outlines both limitations and opportunities for the subsequent studies of
the thesis.
4.7 Discussion
Summary. The two studies analysed the signalling process between an ESV and
potential VCs as well as the social networks of ESVs. Together, the studies and
their results answer Research Questions 1: “how do ESVs signal to VCs and how
do VCs evaluate the signal?”, as well as Research Question 2: “which stakeholders
occur in ESVs’ social networks?”
Interviews conducted with 34 ESV founders and 31 VCs are the foundation of the
signalling study, similar to the eight interviews with founders for the stakeholder
study. Studying the pre-investment process holistically, including the nuanced per-
spectives of ESV founders as well as VC, is unique in the academic domain. This
is because previous literature only studied either the VCs or entrepreneurship per-
spective and mostly did not discern different investment stages (Tykvova´, 2018).
The confocal approach highlighted the significance of the friction-laden investment
process, which, according to the results, is a priority issue for both parties.
By introducing the stakeholder sub-study, it was possible to follow a research op-
portunity which emerged while conducting the signalling study. The topic of ESVs’
stakeholders, who form the surrounding social networks, played an important role
for individuals on both ends of the signalling process. As social networks play a crit-
ical role for a multitude of key business functions, VCs reported being receptive to
these signals. Thus, the social network signals were identified as an effective means
to de-risk investments in the eyes of the VCs.
Implications for ESVs. Important implications for the involved participant groups
can be found in the increased understanding of the founders’ variety of adopted sig-
nalling strategies. While it is unlikely that a single best practice exists, there is cer-
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tainly advice and stimuli for alternative approaches to be obtained from the themes
that were identified in this study. As an example, founders could create bespoke
documents for individual investor categories or share feedback they received about
their venture with other approaching VCs. These strategies might help speed-up
the fundraising process. For example sharing of investor and client feedback, aca-
demic works and reports, as well as social network details, were associated with
fewer challenges during investor engagement.
Implications for VCs. Looking at VCs’ strategies in coping with investment
uncertainties surfaced interesting approaches. Examples included a pre-investment
entrepreneur in residence scheme, VCs’ use of professional services and proprietary
networks of advisers to give expert advice, and a proprietary database to facilitate
investment decisions. It could be argued that there is more potential to be realised
as VC funds codify and homogenise their investment process, including their use of
tools. Such a shift would also mean following the trend of data-driven investing,
which was identified in the literature review. Advances in databases, some of which
are already used by the case study VCs, and analytics-enabled tools which have
already been successfully implemented in other finance-related industries might alter
the way VC makes investment decisions (Gompers et al., 2020). It was interesting to
observe how optimistic some VCs were with regards to potentially industry-shaking
advances compared to others who were reserved. The results of the study did show
that software in support of pre-investment due diligence has the widest adoption so
far, which means the barrier to entry could be lower than for other VC activities
and support tools. Overall, the fact that none of the tools in use had a fundamental
impact on the perceived issues shows that there is still a significant amount of
opportunity to create bespoke software applications and improve models that could
help tie up loose ends of the multifaceted due diligence approach.
Implications for theory. The study has several implications for theory. Firstly, it
provides novel findings about signalled content and its significance during the pre-
investment process. In addition to the question of “how to signal?” which existing
literature addresses on a communication-level, there is reason to believe that the
answers to the question of “what to signal?” are similarly significant. This could be
considered an essential advancement, since a lot of the empirical research to date
stops at a surface-level observation and does not find the richness of themes that ex-
ist. By contrast, the investigations undertaken in this study revealed the dichotomy
between stakeholders that could be considered directly vital as they assist the ESV’s
business functions or indirectly important as their affiliation signals legitimacy and
helps overcome the liabilities of newness and smallness.
Secondly, the study also opens doors to a broader theoretical discussion on whether
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the VC investment strategy can be optimised to a uniform approach. Regarding this
discussion, the criticism which some VCs hold against novel evaluation and due dili-
gence approaches should be heard and taken into account. One VC mentioned that
the wealth of information that is available is a blessing and curse at the same time.
Compound learning over time adds patterns which influence future decisions which
can lead to an “analysis-paralysis”, a situation in which an ESV is over-analysed,
and no decision can be reached (Ramsinghani, 2014). Some investors, therefore,
suggest to consider “the top three risks associated with [...] an opportunity, [and
decide whether to reach] [...] an investment decision based on addressing these
risks” Ramsinghani (2014, p. 219). In response to the analysis-paralysis problem,
SigVC8 explained that a due diligence process in VC differs much from that in other
investment categories since they sift through 300-1000 opportunities per year for in-
vestment purposes. Thus, the art of assessing such a large pool of opportunities lies
in “getting to a quick NO”. Rather than trying to understand the ins and outs of
an ESV and why to invest in a company, the goal is to answer why not to invest in
a company. SigVC7 phrased this as finding the “red flags that would immediately
disqualify [the deal]” to which AdVC1 adds that “every deal has a little hair on it”
and the purpose of due diligence is finding the hair in the deal and assessing how
much hair is acceptable.
Lastly, the social network perspective is further tied to the field of entrepreneurship
and VC through this study. The study identified stakeholder classes which broadens
the academic repertoire, and contrasted their relevance to ESVs and VCs. Addition-
ally, established metrics were used to quantify social network characteristics, and
the study has shown that this is possible with social network depictions sketched by
founders.
4.8 Limitations and further research opportuni-
ties
The signalling and stakeholder studies serve as a basis onto which follow-up studies
of this thesis can be built upon. Thus, the limitations have to be addressed, some
of which lead to new research opportunities.
Firstly, while saturation was achieved with the analysis of higher level network con-
stellations, the question of why and how founders use their social networks to sup-
port certain business functions was not exhaustively answered. As this exploratory
study covered the entire pre-investment signalling process, a sufficient level of detail
was not reached with regards to the support of business functions. The variety of
answers obtained through probing founders with one dedicated question warrants
further research into ESVs’ strategies to leverage their social networks. Examples of
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mentions included social network supporting legal activities and go-to-market strat-
egy. Empirical studies, especially those focusing on ESVs, are scarce, leaving a lot of
“white-space” for further research (Kuester et al., 2018). Such research would also
respond to criticism from previous studies that stress research on resources embed-
ded in social networks must advance from who to how as “with this objective, we
shift away from a focus present in much of the social capital literature on whom an
entrepreneur knows toward an understanding of how they engage in social practices
of resourcing.” (Keating et al., 2014). Chapter 5 is dedicated to an in-depth study
of these resourcing strategies.
Secondly, social networks in their role as an evaluation parameter for VCs were only
identified but not yet thoroughly understood in the study. By isolating the social
network evaluation parameter and using a larger sample, the ESV social network
evaluation experiment in Chapter 6 can improve theoretical and practitioner un-
derstanding of relevant metrics and patterns. Lastly, the study could not control
for the impact signalling strategies had on the fundraising decision. None of the
cases had two-sided information, founders and VCs commenting on the same ESV.
By devising a dedicated study in Chapter 7 the relation of signals and fundraising
success were studied. Thus, this thesis can respond to results from studies such
as Wang (2016) which found that these signals mainly influence a VC’s decision to
interact and select for consideration but little impact on the investment decision.
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5.1 Chapter introduction
This chapter presents a study which takes results from the previous stakeholder
study in Section 4.2.2 as a starting point. The stakeholder study analysed ESVs’
approaches to leverage affiliations to certain stakeholders in their social networks.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the study’s position in the context of the thesis.
Chapter 4: ESV signalling and stakeholders (RQ 1&2)
Chapter 5: ESV social network function (RQ 3)
Chapter 6: ESV evaluation experiment (RQ 4)
Chapter 7: ESV evaluation tool (RQ 5)
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
informs builds to
builds to
converge converge
Research objectives:
Increase the understanding of ESVs’ approaches to leverage their
social networks to support dedicated business functions.
Research Question 3
ESV social network approaches:
Five in-depth case studies of ESVs that highlight approaches chosen
by founders which involve their social networks.
time
Figure 5.1: Data, research questions, and research objectives of Chapter 5, own
illustration.
This study puts the spotlight on the ESVs’ business functions, such as the actions
of ESVs in R&D, product development, establishing access to corporate decision-
makers, sales channels and market entry, or data gathering, overcoming regulatory
hurdles, building a brand, and crowdsourcing tasks, or financing. Particular focus
will be on social network approaches of ESVs to use stakeholders to fulfil these busi-
ness functions rather than relying purely on firm internal approaches. Longitudinal
qualitative data was gathered in a real-life, pre-investment setting result to answer
Research Question 3.
Research Question 3: How and in support of which business functions
can ESVs leverage their social networks?
The following section reviews the specific literature to understand the context of
existing works which enables to build the conceptual framework for this study.
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5.2 Conceptual development and literature review
Recent studies of ESVs’ strategic rethinking of core business functions have been
motivated by a paradigm shift called “lean startups” (Ries, 2011; Guillebau, 2012;
Still, 2017; Conway and Hemphill, 2019). The paradigm’s central element is a per-
ception shift, away from understanding resource scarcity, newness, and smallness
of ESVs as a stifling factor. Instead, ESVs are empowered by a leaner setup, en-
abling quick adaptation and iteration while using few resources and turning the
resulting nimbleness into their advantage. Thus, ESVs can be more successful in
developing and introducing a product than their incumbent counterparts, despite
having comparatively scarce resources and sometimes relying on non-conventional
means (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Huizingh, 2011; Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015;
Frederiksen and Brem, 2017). One way for ESVs to operate both dynamically and
resource-efficiently is through leveraging their social network.
Extant studies discern “market” resources, such as hiring to permanently perform
tasks in-house, or outsourcing, from “non-market” social network resources (Schut-
jens and Stam, 2003; Zhang et al., 2008; Bhalla and Terjesen, 2013; O¨zman, 2017;
Bustamante, 2019). Researchers emphasise the importance of strategic decisions by
ESVs to outsource activities that are critical to their business (Cooper, 2006; Fer-
rary, 2011). The frequently mentioned practices of outsourcing for the lean fulfilment
of tasks can be considered as a market based approach (Bhalla and Terjesen, 2013).
However, most studies researching ESV outsourcing, paint a black and white image
of either complete or no outsourcing (Bustamante, 2019). This could be considered
a gap in the literature as hiring talent and building capabilities in house, or paying
a third party to solve a problem externally can exist in parallel and dynamically
change over time (Bhalla and Terjesen, 2013; Bustamante, 2019). By contrast, this
research investigates an opposite strategic approach in which ESVs build capabilities
in-house to explicitly leverage third parties. A challenge is to motivate these third
parties to collaborate by predominantly non-monetary incentives, as a consequence
of the resource-constrained nature of ESVs. The ESV approach researched in this
study will be termed the “social network approach”. In her influential work, that
supports the notion of entrepreneurial networkedness, Sarasvathy (2008) mentions
the “crazy-quilt” factor as one of five traits that make out exceptional entrepreneurs
and explains that
“effectuation emphasises alliances and pre-commitments from stakehold-
ers as a way to reduce and/or eliminate uncertainty and erect entry
barriers. In fact effectuators do not choose stakeholders on the basis
of pre-selected ventures or venture goals; instead, they allow stakehold-
ers who make actual commitments to participate actively in shaping the
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enterprise. The crazy-quilt principle emphasises that inputs from stake-
holders who actually make commitments to the venture should be taken
into account without regard to opportunity costs as to possible stakehold-
ers who may or may not come on board later.” (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 88)
Previous studies emphasised the idea of relying on social network partners during all
stages of ESV maturity, from incorporation to IPO (Blank, 2013). Positive impacts
resulting from stakeholders’ support stem from elevated levels of creativity and idea
generation (Ohly et al., 2010), prototype and product testing with (lead) users
(Coviello and Joseph, 2012), iterating and innovating (Cheng and Huizingh, 2014),
financing (Zhang et al., 2008), hiring (Wassermann, 2017), suppliers (La Rocca et al.,
2019), marketing through social media (Ghezzi et al., 2016).
As the literature review in Chapter 2 has shown, the majority of empirical research
in the overlapping areas of social networks and entrepreneurship focuses on social
network resources. Besides garnering resources, other ways to leverage resources,
such as those mentioned above have been studied. However, the majority of studies
focus on the stakeholders and place little emphasis on the actual implementation of
the engagement practice from an entrepreneurial perspective.
Table 5.1 shows an overview of previous studies which provide meta-level overviews
of ESVs using the social network instead of market approaches.
Table 5.1: Meta-level studies researching ESV stakeholders
Business function as unit of analysis Study
R&D partnerships impacting number of new prod-
uct introductions
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006)
Investor network and fundraising success Zhang et al. (2008)
R&D partnership impacting ESV valuation Aggarwal and Hsu (2009)
Innovation partnerships with suppliers, customers,
competitors, universities, research institutes
Neyens et al. (2010)
Interaction and collaboration with suppliers, cus-
tomers, and competitors ESV success
Huang et al. (2012)
Friends, colleagues, advisers, supervisors and ESV
success
Gloor et al. (2013)
Customers interaction and retention Meiseberg (2015)
Number of stakeholders influence on on fundraising
success and innovativeness
Semrau and Hopp (2016)
Entrepreneurial collaboration in hiring talent Chatterji et al. (2019)
By nature, these meta-level overviews are either theoretical or aim to generalise the
higher-level social network approach success factors. Moreover, these studies were
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mostly to provide results optimising for breadth by capturing stakeholders and so-
cial network approaches which impact several of an ESV’s business units or involve
different stakeholder types. This trade-off of breadth over depth is a shortcoming of
previous studies and they scratch the surface when analysing ESVs’ social network
approach strategies.
By contrast, this research addresses the gap by studying in-depth ESVs interact-
ing with social network stakeholders to fulfilling business functions through social
network instead of market based approaches. The analysis includes the “who?”,
“how?”, and “why?” of leveraging stakeholders with strong emphasis on the latter
two aspects. Taking a depth over breadth approach, this study responds to recent
empirical research and reviews that have suggested researchers should “focus away
from whom entrepreneurs know toward how they engage with their venture’s social
contexts” (Keating et al., 2014, p. 1027). Likewise, Usman and Vanhaverbeke (2017,
p. 173) fault that although it has been extensively demonstrated that “start-ups rely
more on external partners [...], there is still no explanation on which mechanisms
start-ups are using to organise and manage collaborations successfully with external
partners”. Despite a deep focus, the study nonetheless finds patterns through a
cross-case analysis which categorises the ESVs’ social network approaches using a
business model innovation (BMI) framework.
The next section outlines the study’s enquiry method and research design, including
the sampling strategy, and resulting samples.
5.3 Method and research design
The research method chosen for this study follows the case study method outlined
in Section 3.2.3. The case study firms were identified and studied in a capacity
as a researcher for a VC fund which invests in Seed to Series A funding-rounds in
ESVs with a focus on B2B and commercialisation of science. The dual role of the
researcher as part of the VC fund allowed real-life, pre-investment conversations
to be studied. Holding these conversations gave the researcher the opportunity to
observe whether the ESVs ideated and implemented strategic decisions to leverage
their social networks. The ESVs considered for the study matched the VC fund’s
investment criteria. Apart from the inclusion in these criteria, conversations with
case study firms occurred independently of the investment decision of the VC fund.
In full disclosure, none of the mentioned ESVs have been, are, or will be portfolio
companies of the VC fund.
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5.3.1 Sampling strategy
To be considered as an ESV case study it had to met the following inclusion criteria:
1. The ESV matches Definition 2 as shown on page 24
2. A current C-suite level co-founder is available to interview
3. The interviewee has more than one year experience in his/her current position,
which entails that the ESV has been incorporated for at least one year
4. The interviewee or a co-founder is available for at least three separate conver-
sations over at least six months
5. The ESV leveraged its social network for at least one critical function of its
business
6. Leveraging their social network has to lead to a governance change decision
by the ESV1
Figure 5.2 illustrates the sampling process.
42 ESVs as candidates
1st conversation
(March to November 2018)
25 ESVs filtered for criteria 1-5
2nd conversation
(April 2018 to July 2019)
8 ESVs filtered for criteria 6
3rd conversation
(June 2018 to September 2019)
5 ESVs in final sample
4thth to 7th conversation
(August 2018 to January 2020)
3 ESVs
(c. 1-6)
25 ESVs
(c. 1-4)
14 ESVs
(lost1)
8 ESVs
(c. 1-5)
17 ESVs
(lost2)
2 ESVs
(c. 1-6)
6 ESVs
(lost3)
5 ESVs
(c. 1-6)
114 ESVs filtered out for failing to meet criterion 4
215 ESVs filtered out for not meeting criteria 1-5, 2 for failing to meet criterion 4
36 ESVs filtered out for not meeting criterion 6
Figure 5.2: Sampling procedure, own illustration.
Sampling started with 42 ESVs which were identified as investment candidates and
met the investment criteria of the VC fund. The researcher conducted an in-depth
1 Corporate governance can be defined as “the procedures and processes according to which an
organisation is directed, and controlled. [...] [This includes] the distribution of rights and re-
sponsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as the board, managers,
shareholders and other stakeholders.” (European Central Bank, 2004). While it could be argued
that formal corporate governance structures are unlikely to be found in ESVs, for the purpose of
this thesis it is understood as the firm-internally communicated and permanently implemented
strategic decisions which involve handling of relationships and involvement of external stakehold-
ers.
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analysis of 42 ESVs from March 2018 until November 2018. During this time, a
first conversation took place, which confirmed whether ESVs matched the sampling
criteria.
Of the 42 ESVs, three were included in the sample as they met all inclusion criteria.
These three firms were available for at least two more follow-up conversations and
remained part of the sample. Of the remaining 39 firms, 14 were not available for
a follow-up conversation. The second meetings took place with the remaining 25
ESVs, ten of which were subsequently identified as having met criteria 1 to 5. Two
of those ESVs left the sample because a further third meeting was not possible. Of
the eight ESVs that initially met criteria 1 to 5, five never met criterion 6. The final
resulting study sample comprises of five ESVs that met all criteria at some point
during the study.
Table 5.2 describes the resulting sample, to ensure anonymity of the founders, ge-
ographies and industry descriptions are kept deliberately high-level.
Table 5.2: Case studies ESVs in social network approach study
Case studies ESV characteristics
Sample size 5
Case study interviews1 Count
ESV A 6
CEO 4
CTO 4
ESV B 7
CEO 7
CTO 1
ESV C 6
CEO 6
ESV D 4
CEO 4
ESV E 4
CEO 4
Headquarter geography
Europe 5
Investment stages
Unfunded 3
Seed 1
Grant 1
ESV info
B2B 4
B2B & B2C 1
1Some case study interviews were conducted with multiple
members of the ESV ’s team.
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5.3.2 Data gathering and analysis
The data was gathered during face-to-face discussions with ESV founders. Leading
into every conversation, the researcher emphasised his dual role as an academic re-
searcher and representative of the VC fund. Furthermore, all ESV founders were
guaranteed anonymity including names they would mention during the interaction.
During the discussions the researcher took notes both in the capacity as a fund rep-
resentative and a researcher. Conversations with the founders followed the structure
of a real-life pre-investment discussion, which can be considered an unstructured in-
terview procedure. During the conversations, the interviewer refrained from steering
the founders towards the topic of social networks or the ESV’s stakeholders. Only in
those cases, where founders mentioned a social network related topic, the interviewer
asked further probing questions to extract more detailed accounts. As it is challeng-
ing to lead the conversation while figuratively “wearing two hats” and taking notes,
the conversation notes were promptly fully completed after the discussions. Retro-
spective edits to the notes included anonymisation of names and additions based on
recollections. All the information mentioned in case study descriptions comprises
of verbal accounts, supplementary documents provided by founders not marked as
confidential, and publicly available sources such as the ESV’s website or news arti-
cles. Sensitive information from ESVs’ confidential documents is not included.
As the ESVs are fast-paced, following their development and activities over an ex-
tended period becomes necessary (Schutjens and Stam, 2003; Hartmann et al., 2016).
Thus at least three, and in one case seven, conversations were held in total. This
approach provides multiple snap-shot views and documents changes as well as their
persistence. It should be noted that as a consequence of criterion 6, which requires
ESVs to having made permanent governance changes, the study could not identify
negative experiences from using social networks. Although no interviewee mentioned
negative examples during the sample filtering conversations, bias could have been
introduced by criterion 6 which will be discussed as a limitation of the study in
Section 5.7.
The data analysis was performed after all case study interviews were completed. Fol-
lowing the case study descriptions, the social network approaches were summarised
and compiled with previous interview data. The summarised quotes were then cat-
egorised into three dedicated business model (BM) elements and analysed from a
BMI perspective as later explained in detail in Section 5.5.
5.4 Case study descriptions
The following sections subsequently describe all case study ESVs, beginning with
a brief overview of the ESV, a problem description, the entrepreneurs’ identified
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solutions, and how solutions were translated into permanent governance changes.
5.4.1 Case study ESV A
ESV A was co-founded by a team who had previous work experience in logistics,
management consulting, and in full-stack developing, both in larger organisations
and ESVs. At the time of the first discussion, the ESV A had two employees.
The founders decided to start ESV A after noticing first-hand how inefficiently
firms across industries tracked their assets. The state-of-the-art solution was to
either use a pen and paper-based system, or rely on near field communication or
bar-code scanners from third parties which are highly specialised, expensive, and
inflexible. Using mobile devices, ESV A developed an operating system agnostic
software application which uses mobile devices’ cameras to detect objects that serve
as unique identifiers. The cloud-based platform would then allow users to create a
template, comparable to a paper-based form which specifies additional information
required to describe an asset. From that point on, the software would be able to show
the user the template if it recognises the same or a similar asset again. Clients could
use the product independently, regardless of the use-case or industry, as users could
specify unique identifiers, build customised user interfaces, and fill legacy system
databases.
(a) Problem faced by ESV A
ESV A’s product entered the market as a freemium model2. After launching the
product, user numbers climbed quickly, however, the majority of clients were using
the free functionalities of the product. After a few months the revenue growth
stagnated.
To expand their user base, the founders evaluated whether to raise venture funding
from a VC, or attempt to keep growing the business organically. The founders
were in two minds. If ESV A raised VC funding, they could take their product to
trade shows, launch a marketing campaign, and hire a sales team. However, the
founders were concerned that accepting venture funding before reaching significant
commercial traction would force them to give up a large ownership stake of the
company. By contrast, if ESV A first de-risked the investment opportunity for
VC investors, they could later fundraise a larger amount while suffering from less
dilution.
Another challenge ESV A faced was to manage the engaged user base which gave
constructive feedback and suggested features, but the developer team struggled to
keep up with the demand. Consequently, ESV A devised the plan to achieve a
paid, large-scale contract with an enterprise customer. Achieving this would solve
2 A freemium model allows the use of a software product’s core functionality free of charge, however,
additional premium features require a subscribe in exchange for a regular payment.
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both problems, as software optimisation could focus on the demands of one paying
customer, and the increased revenue stream would allow the founders to retain
ownership.
(b) Solution identified by ESV A
The review of customer feedback and usage patterns revealed that small teams
within the same firm began using the product. The founders also noticed that a
user, who worked for a global car-rental firm, processed rental-car returns with the
software. License number plates served as unique identifiers and information about
the rental-car’s condition and mileage were logged. Equipped with an improved
version of the customer’s template, the team visited a local car-rental branch. In a
conversation with a representative, they discussed the paper-based incumbent solu-
tion and noticed the employee’s frustration. Afterwards, the founders demonstrated
their product, which the representative began using the following day. The represen-
tative became a daily user, converted one of his/her colleagues, and made frequent
requests such as a feature allowing for automatic daily reporting and forwarding to
supervisors. The two employees became ESV A’s internal champions at the rental-
car company, and not long after, the supervisor was in touch to negotiate a paid
pilot. The pilot proved successful and the founders, equipped with a detailed report
about usage statistics that stated over an hour of time saved per day, agreed with
the supervisor to advised the rental-car company’s senior management to roll out
the product gradually to other branches. At the time of writing, the product is
implemented across three countries.
(c) Governance changes by ESV A
Through their experience with one rental-car firm, ESV A approached other rental-
car firms with the same strategy while gaining customers in separate industries such
as retail, automotive, and logistics. Contrary to its direct asset tracking competitors,
ESV A starts engagements with potential clients through employees who would use
the tool and aims to turn these employees into corporate champions. By analysing
the self-created templates of users who already joined the platform, the founders
have an understanding of individual use-cases, which allows the developer team to
tailor the tool accordingly.
The founders still pride themselves in their active users, who generously provide
feedback and suggest continuous product improvements. A temporary decline in
feature requests by users was mitigated through the introduction of a gamified cus-
tomer feedback procedure. As ESV A’s freemium users had been the most active
contributors, ESV A started to offer tokens to unlock premium features in exchange
for submitting feature requests. This measure increased requests per user by 20%
without substantially increasing customer acquisition costs. ESV A broke even and
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increased its revenues steadily allowing the founders to hire an on-the-ground team
of “customer success managers” and expand their developer team.
5.4.2 Case study ESV B
ESV B was founded by five co-founders, a computer vision expert, a medical doctor,
and three full-time senior management employees in the country’s public healthcare
provider in which ESV B is based. The medical doctor has previously sold a medical
device company and is a strong advocate for reaching medical approval as a sus-
tained competitive advantage. ESV B’s product allows users to mark instances in
an image, and a machine learning (ML) algorithm finds similar instances. According
to the founders, almost every vision-based medical analytics tool relies on accurate
quantification of instances, volumes, distributions, etc. Therefore, the product could
reach wide adoption among hospitals and microscope or radiology equipment man-
ufacturers. The main differentiation of ESV B’s product to its competitors is that
the users can specify a few instances which are to be recognised instead of matching
and labelling thousands of images stored in crowd-shared or proprietary databases.
(a) Problem faced by ESV B
ESV B faced multiple issues at the time of first introduction. Coinciding with
ESV B’s formal incorporation, the regulatory body in their home market passed new
legislation which made it significantly more difficult to receive approval for medi-
cal software. Furthermore, their competitors, in the meantime received approval
for clinical use in a dedicated treatment category. As a treatment separated from
the radiology assessment, hospitals could bill patients or insurers a premium. The
re-categorisation as certified providers improved the improved hospitals return on
investment (ROI) when using ESV B competitors’ software. ESV B’s founders knew
they would need to have to find several short-cuts in their development road-map
and nonetheless face strong competition. Even if ESV B received approval, they
feared incumbents could build a long-term competitive advantage in the meantime.
As a consequence, ESV B considered pivoting and changing their target market.
(b) Solution identified by ESV B
A member of the founding team who worked for the public healthcare provider,
frequently interacted with CROs as part of his/her role. This contract research
customer segment already purchases from established software providers, however,
their technology is inferior and outdated compared to that of ESV B. An intro-
duction of ESV B to a CRO was facilitated by the already affiliated member of
the team. During a lab visit and interaction with technicians and researchers at
the CRO, the founders noticed that only a few tasks were supported by analytics
software. Instead, most research activities involved mundane tasks and significant
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human labour. Furthermore, the mostly non-computer specialists employees at the
CRO mentioned the inflexibility of the solution especially considering the breadth
of research they conduct. Market research conducted by ESV B showed that only
medium to large-scale CROs use high-priced, licensed software.
The newly identified use-case had the benefit that regulatory hurdles were less prob-
lematic. CROs predominantly sell services which are either unrelated to ongoing
patient treatments and purely for research purpose or in few instances used to sup-
port decisions overseen by clinicians. However, the barrier to entry of selling to large
CROs was that software solution providers required the reputation as an established
firm or that a software product must first demonstrate its successful application in
a number of peer-reviewed academic studies. This presented an issue since the
ESV was far away from being established and a successful publication of studies
in renowned academic publications takes a long time. Having observed how infre-
quently contract research uses advanced analytical tools, the founders began offering
their software for symbolic contributions to top global university institutions. Uni-
versities who had no comparable solution in place were eager to adopt the technology
and agreed to acknowledge the use of ESV B’s product in their publications.
(c) Governance changes by ESV B
ESV B recognised that their product is better suited for the less competitive CRO
market segment. Consequently, the founding team began targeting university re-
search departments which conduct research in Biology, Chemistry, and Material
Science. Two of the early adopters finished their academic studies and joined a
CRO to continue their research. ESV B continued to attract researchers with free
licenses and was able to convert some to paid licenses. Collaborating with more
than a dozen global research institutes, both in universities and CROs, elevated the
credibility of ESV B. Publishing research with results generated on ESV B’s soft-
ware platform remains an elementary line of business, as several universities have
been turned into paid customers. These universities also provided customer testi-
monials and several public reviews on ESV B’s website while praising the continued
improvements and excellent customer support. Shifting their focus away from be-
coming a medical software device has led to internal tensions at ESV B, as the three
co-founders who worked part-time for the public health organisation, made invalu-
able contributions at first, however, after the pivot towards serving CROs the roles
and future involvement became unclear. The three co-founders working for public
healthcare provider parted ways with ESV B.
5.4.3 Case study ESV C
ESV C was founded by two co-founders with an education in engineering. The
founders have been working in the aerospace and environmental services industry.
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The two founders saw advancements in drone and image processing technology as a
business opportunity for aerial imaging in agriculture. The founders’ initial research
with a small scale farm demonstrated that productivity is lost as a cause of inefficient
irrigation and use of fertilisers or pesticides, leading to sub-optimal yields for farmers.
The entrepreneurs explained that farmers had to estimate their end of season yield
and commit to delivering the amount to down-stream buyers and processors. This
created an opportunity for ESV C as overestimation could mean the farmer fails to
reach the quota, underestimation leaves the farmer with an oversupply of products
which is hard to sell. An analytics solution based on aerial images could identify
treatment mistakes and also help estimate the yield early during the growing season
by counting blossoms and documenting the growth. With the aim of solving these
two problems simultaneously and using their experience, ESV C was founded.
(a) Problem faced by ESV C
From the beginning ESV C encountered strong resistance and described their indus-
try as highly conservative. Furthermore, while the founders understood their prod-
uct and technology very well, their customer base was reportedly not technophilic
and many resisted the use of technology on their farms. Facing pushback and losing
much time in long and unsuccessful sales cycles, the founders concluded that they
did not “speak the customers’ language”. To succeed, ESV C’s founders would have
to acquire a deeper understanding of their clients needs to suitably address farmers
issues through a service product. Several interactions with farming organisations
of varying scales also showed a higher propensity of large-scale operations to use
advanced technology. However, these larger organisations were used to dealing with
enterprise vendors and not pre-product ESVs. For over a year, the founders were
not able to secure a pilot with a large-scale farm.
(b) Solution identified by ESV C
In search for ways to start a pilot with a large farm, ESV C found out about a local
CRO who specialised in R&D as well as testing agricultural products. The CRO has
a century-long history of fostering relationships with farmers, including the majority
of target clients for ESV C. Farmers would regularly engage with representatives of
the CRO which hosts events and has a quarterly circulation to its forum members.
The founders were able to convince the head of the CRO to be invited for a demon-
stration of their aerial image analytics technology to representatives of the CRO.
As part of the subsequent negotiation which would make the CRO and ESV C joint
development partners, the CRO demanded one year exclusive access to the technol-
ogy and licensing agreement for them to sell the solution to its clients as a service.
ESV C had completed a successful pilot project in the research facilities of the CRO.
Throughout, ESV C regularly flew their drones to take footage and monitor cer-
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tain arable products. The CRO set aside a dedicated spokesperson who had weekly
meetings with the founding team and, occasionally, the founders demonstrated their
results to a wider community within the CRO. The technology is featured on the
CROs website which has created a significant amount of inbound enquiries. During
the pilot ESV C’s technology and has been deployed at various farming sites as part
of the service offering of the CRO. With the borrowed credibility of the CRO, an
entity which was familiar to the agricultural businesses, ESV C could demonstrated
their solution to several farmers. The founders hope to win these clients who used
the service through the CRO after the exclusive licensing clause terminates.
(c) Governance changes by ESV C
Regular and close contact with industry veterans has helped ESV C to better under-
stand the characteristics of farming organisations of depending on their scales, and
peculiarities of farming of different arable products. Continued engagement with
the CRO has helped fill the pipeline of clients who shows interest. By now, ESV C
has signed commercial contracts with a group of large-scale farming operations will
soon be deployed on their sites. Equipped with these contracts and several letters
of intent3, ESV C has begun their venture fundraising process.
Another CRO which would act predominantly as a channel partner similar to the
first partner has seen a demonstration of the technology. To a minor extent, the
second CRO could act as a further development partner who focuses on different
crops. If ESV C can demonstrate the application successfully with other types of
crops, they could broaden their proposition.
5.4.4 Case study ESV D
ESV D was founded by a single founder, based on doctoral research in Biology
and Nanotechnology. During doctoral research, the founder tinkered with the early
prototypes of a novel substrate. With the substrate, a surface can be modified
to achieve unprecedented tactile sensitivity and for instance allow robots to gain
dexterous skills exceeding human capabilities. According to the founder, the high
value products in the robotics market have changed in the last decade. Most of
the realised commercial value does not stem from the robot itself but instead the
end-effectors, the part of the robot coming into contact with the handled goods.
The founder explained that while handling robots in manufacturing, logistics, and
retail can be considered a commodity, the end-of-arm robotic components to handle
of fresh food, groceries, and unpacked goods are comparatively underdeveloped.
A market survey conducted by the founder identified online grocery stores as a
3 A letter of intent can be defined as “a letter that formally states what someone plans to do
although this is not a legal promise or official contract” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020).
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beachhead market4. ESV D previously negotiated a paid pilot with a leading online
grocery retailer.
(a) Problem faced by ESV D
To manage the pilot, the founder hired four employees. Not being able to fund
a capital intensive, ground-up development, ESV D attempted to recombine using
off-the-shelf components and adding their sensors. However, early during the pi-
lot phase it became clear the results would not fulfil the customer’s expectations.
Nonetheless, the pilot partner was committed to the further development and offered
to pause the pilot for ESV D to improve their product and continue the testing at
a later stage. The founder traced the cause of the performance issues back to insuf-
ficiently developed algorithms which led to products being handled correctly. The
robotic end-effector was supposed to closely mimic human interaction with sensitive
products, for instance strawberries. The founder explained while human operators
instinctively know how to grip and release different items, the robot had to be taught
how to fulfil these tasks. ESV D’s founder suggested to the pilot partner that em-
ployees could use a make shift glove equipped with the sensors for a limited period
to gather data which would help ESV D improve their algorithms. Suggesting this
move, however, created internal tensions at the online shop, as employees feared
being part of a technology development which could ultimately make their jobs re-
dundant. By making a select group of employees minority shareholders, the founder
convinced both management and operators to begin using the sensor gloves.
At the same time, ESV D was at risk of liquidity issues which threatened the exis-
tence of the firm, and two employees chose to leave.
(b) Solution identified by ESV D
ESV D’s founder won a best-of-show award, which included a small grant, at a pres-
tigious conference. His/her previous PhD supervisor mentioned the achievement
to the technology transfer officer (TTO) of the university. Consequently, the TTO
asked for an introduction to the founder. The university, which is the founder’s
alma mater, was in a geographically disadvantaged location. It was the TTO’s re-
sponsibility to raise the university’s profile as an entrepreneurship hot-spot in the
country. The TTO suggested a joint application for European grant which would
allow the university to build and retrofit laboratory facilities. A successful applica-
tion allowed ESV D to became the first research lab tenant, free of charge for five
years, and office space which could accommodate a large team.
Piloting the improved end-effectors at the online shop’s facilities had started again.
4 A beachhead market is defined as one which is easily accessible, ready for adoption of a technology
and customers buy similar products. Furthermore, sales cycles are similar across customers who
are in turn tightly knit through strong word-of-mouth communication (Aulet, 2013).
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Rewritten algorithms with fed with data the employees had gathered in the mean-
time, improved the handling performance and now exceeded the customer’s bench-
marks. The full roll-out in one logistics facility has been completed.
(c) Governance changes by ESV D
In agreement with the online shop, ESV D was allowed to publicly mention the
online retailer as their customer. This external validation has helped to negotiate
another contract with a retail firm.
Furthermore, the engagement with the universities’ TTO continues, and the founder
mentored another ESV towards a successful grant application. After several pres-
tigious conference keynotes, the founder assumed a thought leader role in the field
of robotics. Being considered a thought leader has allowed him/her to regularly
speak in public, generating invaluable publicity. This publicity has helped to raise
five additional non-dilutive grants. The founder admitted that during the course of
the commercial trial, he/she learned to appreciate the value of a proprietary data-
set to teach and improve algorithms. Only the failed trial made him/her recognise
that besides the hardware the software component of the product might yield more
long time value. Thus he/she used the strong position at the online retailer to re-
negotiate the full ownership of the data. By now, ESV D is likely to own the largest
amount of data on gripping and releasing of delicate and complex to handle goods.
5.4.5 Case study ESV E
ESV E was co-founded by two graduate engineering students based on their Master’s
research. ESV E develops a wearable device to monitor body functions. The de-
vice can measure several biological features current devices cannot yet detect. The
founders knew early on, that their product would only be able to reach adoption if
it is marketed well. However, the wearable device market is saturated with domi-
nant players with million-dollar marketing budgets and out-competing these would
be impossible for an ESV. Furthermore, devices feature little differentiation, hence
competing even if one has a superior product would be hard for new entrants.
(a) Problem faced by ESV E
ESV E assembled a team and launched a crowdfunding campaign. The campaign
failed to achieve the fundraising target which left the founders without funding.
Raising VC funding at favourable terms became impossible following the failed
crowdfunding attempt. A direct route to becoming a B2C wearable device man-
ufacturer seemed out of reach.
Through existing research-collaborations of their university department and one of
the founders past career as a professional athlete, ESV E was introduced to Physi-
ologists and Sporting Directors in world-renowned teams. The clubs were interested
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in the wearable device as it allowed measuring an unprecedented number of bio-
logical features. As a consequence, the clubs offered a commercial partnership to
ESV E which included financial support and an opportunity to test their prototypes
with athletes. However, the funding offered by the two clubs was insufficient to
finance the product development and neither Angel, nor VC investors were willing
to participate in the unconventional partnership agreement. The founders suggested
to expand the partnership agreement, but initially the two clubs were hesitant to
include other clubs fearing to lose proprietary access and gaining an edge over their
sporting competitors.
(b) Solution identified by ESV E
ESV E successfully convinced another sports team from a different discipline to join
the partnership. As this third sports team was not a direct competitor, the two al-
ready partnering clubs agreed. The funds provided by the three sports clubs would
suffice to develop the product. However, supplying only professional sports teams
would limit serviceable market significantly, and the founders held on to their vision
to ultimately sell their product to the public. Through their website, ESV E made
their wearable device available for pre-order and could thereby track private cus-
tomers continued interest. By claiming to deliberately limit access for private users
and stating to only supply to professional athletes, ESV E believed that customers
would get increasingly excited. As the device was developed in collaboration with
professional athletes ESV E had turned a last resort effort into a competitive moat
since none of their much larger and established competitors could make this claim.
ESV E had negotiated with the three clubs permission to publicly disclose that their
product was used by the professional athletes of the clubs, in hopes of bolstering
marketing efforts.
One of the founders began dedicating one day per week to improve ESV E’s so-
cial media presence. As part of this effort, he/she began contributing to HARO5.
A befriended ESV founder had recommended using the platform after being pub-
licly mentioned as a contributer multiple times, thereby getting free, high-quality
coverage.
(c) Governance changes by ESV E
Over time, the founders added five professional sports clubs to pilot their product.
These paid pilots have allowed the founders to bootstrap their venture and not take
on any equity funding. The athletes are dispersed across geographies and disciplines
which helps ESV E to make bold marketing claims. A commercial director of one
of the clubs suggested that once the second device generation, which will be sold to
5 HARO the acronym for Help A Reporter Out and is an online network which connects around
50,000 journalists over 800,000 with industrial expert sources.
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end-customers, reaches the market, it could be sold as a branded version through
the clubs merchandise shop. Being able to publicly mention their affiliation with
world-class sports teams has helped ESV E to strengthen their brand perception.
The founders hired a part-time employee to take over the role as ESV E’s Chief
Marketing Officer (CMO). The website pre-sales conversion rates indicated that the
increased social media efforts were the primary contributor to pre-orders that ex-
ceeded 10,000 units.
ESV E seeks demand from additional sports teams to test their products. As
ESV E’s product is the first to detect certain biological signals, the founders see
increasing value in the data they can generate through their devices. As soon as
ESV E would launch the second version of their product, their plan is to make it
mandatory for professional teams to share the data that will be generated. The
founders’ vision is to expand their product line by adding analytics services and
selling data access to researchers and other device manufacturers.
5.5 Cross-case analysis
The purpose of the cross-case analysis is to compare and contrast the social network
approaches used by the case study ESVs. To provide a structure for the analysis,
ESVs’ social network approaches were categorised into elementary BMI changes. A
working definition of a BM is adopted from Afuah and Tucci (2001, p. 3) who state
that a BM is “the method by which a firm builds and uses its resources to offer its
customer better value and to make money in doing so”. A BMI occurs when firms
alter the fundamental building blocks their BM, namely, the value creation, value
capture, or value network (Teece, 2010).
The BMI categorisation was chosen as it allows to focus on the “how?” and “why?”
rationale of ESVs’ strategic decisions in contrast to the “who?” perspective a pure
stakeholder analysis would give. Furthermore, previous studies have found the BM
perspective particularly relevant for ESVs who are often operating in “uncertain,
complex, and fast-moving environments [...] [Thus,] new firms increasingly benefit
from a combination of novel insights, rapid experimentation, and evolutionary learn-
ing and need to be more adaptive and responsive to organisational and contextual
changes [...] for gaining sustainable competitive advantages.” (Al-Debei and Avi-
son, 2010; Andries et al., 2013; Wrigley and Straker, 2016; Cosenz and Noto, 2018,
p.129).
Varying definitions of the first element of a BM, “value creation”, are abundant in
literature6. Adapted for the context of this study, value creation is understood as
6 Lepak et al. (2007, p. 182) defined that “value creation depends on the relative amount of value
that is subjectively realised by a target user [...] and that this subjective value realisation must at
least translate into the user’s willingness to exchange a monetary amount for the value received.
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the process of building a product or service which is of use to the ESVs’ customers7.
Customers, in turn, are willing to compensate the ESV8.
The second element, “value capture” is linked to the value creation and can be un-
derstood as the mechanisms that enable firms, in the given context ESVs, to retain
a proportion of the value that was created for the customer (Zott and Amit, 2010;
Zott et al., 2011).
The third and last BM element, which will be used to categorise findings from the
case studies is the “value network”. Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) and Ches-
brough (2002) describe the value network as the structure which links a firm to its
surrounding ecosystems.
The three mentioned BM elements have to be viewed in a systemic way, as such Zott
et al. (2011, p.1029) who see them interconnected as follows: “value creation and
value capture occur in a value network, which can include suppliers, partners, dis-
tribution channels, and coalitions that extend the company’s resources.” The value
network element is especially relevant for new ventures and market entrants since
successful businesses are not built in a vacuum, and therefore an effective and pro-
prietary value network can present one of the strongest and enduring differentiators
(Teece, 2010; Al-Debei and Avison, 2010; Zott et al., 2011; Fjeldstad and Snow,
2018).
It is important to note that this cross-case analysis does not look at the general
value creation, proposition, capture, or strategies of the ESVs but specifically the
changes that were introduced, which involved a social network approach. To recap,
Table 5.3 shows a summary of the ESV case studies.
Table 5.3: Cross-case comparison ESV overview
Case study Product
ESV A Asset tracking
ESV B Image analytics
ESV C Aerial imaging
ESV D End-effector for robots
ESV E Wearable device
5.5.1 Value creation effect through social network approach
ESV A established connections to lead users and turned them into integral contrib-
utors to their product development processes. Close contact with its users compli-
The closely related BM element of “value proposition”, which captures reasons why an offering
is “compelling to customers, achiev[ing] advantageous cost and risk structures” (Teece, 2010,
p. 174), is included in the analysis of the value creation as the “use value” (cf. Bowman and
Ambrosini (2000)).
7 Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) defined this value as the “use value”.
8 Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) defined this value as the “exchange value”.
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mented the founders’ broad industry experience with industry-specific knowledge,
feature demand, and state of the art use-cases. As a result, its users served as
ESV A’s use-case radar and helped identify potential enterprise customers. Seeing
first-hand the use-cases of lead users allowed the development team to tailor products
better to their clients’ requirements than their direct competitors. Moreover, clients
appreciated the bespoke feel of the solution. While direct competitors sold inflexi-
ble, expensive, off-the-shelf bundles of hard-and software ESV A found an inexpen-
sive way to include clients in the role of product development and testing without
hardware requirements. Alongside selling a tool-kit, founders began focusing their
development efforts on individual use-cases, and ESV A sold an enterprise-grade,
bespoke service.
While ESV B’s product worked with small amounts of labelled data, the accuracy
of their product increased when large data sets were used to train the algorithm.
Thus, ESV B was incentivised to disseminate its product widely and gather training
data. Collaboration with prestigious research institutions for product development
purposes, gave ESV B a credibility-edge over new market entrants. External val-
idation of the software directly improved the customer value proposition, as their
target clients, the CROs, sell high-quality contract research. Being able to mention
that the analytics software was in use at the best universities in the world enhanced
the perception of trust in the CRO’s work. By comparison, software products the
CROs previously used were rarely found in academic research due to its high price.
Besides offering an analytics solution, the founders expected that the wealth of data
which clients share could become ESV B’s biggest asset. The founders mentioned
that it is common for their competitors to outsource data-labelling to low-income
countries, whereas ESV B’s clients essentially act as their proprietary army of well-
trained researchers that ESV a did not directly compensate.
The founders of ESV C lacked industry expertise and were initially not able to
launch their product in the traditionalist agricultural industry. In an attempt to
establish indirect access, ESV C had to sell to research organisations instead of
farmers. The customer value proposition shifted from covering large arable land-
areas and a limited number of crop categories at a low cost, to delivering small-scale,
crop-agnostic, precision measurements. Following the push by their pilot partner,
ESV C successfully adapted their technology to also work in indoor settings. As
a result of working with the CRO, ESV C significantly expanded its technology
portfolio.
ESV D developed robotic components which, according to the founder, is usually
a capital intensive undertaking. By using off-the-shelf components and fine-tuning
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these with a pilot partner, ESV D ensured fast development while using inexpen-
sive components. To gather data despite their end-effectors not being deployable
yet, ESV D fitted their sensors to gloves in a makeshift manner. The team thereby
noticed that they could not only build new end-effectors but also retrofit exist-
ing components, thus allowing customers to keep their existing equipment. The
founder emphasised that cross-platform compatibility could become the “holy grail”
of robotic workflow automation, and ESV D competitors capabilities to work across
platforms are limited. Most of ESV D’s competitors are international robot manu-
facturers who have the incentive to avoid compatibility and lock customers into one
platform.
In their partnership with the online retailer, ESV D has assumed a role on equal
footing. Before engaging with ESV D, the online retailer had contracted multiple
incumbent robotics manufacturers to build suitable robotic-endeffectors who failed
at achieving satisfactory results. ESV D’s solution was the first to meet all standards
and has since helped its client reduce the operating costs by a seven-figure amount
per year in a single warehouse. Furthermore, as the online retailer’s flagship example
of its digitisation strategy, ESV D has become an invaluable strategic partner.
After the crowd-funding failed, ESV E switched from a pure B2C to a pure B2B
device manufacturer. Before the shift, the focus was on three factors, design, user-
friendliness, and low cost. To sustainably compete in a crowded wearable device
market, ESV E would have had to focus on optimising these three factors and missing
out on the opportunity to build a truly differentiated product. After the shift, they
found white space in the competitive landscape. Serving the closely related B2B,
professional equipment market allowed ESV E to gather valuable experience which
might help future efforts out-compete other manufacturers. ESV E’s customers were
keen to start a development partnership as they hoped to use proprietary wearable
technology and gain an advantage over sports rivals in their respective leagues. The
sports teams used their bargaining power to preclude competing sports teams from
getting access.
ESV E used an aggressive social media tactic to create hype and make the product
artificially scarce, which increased excitement among future private customers. This
cost-effective marketing, primarily enabled by tagging onto sport teams brands, has
helped ESV E to be on par much larger organisations when comparing online social
media followership and engagement metrics.
5.5.2 Value capture effect through social network approach
ESV A altered their product development strategy to be user-centric. This approach
was successful and possible by retaining and motivating their most engaged users
through rewards programs which translated into higher engagement and industry-
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leading user-experience and satisfaction. According to the founders, while most
contributors started as freemium users, an over-proportional amount of contribu-
tors were ultimately turned into paying customers. While the founders initially
emphasised that their product could be of use to everyone, their new approach was
to target client segments and serve them with a mass-customised applications capa-
ble of solving niche tasks. Because ESV A’s product is versatile, the development
team can create a minimum viable product within less than one day, making their
offering testable. By contrast, competitors would require large upfront capital ex-
penses before any testing or customisation could be offered. As users were involved
in the product development, they were familiar with the application. ESV A has
seen users make improvements to their templates which has helped reduce ESV A’s
customer-service expenditure.
ESV B was able to swiftly adapt its tool to an array of use-cases. Enabled by the
inputs from users in university organisations, the shift away from the pure med-
ical application was possible in a few months. A focus on one application would
have also drawn all the team’s attention to one problem. Instead, working closely
with university researchers who tinkered with the analytics software in non-medical
applications pointed the founding team towards other research areas to explore.
Demonstrating applicability in fields such as Biology or Material Science, and pub-
lishing peer-reviewed articles, broadened the number of addressable customers as
ESV B can serve a spectrum of CROs.
As opposed to their initial customer segment consisting of hospitals and incumbent
device manufacturers who have significantly more bargaining power, selling to CROs
was a more level playing field for ESV B. Not only did the CROs’ management see
value in ESV B’s product and were willing to compensate the founders for the pilot,
but the CROs also expedited purchasing decisions, accepted a shorter pilot phase,
and thus allowed ESV B to turn pilots faster into paid contracts. Compared to the
initial use-case tied to medical equipment, the CROs saw a clearer ROI, and ESV B
was able to increase their margin.
Competitors of ESV C sell specialist solutions for a single and sometimes a few crop
categories. The seasonality of crops planting and harvesting creates cycles of high
demand and no demand across the year. While ESV C’s competitors resorted to
starting operations in the northern and southern hemisphere, ESV C could remain
in one hemisphere. By being able to spread farmers’ demand over three quarters
of the year, providing analytics during seeding, growth, and harvesting for multiple
crops, customer demand is relatively constant. Indoor operations capability allows
the ESV to work with CROs over the winter period. Synergistic effects from building
an analytics platform that creates value for CROs and farmers, ESV C was able to
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translate learnings from farm operations into the high-margin CRO business.
ESV D’s makeshift sensor-gloves inspired a new line of business which would allow
retrofitting existing end-effectors with ESV D’s technology. In a market where
incumbents use the lack of standards to lock-in customers, ESV D almost by accident
learned how to work platform agnostic. Competitors miss significant portions of the
addressable market, by only focusing on new sales which are compatible with only
a few robotics manufacturers. By contrast, ESV D capitalised on already installed
robotic end-effectors through retrofittable solutions and being compatible with all
established device manufacturers.
Most clients comparable to the online retailer would expect to purchase a plug-and-
play solution. ESV D’s development partner agreed to jointly develop an innovative,
albeit not fully functioning solution. Securing a partnership with such a cooperative
partner is a remarkable achievement and presents a significant market entry barrier
for new entrants. As ESV D found a partner who is strategically involved, the ESV
performed the usually capital intensive development cost effectively.
ESV E can offer insights to sports teams which span disciplines, creating network
effects even as a small scale operation. Similar to ESV D’s founders, the founders
of ESV E increasingly saw data as a durable, competitive advantage, as it would
allow the device manufacturer to capitalise not only on device sales but also on
strategic data-sharing agreements. ESV E has a unique opportunity to become
one of the first wearable manufacturers to be applied in professional environments,
and has since expanded their areas of application to divers, fighter-plane pilots,
and astronaut training. ESV E’s approach enabled them to fund developments and
establish a high-margin business with a wealth of differentiating product features
which positions to also compete in a potentially loss-leading or lower-margin B2C
business.
5.5.3 Value network effect through social network approach
To promote enterprise sales, ESV A incentivised lead users, and employees of target
enterprise clients. By giving users a sense of ownership of the product implemen-
tation project, while solving their the user’s self-identified pain points, successful
user retention was achieved. Providing their corporate champions with support-
ing operational metrics and sales material, ESV A ensured internal success of their
product. The quantification of benefits paired with the enthusiasm of the corporate
champions has proven successful to convince higher management. As a consequence,
minimal capital investments in hiring customer success managers were sufficient to
engage with the entire pipeline of prospective enterprise clients.
ESV B created an unconventional partnership model which is rare in the software in-
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dustry. By using academic researchers from prestigious universities as development
contributors ESV B could develop and sell high-margin software to the CRO in-
dustry. Similar to the regulatory market entry barrier the founders initially sought,
research publication thresholds have also proven to create a barrier. By crowdsourc-
ing the paper-publication process, ESV B has created a strong moat. Furthermore,
through relationships with non-computer scientists users who shared their user ex-
perience, ESV B was able to develop an easy to use solution without sacrificing ad-
vanced functionalities. The co-development with academic and industrial research
partners, who are themselves in a dense network that grows by migration of skilled
talent, helped ESV B scale their sales. Users who have been using ESV B’s appli-
cation are unlikely to revert to mundane manual calculations. As CROs frequently
hire graduates from universities and ESV B has continued to equip graduates with
their software, they established a corporate champion model similar to ESV A.
When comparing the two, the main challenge ESV B faces is the smaller staff count
of most locally operating CROs, compared to an enterprise-scale network of, for
instance, rental-car branches.
ESV C identified CROs as a secondary target customer segment, which is, in turn
tightly knit to their primary customer segment, the farming operations. Long-time
relationships between individuals in their two customer segments have helped break
up traditional, siloed operations and win customer trust. Several of ESV C’s com-
petitors failed because they could not establish access. In this particular industry
example, products are “sticky” as customers are notoriously unwilling to change
their vendors, which means that ESV C can reap the benefits of the customer lock-
in and loyalty. This lock-in also applies to ESV C’s clients as they have become
indispensable partners without which the CRO would have to cut their service of-
ferings. Being dependable on the ESV to upkeep their service portfolio and signif-
icantly reduce its ongoing operating costs, the CRO and ESV have an intertwined
strategic relationship. Besides the technological differentiation ESV C was able to
build through the partnership, the founders also learned to navigate the high-inertia
traditional farming industry, which in itself could be a substantial moat.
ESV D has established a partnership with two main stakeholders, the online retailer
and the TTO at the founder’s alma mater. As mentioned before, the close R&D
involvement of the retailer is invaluable. The founder mentioned that the strategic
relationship with a retailer that was willing to sacrifice being able to pick a product
from a brochure but instead help to develop an innovative product has saved the
ESV from failing prematurely. The founder has leveraged his domain expertise to
get involved in European initiatives who in turn funded the venture on founder-
friendly terms. Furthermore, several of the grant-givers are strategically valuable
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partners and supply invaluable advice and ties to industry. Some of ESV D’s pipeline
clients are large-scale buyers of robotics technology. The robotics manufacturers
have noticed the new market entrant and have been approached as a potential
acquisition target and to use their commercial traction to engage partnerships with
manufacturers. ESV D managed a critical moment of the pilot, winning over a highly
sceptical group of employees who would be essential to the development of ESV D’s
algorithms. The founder’s thought leadership role at conferences inspired him/her
to start an initiative which investigates the trickle-down effects of installing robotics
on working-class talent. This new ethics platform could help ESV D to overcome
a barrier towards increased adoption of their technology as they learn to navigate
sensitive workplace situations.
ESV E established a strong brand through their affiliation with prestigious sports
teams. Compared to the professional athletes accompanied by a support staff of
trainers, physiologists, and nutritionists, engaging with private customers would
have unlikely been as involved and helpful for the wearable device development.
The founders hope to continue as a strong contender in the B2B market. The high
fluctuation of sports directors and trainers, leaving one team to join another one,
could help ESV E to scale as coaches move on to their successor clubs. ESV E has
not yet started to leverage individual athletes but sees this, as well as selling as
merchandise, as a future opportunity to increase brand awareness.
5.6 Discussion
Summary. This chapter presented five case studies conducted to answer Research
Question 3: “how and in support of which business functions can ESVs leverage their
social networks?” The case study descriptions and cross-case analysis, which followed
a categorisation into critical elements of BMIs illustrate nuanced expose´es of ESVs’
strategies to leverage social network stakeholders. A common theme found across
the case studies was that ESVs found pilot partners who either directly contributed
to the product development or indirectly through product testing. Furthermore,
stakeholder involvement also traverses topics such as crowdsourced tasks, gathering
of data sets, and establishing sales channel access. While stakeholders infrequently
supported financing activities directly, it still shows that no business component in
ESVs is immune to scrutiny to potential improvements through stakeholder involve-
ment. The empirical study described in this chapter is among the first to analyse
ESVs longitudinally while explicitly investigating strategic approaches that involve
social network stakeholders.
Theoretical contribution. First and foremost, the study responds to criticism
that the majority of research conducted on stakeholder relationships with ESVs fo-
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cuses on the stakeholder perspective, such as corporate entities or suppliers, instead
of analysing the ESV perspective (Huang et al., 2012; Weiblen and Chesbrough,
2015).
Secondly, the research study responds to calls that stakeholder involvement in so-
cial network and entrepreneurship should aim to understand the motivations (why?)
and execution (how?). It contributes to the knowledge of social network approaches
to fulfil critical business functions.
Thirdly, the study adds to the nascent research on ESVs’ outsourcing activities
(Bhalla and Terjesen, 2013; Bustamante, 2019). Focused studies on outsourcing
have highlighted that ESV adaptation to increasingly fast-paced environments can
be fulfilled through partial outsourcing as opposed to building firm internal capa-
bilities through hiring. Given the accounts shared by the ESV founders it becomes
clear that there is a spectrum of outsourcing which addresses the research gap and
previous findings can be supported. A point worth noting is that across all case
studies, ESV founders retained significant control of the business function within
the perimeter of the firm and used scaleable, often redundant partners to execute
functions externally while avoiding over-dependence. Fourthly, changes incorpo-
rated by the founding teams demonstrated structured, replicable examples of en-
trepreneurial aptness. Studies in the BMI domain have found that such successful
stakeholder relationship management can often help to cope with sudden disrup-
tions to the business and prevent bankruptcy (Al-Debei and Avison, 2010; Andries
et al., 2013). Therefore, the study’s results add to previous research which suggested
that founders should continuously ask: “Who should perform each of the activities
that are part of the business model? Should it be the company? A partner? The
customer? What novel governance arrangements could enable this structure?” and
permanently binding their closest stakeholders by ensuring that “value [is] created
through the novel business model for each of the participants” (Amit and Zott, 2012,
p. 42).
Lastly, the case study examples showcased how ESVs can achieve a critical com-
ponent of stakeholder relationships, namely reciprocity. Through the proposition
of saving capital and time, the case study founders incentivised and retained core
stakeholders. The consistency of mutually beneficial relationships has been identi-
fied as a significant determinant on the “return on investment” of social networking
relationships (Pollack et al., 2016).
Implications for practice. The study has several implications for the main inter-
est groups of this thesis, entrepreneurs and VCs.
Founders can study the outlined approaches which were successfully implemented by
ESVs and see these blueprints as inspiration to leverage their social networks more
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expediently. Both high-level findings and detail-level accounts could translate into
founders specific problem-settings. The analysis drawn from the case studies allows
entrepreneurs to position their approaches or plans in the competitive landscape.
Founders for which this study raised awareness should feel encouraged to scrutinise
their strategic choices and seek for optimisation by integrating stakeholders more
closely, even into the vital business functions. As for the case studies, the founders
demonstrated that building a social network was within their control and the result
of calculated activities.
For VCs, the case studies demonstrate which seemingly unconventional approaches
founders can take to build ESVs that could eventually create more and enduring
differentiators. Compared to the traditional approaches of raising venture funding
first, the majority of founders featured in this study elected to focus on stakeholder
engagement to cost-effectively build and sell their products. As there was no control
group, it is not possible to compare the results of the case study ventures with that
of a “fundraise first” strategy. Consequently, this study does not claim to favour
one approach over the other but highlight the existence of several potential path-
ways. Studying the ESVs’ approaches, VCs could reduce investment uncertainty by
understanding how founders build moats and market entry barriers different from
typical examples such as military or government contracts, regulation, and patents
(Delmar and Shane, 2004; Sherman, 2011). Furthermore, it can be stated with con-
fidence that VCs should be attuned to consider the upside and downside presented
by a ramified stakeholder network that could be responsible for critical business
functions. Thus, besides scrutinising the focal ESV, VCs conducting due diligence
should “zoom-out” to capture a complete unit of analysis, one that includes the
ESVs’ social networks.
5.7 Limitations and research opportunities
The research study has limitations which are common in interview-based case study
research designs such as small sample size, reporting biases, and interviewer influ-
ence.
Firstly, both the initial sample size of 42 as well as the final sample size of five case
studies does not allow any generalisations across the ESV population. It is likely
that a larger sample size could have yielded other modes of stakeholder engagement
which have not been uncovered by this study. Readers should view the cases as
spotlight findings which span a small vector space of strategic alternatives. The
sample size resulted partly from the research design, which only allowed ESVs that
made governance changes into the sample and cut those that were merely using
social network approaches occasionally. Another reason for the small sample size
was that it proved challenging to motivate founders to contribute to the research
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project. An inherent consequence of the longitudinal study design was that at least
one, often two in-depth discussions had to take place before identifying ESVs as a
potential candidate. In itself, the sampling process, of funnelling from 42 to five
ESVs indicates how sparsely social network are articulated among ESVs9.
Secondly, survivors-bias plays a significant role in studies of ESV, which have noto-
riously high failure rates (Hellmann et al., 2002; Shermer, 2014; Smith, 2015).
Thirdly, it is likely that a positive reporting bias is present, i.e. founders were in-
clined to report successful experimentation and implementations but not mention
the negative examples. Previous research has identified such distorting behaviour
Van Gelderen et al. (2000); Hyytinen et al. (2015).
The interviewer influence might have further contributed to a positive reporting
bias. The last limitation originates from the dual role of the interviewer, as a re-
searcher and representative of a VC fund, which could have caused founders to
over-emphasise positive aspects of their ventures. However, the dual role also cre-
ated a more realistic investment-seeking environment and interviewer-interviewee
relationship. These inherent traits of the study design can be considered a unique
feature and methodological contribution.
This study indicates several promising opportunities for future research. A dedicated
case study series conducted with a VC sample could identify a more nuanced under-
standing of how VCs respond and evaluate social network approaches of founders.
Another research opportunity could lie in observing how different founders imple-
ment solutions after receiving identical advice. A possible research setting would be
an industry focused accelerator program. At the beginning of the program, founders
start their venture journey at comparable stages. During their acceleration time,
the ESVs’ target industries can be controlled for. A comparison of the founders
chosen social network approaches could be drawn after the acceleration period, dur-
ing which founders receive identical instructions and mentoring. Such an approach
would also be likely to have less attrition in case study candidates along the survey
period.
Similar to the stakeholder study in Chapter 4, this study did not analyse the social
networks from a structural perspective. Furthermore, the case study based approach
has the inherent reporting biases as discussed above. More anonymous settings could
entice participants to mention more critical points which might complement the re-
sults of this study. The subsequent Chapter 6 and 7 take these limitations into
account during the research design and are based on substantially larger samples,
and in one case, third party data.
9 Depending on how filtered ESVs are counted, across all ESVs only one fifth to one-tenth of the
sample exert social network approaches.
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6.1 Chapter introduction
The previous studies in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated the importance of social
networks for venture investing and building and that both entrepreneurs and VCs
face challenges when signalling investability and evaluating ESVs. Figure 6.1 illus-
trates how findings drawn from the stakeholder study in Chapter 4, which identified
several preferential social network constellations, serve as inputs for this study. In
particular, the study examines how network size, diversity, density, and the position
of ESVs in their ego-network influence the perceived investability of the ESV.
Chapter 4: ESV signalling and stakeholders (RQ 1&2)
Chapter 5: ESV social network function (RQ 3)
Chapter 6: ESV evaluation experiment (RQ 4)
Chapter 7: ESV evaluation tool (RQ 5)
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
informs builds to
builds to
converge converge
Research objectives:
Increase the understanding of the social network perception of ESV
founders and investment decision-makers in the context of signalling
value and investability
Research Question 4
ESV evaluation experiment:
Primary data-set gathered from an online survey with 121 partici-
pants comprising (former) ESV entrepreneurs, several categories of
(former) venture investors, and a control group of academics and in-
dividuals with ESV experience.
time
Figure 6.1: Data, research questions, and research objectives of Chapter 6, own
illustration.
For this study, the specific literature on VC evaluation, business venturing, and social
networks, was reviewed. The review refines the understanding of effects of ESVs’
networking activities on financing and answers the following research question:
Research Question 4: Which social network constellations are perceived
most favourably by VCs and entrepreneurs?
Calls to rethink evaluation techniques and advising entrepreneurs on enhancing their
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chances of success are addressed through this research. A survey-based scenario
experiment with experts from the entrepreneurship and venture investing domain
is undertaken to examine the concept of a “social network-centric” ESV evaluation.
The following sections introduce the specific literature reviewed for the study and
generate the hypotheses to be tested (6.2). Furthermore, the rationale for using an
online survey enquiry method (6.3), as well as its design, data gathering procedure
(6.3), and results (6.4) are discussed.
6.2 Conceptual development and hypotheses
The literature review in Chapter 2 serves as a foundation for this chapter as it
outlines the reasons for ESVs to form strategic partnerships and alliances with its
stakeholders for resource, organisational learning and knowledge transfer, as well
as signalling purposes. This section builds upon the previous reviews and focuses
on characteristic determinants of ESVs’ social networks. Established social network
parameters are drawn from the literature and used for a quantification of critical
social network characteristics. To clarify, this study also adopts Definition 4 for a
social network1.
The multifaceted and uncertain nature of the pre-investment signalling and invest-
ment decision processes, has led researchers and practitioners to call for an adap-
tation of evaluation approaches and development of more comprehensive models in
ESV investing (Riding et al., 2007; Audretsch and Link, 2012; Sharma, 2015; Ko
and McKelvie, 2018; Arroyo et al., 2019).
To date, entrepreneurial social networks, especially their structure and composition,
have received little attention (Stuart and Sorenson, 2007; Lee et al., 2010; Heuven
and Groen, 2012; Pangarkar and Wu, 2013; Miloud et al., 2012; Ko and McKelvie,
2018), apart from some notable exceptions (Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Zheng et al.,
2010; Martinez and Aldrich, 2011; Pangarkar and Wu, 2013; Ter Wal et al., 2016).
For entrepreneurs and investors, a lack of understanding about social network con-
stellations that maximise positive signalling to investment decision-makers presents
an issue. Consequently, improving the understanding of what constitutes quantifi-
able signals of investability, and a demonstration of a venture’s value could help to
bridge the financing gap for ESVs (Ko and McKelvie, 2018; Gompers et al., 2020).
A review of focused literature has identified four characteristic properties of social
networks which are tested in this study: network size (6.2.1), diversity (6.2.2), den-
sity (6.2.3), and position (6.2.4).
1 Definition 4 can be revisited on page 36.
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6.2.1 Network size hypothesis
Network size as defined in Chapter 22 is the total number of vertices in a network
comprising of the stakeholders and the ESV itself. Spender et al. (2017) studied net-
work effects on ESVs’ innovation performance and found that the utility of network
size follows an inverted U-shape. A benefit of larger networks is an increased chance
of having many weak ties to loosely affiliated actors, allowing for the acquisition of
non-redundant information (Xu, 2011). Increased network size is also a predictor
of access to network resources and reaching milestones (Semrau and Werner, 2014;
Semrau and Hopp, 2016). In a direct financial context, participation in more exten-
sive social networks was found to positively impact revenue growth (Abou-Moghli
and Al-kasasbeh, 2012) and the ability of ESVs to attract funding (Soetanto and
Van Geenhuizen, 2015) while achieving higher valuations (Zheng et al., 2010). How-
ever, and this explains the inverted U-shape, ESVs could face difficulties in securing
funding when their networks are small, as co-opting in only a few partnerships can
result in an over-dependence (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). Hoang and Antoncic
(2003) also state that over-embeddedness can be a burden and thus limit firms’ per-
formance. Taking these aspects into consideration, the suggested hypothesis was:
Hypothesis 6.1: A large network comprising of many actors is perceived
as more valuable than a small network with few actors.
6.2.2 Network diversity hypothesis
Several researchers who studied social network and social capital theory at the inter-
sect with entrepreneurship argued that diverse networks allow the quickest resource
location (Birley, 1985; Lin, 2001; Das and Teng, 2000). However, the benefits of
similarity versus diversity in networks, in the literature also framed as redundancy
and non-redundancy of stakeholders, has been the substance of academic discourse
for years (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004; Ter Wal et al., 2016). Baum et al. (2000) and
Hoang and Antoncic (2003) stressed the importance of diversity of actors in ESVs’
networks, an idea based on Granovetter’s (1973) notion of weak ties. Actors outside
the core group of regular interactions are especially valuable as they deliver less re-
dundant information, a finding which is supported by empirical studies (Uzzi, 1996,
1997; Xu, 2011). From an ESV’s perspective, this thought is essential because a
diverse influx of ideas may help to de-risk, recombine successful ideas, and foster
inter-organisational learning and knowledge transfer (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996; Hayter, 2013; O¨zman, 2017). According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and
Elfring and Hulsink (2003), a decision on whether a homogeneous network of strong
connections or a heterogeneous network is preferable depends on ESV characteris-
2 The definition of network size can be revisited in Table 2.3 on page 38.
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tics. They argue that in cases where the communication of complex ideas requires a
deep understanding of a common language, similarity of actors is preferred, and vice
versa. Lundberg (2013) found that broad networks are suited to procure resources,
generate innovative ideas, and help with product introduction. Martinez and Aldrich
(2011) found that cohesive, i.e. strong connections among members and diversity,
as well as a spectrum of social characteristics among members positively influences
ESV survival and success. Uzzi (1996) and Xu (2011) reconciled these different po-
sitions in favour of a balanced network consisting of a mix of weak and strong ties.
Too much diversity may lead to an overwhelming amount of information, requiring
entrepreneurs to decide which information from numerous stakeholders is essential;
therefore, diluting the usefulness of multiple opinions (Ter Wal et al., 2016). Shane
and Stuart (2002) demonstrated that heterogeneous connections to key individuals
such as investors could further increase the likelihood to secure funding. Therefore,
the hypothesis to be tested stands as:
Hypothesis 6.2: A heterogeneous network featuring multiple types of ac-
tors is perceived as more valuable than a homogeneous
network.
6.2.3 Network density hypothesis
The density of a network measures the actual number of connections between ac-
tors compared to the theoretically possible number (Newman, 2014). Regarding
the optimal density of networks, a long-standing discussion between influential re-
searchers has taken place. Burt (1995), describes social capital as the lack of edges,
so-called structural holes, as non-redundant ideas are more likely to occur. Instead,
Coleman (1990) theorised that dense networks, which allow coordination amongst
vertices in a network, yield the highest social capital. This leads to an interesting
paradox for ESVs’ social networks which could be an explanation why several pa-
rameters describing social networks have a U-shaped tendency, i.e. there can be too
much or too little of one characteristic (Uzzi, 1997). As mentioned before, infor-
mation asymmetry frequently occurs in an ESV context. The more knowledgeable
party is tempted to behave opportunistically and deceive the less informed party
(Williamson, 1975). Being an outsider faced with uncertainty makes it difficult for
investors to acquire relevant and reliable information (Festel et al., 2013). In dense
networks however, the incentive to act opportunistically is significantly reduced be-
cause misbehaviour is communicated quickly within the network and trust can be
lost with multiple stakeholders at once (Coleman, 1988; Larson and Starr, 1993).
As a consequence, Coleman (1988, 1990) finds that dense networks create the most
value from a social capital perspective. Heuven and Groen (2012) explain that the
individual performance in dense networks increases due to a higher commitment.
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From an operational point of view, Soetanto and Van Geenhuizen (2015) find that
an increased network density leads to a faster and more reliable exchange of in-
formation. Moreover, interconnected clusters of commonly shared partners tend
to form stronger alliances (Walker et al., 1997). Reviewing the literature which
discusses density of networks revealed that theories and supporting empirical evi-
dence showed that densely populated networks are favourable. Thus, the hypothesis
generation is as follows:
Hypothesis 6.3: An interconnected network of actors is is perceived as
more valuable than a dispersed network.
6.2.4 Network position hypothesis
This study understands the network position as the location of a vertex within a
network, in line with Burt (1976, p. 93; 2005) who states that “a position in a
network [is] the specified set of relations to and from each actor in a system.” As
previously mentioned, in social network science, a central actor is often called “hub”
and can act as a boundary spanning node in a network that benefits by taking control
over information flow and direct access to a large proportion of the network (Zaheer
and Bell, 2005; Baraba´si, 2016). Burt (1995) theorises that an optimal network
requires structural holes and network actors who bridge these, control the flow and
have access to non-redundant information. From a coordination cost perspective,
a peripheral network position should be advantageous as the few closely connected
partners handle the majority of the coordination efforts on behalf of the ESV (Rost,
2011). As a counterargument, Das and Teng (2001) and Knoben and Bakker (2019)
discuss the dependence on too few partners which can present a threat for ESVs
due to the comparatively low bargaining power, lack of legitimacy, and vulnerability
towards misappropriation of resources. They add that the most effective mitigation
is a plurality strategy to avoid overdependence at a time where the ESV is vulnerable
to exploitation. Ahuja et al. (2009) mention a positive, self-reinforcing mechanism of
being centrally positioned, as the ESV becomes a more attractive partner to others,
enabling future relationships with a broader array of stakeholders. Moreover, they
mention that ESVs in peripheral positions do not benefit from reputation gains in
the same fashion as central ones. The majority of studies find evidence in favour of
central positions for ESVs (Spender et al., 2017). Therefore, the hypothesis follows
as:
Hypothesis 6.4: ESVs obtaining a central position are is perceived as
more valuable than those in a peripheral position.
In summary, the hypotheses focus on characteristics defining social networks constel-
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lations and were found to impact ESV evaluation. Thus, perceived ESV value and
investability is expected to increase when size (Hypothesis 6.1), diversity (Hypoth-
esis 6.2), and density increase (Hypothesis 6.3) or the ESV obtains a more central
position (Hypothesis 6.4).
6.3 Method and research design
This study examines the investability of ESVs depending on their social network.
To test the hypotheses, data was collected via an online survey. As mentioned in
Chapter 2, the layered nature of ESV evaluation in practice includes many parame-
ters, with varying degrees of importance and resulting weighting, depending on the
individual venture. Thus, to allow an isolated study of the social network’s influ-
ence, the parameters to be studied were limited to this single perspective. In an
experimental setting, participants were asked to evaluate ESVs by assessing their vi-
sualised social network constellations. The study design incorporated the guidelines
of Huber and Power (1985) and Sue and Ritter (2012). While preparing the sur-
vey pilots, 15 participants took place that allowed refinements of the survey design.
During execution of the study, participants were informed about the approximate
time until completion and given individual incentives to encourage participation.
Furthermore, participants were reassured about confidentiality given the fact that
their preferences are sensitive. The practical importance as well as the use of the
data was elaborated for participants. To ensure adherence and interest of the par-
ticipants in the study, the online survey was path dependent and posed specific
questions depending on participants occupation, experience, and previous survey
answers. Finally, participants were allowed to share the survey with suitable par-
ticipants and loss of control about dissemination was managed by narrowly defining
what constitutes relevant participants.
Participants of the study were provided with a detailed description and exemplary
evaluation procedure as shown in detail in Appendix E3.
6.3.1 Sample
The online survey description clearly specified the target participant groups of ESV
entrepreneurs and VCs according to Definition 1 and 2, but allowed later-stage
investors, academics, and other relevant practitioners to participate and serve as
the control group4. Table 6.1 shows the online survey participants’ distribution
across professions and their secondary roles.
3 The online survey description can be found in Appendix E on pages 262 to 266.
4 Definition 1 and 2 can be revisited on pages 14 and 24.
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Table 6.1: ESV evaluation experiment online survey sample
Age in years Responses Tenure in years Responses
< 21 2 (1.7%) < 1 1 (0.8%)
21-30 52 (43.0%) 1 9 (7.4%)
31-40 28 (23.1%) 2 15 (12.4%)
41-50 24 (19.8%) 3 22 (18.2%)
51-60 14 (11.6%) 4 13 (10.7%)
> 60 1 (0.8%) 5 7 (5.8%)
6 to 10 8 (6.6%)
Profession Responses 11 to 15 18 (14.9%)
Academic 10 (8.3%) > 15 28 (23.1%)
Entrepreneur 30 (24.8%)
Investor 70 (57.9%) Investor role Responses
Other 11 (9.1%) Angel investor 16 (13.2%)
VC 52 (43.0%)
Investor type Responses CVC 4 (3.3%)
Financial 68 (97.1%) Late-stage 3 (2.5%)
Strategic 20 (28.6%) No investor 46 (38.0%)
Investors’ stage focus Responses
Pre-seed 27 (22.3%)
Seed 57 (47.1%)
Series A 50 (41.3%)
Series B 24 (19.8%)
Note: Column sums may not add up to 100% due to rounding effects or when
participants were allowed to give multiple answers.
Within the group of entrepreneurs and investors, participants were sub-categorised
into first-time entrepreneurs, serial entrepreneurs, former entrepreneurs, and ESV
employees, while investors were categorised as angel investors, VCs, CVCs, and late-
stage investors. Investors additionally specified their focus on strategic and financial
returns. Participants stated their age and tenure in years, and the geographic loca-
tion of respondents was identified via their IP address. The participants locations,
which served as the indicator for the headquarter or residency location, were found
to be in Europe (108), the US (8), and Asia (5).
6.3.2 Data gathering
Qualtrics was used to gather data through an online survey. From February to April
2018, 466 participants were invited via email, social media, and LinkedIn. The
purposeful sampling strategy controls for the early-stage focus of VCs and ESVs
while maximising the variety of participants regarding their experience, industries,
and geographies (Shadish et al., 2002). A total of 142 participants responded (30.4%)
who comprised of investors, entrepreneurs, and academics in the field of business
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venturing as shown in Table 6.1. 21 answers were discarded due to missing data
resulting in a final sample of 121 individuals. As the participants had to evaluate
four different ESV networks per hypothesis, the four answers were treated as separate
responses which explains the final sample size of n = 484 in the subsequent analyses
and n = 232 when comparing two types of network constellations. Furthermore,
participants were given the opportunity to justify answers in free text fields.
6.3.3 Measures
(a) Treatment (independent) variables
Table 6.2 summarises the four dichotomous, independent variables, which are here-
after called treatment variables.
Table 6.2: ESV evaluation experiment treatment variables
Network metric
(Treatment var.)
Treatment var. description Example
Network size
soc net size
small or large, i.x. how many
entities does an ESV know and
engage with?
Does the ESV’s social net-
work compose of 5 or 50 en-
tities?
Network diversity
soc net div
homogeneous or heterogeneous,
i.e. how diverse are the stake-
holder groups in the ESV’s so-
cial network?
5 VC investors or 1 VC, 1
mentor, 1 accelerator, 1 re-
searcher, and 1 lawyer
Network density
soc net dens
interconnected or dispersed, i.e.
Do the entities in a ESV’s net-
work know each other?
Is it beneficial that your
mentor knows the VC who
is invested in the ESV?
Network position
soc net pos
central or peripheral, i.e. is the
ESV the most connected vertex
in the network or connects pri-
marily through intermediaries?
A VC that is invested di-
rectly versus an ESV that
interacts with a lawyer via
a mentor
The evaluation was presented to participants in randomised order during the exper-
iment. Table 6.3 shows the three scenario experiment treatments.
Table 6.3: ESV evaluation experiment treatments
Treatment Resulting social network constellations
A small/homogeneous (A1), large/homogeneous (A2),
small/heterogeneous (A3), large/heterogeneous (A4)
B small/interconnected (B1), large/interconnected (B2),
small/dispersed (B3), large/dispersed (B4)
C small/central (C1), large/central (C2),
small/peripheral (C3), large/peripheral (C4)
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The treatments which contrasted two different treatment variables resulting in the
three different treatments: size versus diversity (Treatment A), size versus density
(Treatment B), and size versus position (Treatment C). Within each treatment,
four social network constellations (A1-A4, B1-B4, and C1-C4) had to be evaluated
which were explained to the participants as exemplary social network constella-
tions of imaginary ESVs. Contrasting the treatment variables pair-wise against the
treatment variable soc net size resulted in three treatments with four network con-
stellations each. For instance, treatment A consists of a small homogeneous, large
homogeneous, small heterogeneous, and large heterogeneous network constellation.
Figures E.2, E.3, and E.4 illustrate the different visualisations of the treatments as
they were presented to the participants5.
(b) Effect (dependent) variables
The four dependent variables per treatment, hereafter called effect variables, capture
the participants perceived investability and evaluation. The study description intro-
duced the concept of network value as follows. A “high network value” has a positive
influence on the ESV evaluation, while a “neutral value” means that the social net-
work is decision-irrelevant and does not influence ESV evaluation, a “low value”
represents a network which is a reason for concern and would, therefore, decrease
investability. The respondents answered on a seven-point Likert-scale (1-disagree
strongly, 4-neither agree nor disagree, 7-agree strongly) whereby “1” represented
negative influence, “4” decision neutral, and “7” positive evaluation influence.
(c) Control variables
To control for confounding factors that affect the perceived evaluation, the study
introduced several control variables that have been used in related studies (Bru¨derl
and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998; Witt, 2004; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Zheng et al., 2010;
Martinez and Aldrich, 2011; Pangarkar and Wu, 2013). Those control variables
included the participants gender (1 = male), age as categorical variable (<21, 21-
30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, <61), and tenure (<1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-10, 11-15, >15).
Furthermore, dummy variables were introduced for active investor (1-yes), multiple
work experiences (MWE) (1-yes), the participants primary occupation as an investor
(1-yes), entrepreneur (1-yes), or academic (1-yes). As the last control variable,
investment categories of investors and stages of ESV’s financing were categorised in
(1-Pre-seed, 2-Seed, 3-Series A, 4-Series B, and 5-Series C).
6.3.4 Analysis
To analyse the data, an OLS regression was applied first, as the dependent variables
were approximately linear. Subsequent tests with an ordered Probit and Tobit
5 Figures E.2, E.3, and E.4 can be viewed on pages 264 to 266.
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model yielded similar results. Consequently, the final analysis settled on OLS due
to easier interpretation and being the best linear unbiased estimator (Kutner et al.,
1996; Wooldridge, 2002). To compare the difference between each of the treatment
variables, network constellations were contrasted against each other as described
in 6.3.3 (a).
6.4 Results
The following section presents the descriptive results and the OLS regression results
of the study, which were generated using the STATA statistics software package6.
6.4.1 Descriptive results
Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics in the form of a pair-wise correlation
matrix of the main effect variable ESV eval and control variables (2-9) as well as
their means and standard deviations.
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of ESV evaluation experiment
Variable var σ min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 ESV eval 4.74 1.32 1 7 1
2 age 2.99 1.11 1 6 0.08 1
3 gender 1.19 0.39 1 2 -0.01 -0.11 1
4 tenure 4.99 2.63 0 9 -0.05 0.72∗ -0.08 1
5 active inv 0.62 0.49 0 1 0.00 0.30∗ 0.16∗ 0.34∗ 1
6 MWE1 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.02 0.14∗ -0.12∗ 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 1
7 investor 0.65 0.48 0 1 -0.02 0.35∗ 0.13∗ 0.33∗ 0.93∗ 0.21∗ 1
8 founder 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.25∗ 0.55∗ -0.26∗ 1
9 academic 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.02 -0.1 -0.20∗ 0.04 -0.30∗ 0.29∗ -0.28∗ -0.01 1
Note: n=484, ∗p < 0.1, 1MWE = multiple work experiences
6.4.2 Regression results
(a) Network size Hypothesis (6.1)
The first hypothesis suggested that ESVs with larger networks are more favourably
evaluated than ESVs with smaller networks. Table F.27 shows the results from
the OLS regression models 1 (soc net div), 2 (soc net dens), and 3 (soc net pos)
which yield the estimates of the test for this hypothesis. As expected, due to the
scenario experiment, none of the introduced control variables significantly influ-
ences the evaluation of the ESV. The regression coefficient of large social networks
(A2&A4, B2&B4, C2&C4) was positive and statistically significant at the 1% level
in all three models. Table 6.5 shows the summarised results.
6 The STATA script can be retrieved from https://github.com/Marcfelske/STATA-online-surve
y-analysis.
7 Table F.2 can be viewed on page 268.
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Table 6.5: soc net size treatment summary
Constellation vs. constellation Likert∆ Significance level Model
A2&A4 vs. A1&A3 0.599 p<0.01 1
B2&B4 vs. B1&B3 0.909 p<0.01 2
C2&C4 vs. C1&C3 0.574 p<0.01 3
Larger networks were perceived more favourably by the survey participants re-
gardless of whether constellations were generated by overlaying soc net size with
soc net div, soc net dens, or soc net pos. The results indicate support for Hypoth-
esis 6.1, larger networks are perceived as more valuable and thus improve an ESVs’
evaluation.
(b) Network heterogeneity Hypothesis (6.2)
The second hypothesis to be tested supposed that the evaluation of ESVs with
heterogeneous networks would be superior to those with homogeneous networks.
The results are depicted for OLS regression models 5 to 8 in Table F.38. Table 6.6
shows the summarised results.
Table 6.6: soc net div treatment summary
Constellation vs. constellation Likert∆ Significance level Model
A1 vs. A3 1.198 p<0.01 5
A1 vs. A4 0.686 p<0.01 6
A2 vs. A3 1.884 p<0.01 7
A2 vs. A4 1.372 p<0.01 8
The regression coefficients for the more diverse networks (A1 and A2) compare
positively and statistically significant to the less diverse networks (A3 and A4) at
1% level. The results support Hypothesis 6.2.
(c) Network density Hypothesis (6.3)
The third hypothesis followed the assumption that a network of interconnected
stakeholders (B1 and B2) lead to a better ESV evaluation than dispersed networks
(B3 and B4). As Models 11 to 14 in Table F.49 demonstrate, Hypothesis 6.3 is
confirmed at the 1% level.
Participants ranked ESVs’ social networks with heterogeneous stakeholders higher
than homogeneous ones. The participants perceived a small network (B1) and a
dispersed network (B4) only marginally different. Thus, participants perceived an
equivalent trade-off between increasing size and reducing network density.
8 Table F.3 can be viewed on page 269.
9 Table F.4 can be viewed on page 270
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Table 6.7: soc net dens treatment summary
Constellation vs. constellation Likert∆ Significance level Model
B1 vs. B3 1.074 p<0.01 11
B1 vs. B4 0.017 p>0.1 12
B2 vs. B3 1.835 p<0.01 13
B2 vs. B4 0.777 p<0.01 14
(d) Network centrality Hypothesis (6.4)
Finally the fourth hypothesis predicted that ESVs which obtain a central position
in their social network are evaluated more favourably than ESVs in peripheral po-
sitions. The detailed OLS regression results of Models 16 to 19 are presented in
Table F.510. Table 6.8 summarises the regression coefficients.
Table 6.8: soc net pos treatment summary
Constellation vs. constellation Likert∆ Significance level Model
C1 vs. C3 2.041 p<0.01 16
C1 vs. C4 1.479 p>0.1 17
C2 vs. C3 2.628 p<0.01 18
C2 vs. C4 2.066 p<0.01 19
The results show survey participants favour ESVs obtaining more central positions
(C1 and C2), over the peripheral positions (C3 and C4). The regression coefficients
are the largest compared coefficients in other models. Consequently, the results
strongly support Hypothesis 6.4.
To ensure the robustness of the regressions and thereby findings, variance inflation
factors (VIFs) were calculated to test for confounding effects of the treatments. The
VIF for all variables was calculated to be less than < 2.3 and therefore well below
the recommended threshold of (Kutner et al., 1996; O’Brien, 2007; Prinzler, 2012)
of 5-10, suggesting few problems of multicollinearity11.
The summary of the regression results concludes the analysis of the online survey.
The next section discusses and evaluates the survey experiment in the context of
existing literature and practitioner understanding.
10Table F.5 can be viewed on page 271.
11Multicollinearity occurs if explaining variables of a model are correlated with each other. This
can have negative effects on the interpretability of the individual contributions of model variables
and thus the results, while also impeding the model’s robustness (Aiken and Wea, 1996).
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6.5 Discussion
Summary. The beginning of the study presented the theoretical underpinnings of
various factors which determine social network constellations, including the formu-
lation of hypotheses. Afterwards, the results were linked to the existing literature,
and critical points supplemented with additional qualitative findings that were ob-
tained through the survey and individual follow-up interviews.
Studying preferences of relevant stakeholder groups such as entrepreneurs and in-
vestors was enabled through an online survey scenario experiment which tests the
impact of social networks on ESVs’ evaluation. The OLS regressions showed broad
support of the hypotheses, which suggests that the perceived evaluation and investa-
bility increases for ESVs whose social networks are large and have heterogeneous
roles among their stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the perceived value increases for
interconnected social networks of ESVs in which the ESV obtains a central position.
Theoretical contribution. All hypotheses were formulated based on existing lit-
erature making the findings consistent with the described theories. Thus, the study
contributes to a generalisation of theoretical concepts, and the expansion of theories
to the field of ESV at the intersect with signalling and network theory. Studying the
effects on the perceived evaluation of ESVs based on their networks revealed that
social networks are a decision-relevant metric which is positively correlated with a
favourable evaluation and a signal of investability. The relevance of social networks
for ESV evaluation is a significant finding as it suggests that the value created for
entrepreneurs outweighs the costs of coordinating the social network. More specifi-
cally, the findings suggest that founders can influence the investability perception of
their venture by aiming to position themselves in a social network which maximises
constellations according to the chosen metrics. Overall, ESVs centrally embedded
(Hypothesis 6.4) in a large (Hypothesis 6.1), diverse (Hypothesis 6.2), and densely
interconnected (Hypothesis 6.3) network are preferred by the participants.
Hypothesis 6.1 was confirmed as the results demonstrated an influence of increas-
ing social network size resulting in better ESV evaluation. The survey participants
emphasised additional benefits resulting from reduced dependence on a single tie,
as well as increased information flow as a positive feature of diverse networks. One
participant stressed that ESVs tackling complex problems require multidisciplinary
input which makes an extensive network a necessity. ESVs’ ability to handle an ex-
tensive network can be seen as a positive signal, particularly when a problem-specific
selection of partners is assembled. However, some participants reported that large
networks would be too difficult to handle for some ESVs. Reasons mentioned were
the increased “noise” and having to resolve conflicting views that lead to a situation
where inputs could become overwhelmingly frequent, which was previously shown
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by other studies (Ter Wal et al., 2016). Mitigating large information exchange is
a challenge that can be assigned to the absorptive capacity concept (Zheng et al.,
2010). Consequently, participants added that during the early stages, a focused
network with aligned stakeholders might be beneficial to avoid losing sight of core
targets. The findings, therefore, reflect the notion of a U-shaped tendency also found
in the literature (Uzzi, 1997; Spender et al., 2017).
The predominantly positive effect of network diversity (Hypothesis 6.2) was con-
firmed as the results found a significant increase in perceived ESV evaluation with
increasing heterogeneity of network stakeholders. Participants reported that “a
broad stakeholder base helps to scale easier” and prepares the venture for later
stages as stakeholders can give access to their proprietary social networks. Even
few weak ties to high reputation individuals were reported to increase visibility and
confer legitimacy, both ideas which are known from signalling theory. By contrast,
other participants claimed that social networks comprising of multiple experts in
“few domain areas are most suitable for ESVs”, whereas “broad domain expertise
[is preferred] in later stages” during which the firm grows geographically and po-
tentially serves multiple industries. Supporting Hypothesis 6.3, an interconnected
network being superior to a dispersed network, participants emphasised that high
density reinforces trust and increases transparency. As mentioned earlier, the lack
of transparency is a concern for investors taking an outsider view, who thus wish
for a reduction of information asymmetry. From an entrepreneurial perspective, ad-
ditionally gathered qualitative survey data suggested that interconnected networks
“would become a nightmare to handle as networks grow”. The resource-constrained
nature of ESVs could be problematic, and networks would be “harder to manage and
[one] can neglect some relationships”. Controversially, various participants indicate
that a less dense network might have upsides too. The most frequently mentioned
example was the ability to remain in control of information flow. For instance, a
seed-stage founder shared an experience: “[...] when you have a tech problem, and
there are many in early stages, the last thing you need at that moment is a con-
cerned investor on the phone. Much rather would you tell him a week later in person
how you fixed it.” Such a situation could occur when stakeholders communicate di-
rectly rather than through the ESV. From an external stakeholder’s perspective, a
sizeable unconnected network might yield the most significant extension to his/her
network because it is unlikely to know all stakeholders already. The benefits of a
position in a sizeable network of loosely connected individuals also reflect in the
data, as the large dispersed networks were almost equivalently valued to small in-
terconnected networks. The findings drawn from the analysis are well founded on
literature which states that a network comprising of many weak ties ensures little
redundancy of information and ESVs that span the boundaries between stakehold-
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ers remain in control (Granovetter, 1973).
Finally, Hypothesis 6.4 predicted a positive influence on perceived valuation when
ESVs obtain a central position. The participants’ responses and the analysis thereof
support this prediction. The effect on participants perception was most substantial
for the network position treatment compared to all other treatments. In their qual-
itative remarks, investors were critical of peripheral ESV positions as ESVs relying
on few partners, a situation that could create strong dependencies on stakeholders.
Investors stated that they prefer to see “vested interest” of other stakeholders and
the ability to compensate eventual losses of stakeholders from the ESV network with
stakeholders from the VC’s own network. One participant reported a self-reinforcing
mechanism in which a central actor may quickly expand their network as opposed
to a peripheral ESV. Some respondents reported that the ability to handle a few
connections is interpreted as a weakness of the ESV’s management team. Positive
aspects of peripheral positions were reported as well. The main reason given in
favour of decentralised positions is the minimal effort required to concentrate on a
few key partners and still have indirect network access to a broad stakeholder base.
Additional data and qualitative remarks mirror the positions in the literature which
emphasise coordination and cost-advantages of peripheral positions (Rost, 2011)
whereas opponents warn of the resulting dependency (Miles et al., 1999; Knoben
and Bakker, 2019). Monitoring dependencies is critical for ESVs which procure crit-
ical resources through their networks (Sullivan and Ford, 2014) as overdependence
can constrain further access to resources or partners (Ahuja et al., 2009) and in-
crease the risk of failure or poor economic performance (Uzzi, 1996, 1997).
In addition to contributions to research on network theory, resource-based view,
absorptive capacity, and signalling theory, the study provides new evidence of dy-
namism along the ESV life-cycle and the role of the assessor on ESV evaluation.
Regarding dynamism, Martinez and Aldrich (2011) state changes in requirements of
ESVs concerning their social networks occur over time. Tidd (2013) describe that
networks are critical during the launching phase of a venture during which search
and identification activities dominate. In a few qualitative remarks, ESV maturity
was mentioned as a condition. However, the quantitative data does not indicate
significant changes towards later stages. Similarly, characteristics of the evaluating
person, such as their prior experience, were mentioned. Three young investors re-
ported placing a high value on ESV networks as their own networks have not yet
developed to the extent of senior investors. The qualitative evaluations, however,
did not reflect this influence.
Implications for practice. The study contributes to the practitioner understand-
ing of ESV and social networks in four important ways.
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First, the study introduces a new perspective on evaluating ESVs by highlighting
the importance of their social networks. Results drawn from this study strengthen
the case for networks being an essential element of an ESVs investability signals to
VCs which has mainly been neglected in the literature to date.
Second, the magnitude of the preferences found in several models suggests that a
network perspective should supplement existing evaluation approaches. As different
constellations had both strong positive or strong negative and statistically signif-
icant influence on the perceived valuation, establishing a formalised methodology
which thoroughly examines social networks of an ESV seems reasonable. The met-
rics utilised to test the hypotheses could be adopted by practitioners to develop
actionable evaluation tools.
Third, the results provide advice on how ESVs should orchestrate their network-
ing activities to optimise the perceived positive signals which could lead to more
favourable evaluations of the venture. These notions align with evidences in pre-
vious studies which found that purposely building social networks is possible and
advisable for entrepreneurs (Hallen, 2009; Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012).
Fourth, prior research focused on later-stage companies and traditional valuation
or qualitative assessments of ESV founding teams. Existing studies provided little
guidance for practitioners on how to analyse social networks. By contrast, this study
sought to reveal which social network constellation of ESVs increases the perceived
investability in the eyes potential investment decision-makers and several control
groups.
6.6 Limitations and research opportunities
Despite its contribution to theory and practice, this study has limitations in five
separate areas. First, the sample is limited to a small portion of the entire VC
and entrepreneur population.Furthermore, the selection of candidates and whether
they chose to participate introduces a bias which is challenging to control for. The
response rate of 30.4% is comparable to other publications in the entrepreneurship
field. Future surveys could aim for increased coverage by focusing on fewer stake-
holder groups or technology verticals and thereby investigate a more specific sample.
Second, the study focuses on the higher-level network character and disregards the
characteristics of individual ties. Studies such as Stuart et al. (1999) demonstrated
that the individual characteristics of network actors have a significant influence on
network value. Future research could assess the characteristics of ties with a higher
level of detail.
Third, several participants and scholars such as Hoang and Antoncic (2003) point
out the importance of monitoring network changes over time. The research design
excluded the time-dimension from the models to reduce complexity. Future studies
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focusing on the element of time could respond to this notion. Two questions could
be worth investigating: (1) how long does a weak network tie remain valuable be-
fore necessarily creating redundancy over time by becoming a strong tie? (2) how
can networks of ESVs be captured when the staff count grows rapidly? It could be
argued that the external ties of an ESV are a mesh of multiple networks around its
founders and employees. Thus, the assumption of a single ESV network rather than
seeing the network as a conglomerate of sub-networks presents an oversimplification.
However, during the research design the decision was made that the additional com-
plexity of fragmenting the ESV into its team members and their respective social
sub-networks would not justify the additional insight.
Fourth, the research aimed to determine the factors which maximise ESV perceived
value and investability. In a discussion leading to this study, and interviewed prac-
titioner mentioned that spotting a weakness in a social network might be of higher
importance than identifying a strength. Future research could investigate if weak-
nesses can be revealed by reversing the treatment variables or whether other metrics
have to be introduced.
Finally, reducing ESV evaluation to one parameter, i.e. social networks of the ESVs,
was a necessary simplification to to extract the influence of social networks around
ESVs. It should be assumed that commonly assessed factors such as the product,
team, technical defensibility, or the market would have possibly confounded the
evaluation experiment. Moreover, in real world applications, detailed social network
information might not be available to VCs when making an investment decision.
The last two limitations present an opportunity for future research to incorporate
findings from this study in a broader context, repeat evaluation experiments un-
der consideration of additional decision-making factors, and with publicly available
data.
The study in Chapter 7 addresses several of the limitations of this study and incor-
porates those into the research design. Examples for such aspects are a longitudinal
observation of social networks, the use of third party data, and tying the results to
the observable financial performance of ESVs.
7. ESV evaluation tool
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7.1 Chapter introduction
The study in this chapter investigates whether an ESV’s investability can be anal-
ysed by looking at its social network. The previous Chapter 6, and particularly
the social network metrics described in it, serve as a conceptual foundation for this
study. Conclusions drawn from the previous studies inspired a comprehensive indus-
try analysis into third-party data sources that could be used to proxy ESV success.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the position of the final study conducted for this thesis in the
context of previous studies.
Chapter 4: ESV signalling and stakeholders (RQ 1&2)
Chapter 5: ESV social network function (RQ 3)
Chapter 6: ESV evaluation experiment (RQ 4)
Chapter 7: ESV evaluation tool (RQ 5)
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion
informs builds to
builds to
converge converge
Research objectives:
Develop an evaluation tool to be used by practitioners which cor-
relates secondary social network data with ESV performance data
and help identify investment candidates. Increase the theoretical and
practitioner understanding of a data-driven investment decision-aid.
Research Question 5
ESV evaluation tool:
Develop and test the practicability of a tool by using a proprietary
data-set comprising 1,103 UK based ESVs in the ML & artificial in-
telligence (AI) industry vertical.
time
Figure 7.1: Data, research questions, and research objectives of Chapter 7, own
illustration.
For this study, ESV success is measured as financial fundraising success and the
fundraise frequency. Gathering longitudinal data from private market databases,
social media, and ESV websites creates a unique, proprietary data set which is used
to answer Research Question 5.
Research Question 5: Which social network data can proxy the fundrais-
ing success and fundraising frequency of ESVs?
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The next section develops the conceptual background of the study.
7.2 Conceptual development
The following section first reviews the existing and specific literature that describes
how ESV success can be quantified (7.2.1), and second formulates hypotheses (7.2.2)
which are tested to answer Research Question 5.
7.2.1 Literature review
In the literature on VCs’ approaches to evaluate ESVs, a common denominator
can be identified. Studies predominantly aim to predict future success based on
historical data and thereby understand the risk-return profile of the investment op-
portunity (Ramsinghani, 2014). A critical parameter for the risk-return profile is the
resulting ROI for the investor, as well as the gains of the entrepreneur, which both
are fundamentally dependent on the venture’s financial success. This financial as-
sessment of VCs’ investments depends on the entry-price they initially pay for their
equity stake, potential additions to the investment over multiple investment rounds,
and the exit price that is achieved when the investment is liquidated (Gompers and
Lerner, 1999; Ramsinghani, 2014). However, this success of a venture is not only
difficult to predict, as a consequence of the serendipity of the ventures’ develop-
ment, but also obfuscated by investment uncertainties and asymmetric information
as thematised in Chapter 2. To estimate the ROI of an ESV pre-investment, multi-
ple proxies, obtainable from secondary data, have been theoretically suggested and
empirically tested by previous research. Murphy et al. (1996), Spinelli et al. (2012),
and Staniewski (2016) provide overviews of such success factors. The results of a
review going beyond those existing works are listed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: ESV success factors
Success factor Reference
Firm survival Agarwal and Audretsch (2001); Van Gelderen et al. (2006);
Raz and Gloor (2007); Andries and Debackere (2007); Fried
and Tauer (2015)
Jobs created,
employee growth
Watson et al. (1998); Bru¨derl and Preisendo¨rfer (1998);
Laitinen (2002); Davila et al. (2003); McCartan-Quinn and
Carson (2003); March-Chorda (2004); Caliendo and Kri-
tikos (2008); Khaire (2010); Fried and Tauer (2015)
Achieve milestones Roure and Keeley (1990); Steier and Greenwood (1995);
Zheng et al. (2010); Vu et al. (2012)
Achieve IPO/M&A Robinson (1999); Plummer et al. (2016); Croce et al. (2018)
Receive VC Hsu (2007); Colombo and Grilli (2010); Zheng et al. (2010)
Continued on next page
154 Chapter 7. ESV evaluation tool
Success factor Reference
Market share McCartan-Quinn and Carson (2003); Van Gelderen et al.
(2006)
Unit sales, revenue,
ROI, profit
Roure and Keeley (1990); Cooper (1993); Kakati (2003);
Baron and Markman (2003); Sebora et al. (2009); Hormiga
et al. (2011)
In recent years, research into success factors has shifted from predominantly qual-
itative survey data, towards a quantitative “data-driven” assessment of secondary
data. Quantitative research has been enabled through both by the advent of pri-
vate market databases and increased computational performance, which made large
structured data readily available and analysable (Martens et al., 2011; Arroyo et al.,
2019; AdF3; AdVC4).
The review of previous studies surfaced three critical limitations of research on ESVs’
success.
Firstly, as the literature review in Chapter 2 described, firms exert fundamentally
different characteristics as they mature. Many studies fail to consider “success”
during fledgling stages from perspectives other than M&A and IPO, therefore over-
simplifying the problem.
Secondly, ESVs have a non-linear, almost cyclical growth pattern which is initiated
by discrete events (e.g. achieve a milestone, set new milestone goals, fundraise, ex-
ecute or make adjustments, and repeat), which few studies consider (Vohora et al.,
2004; Zheng et al., 2010; Martens et al., 2011).
Finally, the most successful firms, ultimately those investors aim to identify, are ex-
treme outliers (Feld and Mendelson, 2011; Ramsinghani, 2014; Liang and Yuan,
2016), which are conversely often excluded from statistical analysis (Yang and
Berger, 2017). As a consequence, traditional, linear statistical models have not
been successfully applied on neither qualitative nor quantitative analyses (Stuart
and Abetti, 1987; Nahata, 2008). Thus, academic studies in the venture investing
context applied non-linear models such as Logit and Probit models which are more
suitable to describe discrete data (Nahata, 2008; Allison, 2010).
In the past five years, ML based, neural network approaches were adopted by re-
searchers and practitioners for modelling purposes (Martens et al., 2011; Arroyo
et al., 2019). Those approaches benefit from being able to model patterns and non-
linear relationships while being more robust towards issues arising of multicollinear-
ity and occurrence of outliers (Bishop, 2006; Garg and Tai, 2013). Such approaches
have several characteristics which allow for more complex models, through inclusion
of a greater number of parameters, which can positively influence their descriptive
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power and accuracy (Goodfellow et al., 2016)1.
In parallel to the advancements in ML algorithms, SNA algorithms allowed re-
searchers to handle large sets of “networked-data” which opened up new research
opportunities in several areas, among them financing (Kalampokis et al., 2013). The
importance of “online” relative to “offline” social networks is subject to an intensive
academic debate (Wu, 2007; Tan and Tan, 2012; Song, 2015). Nonetheless, this
newly emerged area of research has attracted interest from the finance-oriented aca-
demic and practitioner community. The combination of state-of-the-art modelling
combined with private market data and a social network perspective opens new
methodological avenues to assess and predict ESVs’ success and characteristics.
This growing body of literature is limited to a small number of peer-reviewed pub-
lications. Therefore, conference publications, working papers, and research from
tangential domains were also included in the review. Table 7.2 summarises the
results of the concentrated literature review.
1 Higher descriptive potential involves a trade off, as results are often difficult to interpret due
to a greater number of variables and decreased transparency of causation. Such models can be
metaphorical “black-boxes” (Muhlbacher et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2016; Doerr et al., 2015).
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Table 7.2: Advanced models based on SNA in the VC and ESV domain
Reference/
unit of analysis
Analysis/method/detail
Alexy et al. (2012) predicted
second-round fundrais-
ing amounts from pre-
vious investors portfolio
diversity, and network
degree/syndication.
3,668 US firms and 3,173 VC investments in the areas of advertising, e-commerce, enterprise software and services,
games and video, hardware, mobile, network hosting, search, security, software, and web. Their analysis was per-
formed using linear regression to correlate with the logarithm of the funding amount. The research found that ESVs
funded by investors with higher degrees (connections to other VCs) are more likely to fundraise a second round,
while those rounds are also larger. The finding is noteworthy since it contradicts an established finding that better
connected, highly reputable VCs invest at a “discount” (Hsu, 2004).
Gloor et al. (2013) compared
social networking behaviour
with ESV success.
Comparing the social networks of the sample participants form a real world networking event and measuring social
network metrics using LinkedIn, Facebook, Xing, and e-mail, the authors mapped networks of 62 entrepreneurs and
77 academics with a total network of 15,913 LinkedIn and 6,928 Facebook actors as well as 28,152 email headers.
Their analysis showed that more central actors and entrepreneurs who are connected to key individuals (Directors,
VCs, and Advisers) were more successful. The success metrics used in the study were venture survival, entrepreneur
seniority in the ESV and prize money wins in competitions. The results showed that the professional LinkedIn
network is the best predictor followed by Xing, e-mail and the more informal Facebook. Furthermore, the study also
indicated that combining networks increased the predictive power.
Spiegel et al. (2016) predict-
ing second round fundraise
success of ESVs.
Snapshot SNA of 70 US internet ESVs and their 145 founders. Based on previous first-round investments and SNA
of founders’ LinkedIn networks, fundraising events drawn from AngelList, Crunchbase, and SEC data were used to
predict whether ESVs could raise second-round funding retrospectively. The study used a t-test and Fisher’s exact
test. The considered factors included the founders’ network centrality, average number of (co-)founders, previous
VC, consultant, or founding experience, average years of education and experience. The study found that shorter
paths, i.e. closeness between VCs and ESVs, makes receiving second-round investments more likely and encouraged
further ESV specific research.
WP = working paper, C = conference paper Continued on next page
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Reference/
unit of analysis
Analysis/method/detail
Ter Wal et al. (2016) re-
searched the influence of net-
work closure of investor syn-
dicates on the ESVs’ ability
to raise second-round fund-
ing.
Snapshot of 10,266 US ESVs that received funding over 37,146 funding rounds from 5,032 investors, reduced to 2,371
syndicated first-round investments involving 1,646 unique investors. Furthermore, US patent and trademark data
was included in the Logit regression analysis. The study identified that ESVs receiving investments form syndicating
investors with either open-specialised or closed-diverse networks have the highest chance of receiving second-round
funding.
Liang and Yuan (2016) pre-
dicted investor behaviour in
a four-degree separation net-
work around Facebook Inc.
Snapshot of 11,916 primarily US companies, 12,127 people, 1,122 investors, and 5,341 funding investment activities.
Analysis of closeness calculated for all firms using shortest paths and similarity using the Jaccard coefficient in
combination with investor and company information such as age and industries. ML approaches such as Decision
Trees, Support Vector Machines, and Na¨ıve Bayes were used to predict investments drawn from Crunchbase data.
The study found that edge prediction can be facilitated through a ML based link prediction model and called for
a replication of the study in the VC domain. Furthermore, (Liang and Yuan, 2016) suggests research into finding
“super-stars” in networks.
Glupker et al. (2019) pre-
dicted fundraising success
from investor community
affiliation.
14,000 ESVs and over 5,300 investors, for a total of nearly 60,000 investment rounds. SNA was used to detect
investor communities and correlated community membership with a binary variable of measuring whether an exit
has occurred. Using traditional statistic approaches such as logistic regression, as well as ML approaches of Random
Forests and K-nearest neighbour, the study identified that unsuccessful investors are easier to identify than successful
investors.
Banerji and Reimer (2019)
analysed founders’ LinkedIn
followership influence on
fundraise amount.
The study analysed the LinkedIn followership numbers of founders of 129 US ESVs in the information and technology
industry. Using linear correlation, Banerji and Reimer analysed the variance in followership numbers correlated with
reported fundraise events drawn from Crunchbase. They found that founders with higher followership numbers
fundraise larger amounts 69% of the time.
Arroyo et al. (2019) anal-
ysed firm success based on
founders, company, and
fundraising information.
A retrospective, longitudinal analysis of 120,507 companies with 34,180 fundraise rounds was analysed through various
ML approaches such as Decision Trees, Random Forests and Support Vector Machines. The decision support tool
defined success as being acquired (M&A), to achieve a fundraise, or an IPO. Analysed metrics included: firm age,
binary variables for companies’ phone, web, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn presence, number of rounds, fundraised
amounts, valuation and investor counts, as well as the time since last fundraise.
WP = working paper, C = conference paper Continued on next page
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unit of analysis
Analysis/method/detail
Yang and Berger (2017)WP
predicted fundraising
amounts through social
media metrics.
Snapshot of 37,875 US companies selected, 119 analysed for Twitter and Facebook followership and engagement
measured by posts and Tweets. The data was analysed using a multi-variate OLS and Logistic regression. The
study found that Twitter follower count, as well as Facebook fan activity, correlate with total logarithmic fundraising
amount. Furthermore, it found that Twitter follower tweet counts and ESVs’ tweet count were not significant.
Nann et al. (2011)WP pre-
dicted ESV success and eco-
nomic value creations.
Snapshot of 14,854 alumni from 12 German universities were identified on the professional network Xing. 80 randomly
drawn alumni/entrepreneurs of each university were analysed for their companies’ job creation numbers. Betweenness
and degree centrality of entrepreneurs was analysed for linear correlation with the success metrics “survival” and
economic impact. The economic impact was defined as the number of employees multiplied with average income
based on a survey. The study found a significant correlation between founders’ economic impact and alumni group
betweenness centrality. Further research into the strength and relevance of social ties was encouraged.
Xiang et al. (2012)C ap-
plied topic modelling on
TechCrunch articles to pre-
dict M&A activity.
Textual information from web- and social media sites, was analysed using ML approaches such as Bayesian Network,
Support Vector Machines, and Logistic regression. ML outperformed the traditional statistical approach and found
M&A with above 60% true positive and below 8% false-negative rate. Metrics included employee number, company
age, location, offices, product, providers, milestones articulated in and revisions of the companies’ Crunchbase profiles,
TechCrunch articles per company, competitors, and acquired competitors.
Yu and Perotti (2015)C anal-
ysed fundraising capability
based on Twitter metrics.
644 ESV firms across industries and stages were analysed for their Twitter follower and friendship metrics as well
as the firm’s betweenness centrality in the Twitter network. The total fundraised amount was used as a proxy of
success for each firm and analysed with a linear regression model. The preliminary results show that the betweenness
centrality could be an indicator for firms fundraising capability.
Jin et al. (2017)C researched
the influence of social me-
dia presence on fundraising
rounds.
Snapshot of 2880 US ESVs across industries was drawn from Crunchbase and analysed whether ESVs raised second-
round funding. Using OLS, 2SLS, Logit regression models company and founder information were analysed for
correlation. The study found that ESVs with a social media presence raise funding rounds with more investors
and found that Tweets page-rank is not relevant. Analysed metrics included: age, employee count, and number of
different lines of business, funding received before first-round funding, total funding, and executive-level management
experience, ESV industry, years until second-round fundraise, number of Tweets and number of followers.
WP = working paper, C = conference paper Continued on next page
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Reference/
unit of analysis
Analysis/method/detail
Zhang et al. (2017)C analysed
crowd-funding success based
on social media engagement.
271 ESVs on AngelList with a Twitter and Facebook account operating in a variety of industries were tracked over
seven months for their AngelList followership, Facebook likes and posts, and Twitter followers and Tweets. An
analysis with Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines, and K-nearest neighbour predicted crowd-funding success
with 84% accuracy. In detail, ESVs that use social media are more likely to successfully crowd-fund. Furthermore,
among successful companies, 47.8% are on Facebook and 69.6% are on Twitter. In contrast, among unsuccessful
companies, only 9.5% and 38% are on Facebook and Twitter respectively. Across all variables, the AngelList followers,
Facebook posts and crowd-funding campaign description length were found to predict success, Twitter followers and
Tweets were found to be irrelevant.
Sharchilev et al. (2018)C pre-
dicted second-round invest-
ment based on web mentions.
37075 firms on Crunchbase were analysed for their inbound websites’ content. Findings from an analysis using a ML
Decision Tree suggest that the web presence and unstructured data have to be taken into account as they improved
the model’s explanatory power compared to models based solely on information from a structured database.
WP = working, paper C = conference paper
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The comprehensive literature review of studies at the intersect of online social me-
dia, with ESV success description and prediction helped position this study among
existing works, identify a research gap, and clarify to which previous calls for re-
search it could respond. Five issues were isolated from the literature.
Firstly, comprehensive success measuring for ESVs is not sufficiently understood
(Zachary and Mishra, 2013), especially when compared to later-stage investments
where more quantitative metrics are available to build comprehensive models (Miloud
et al., 2012). Secondly, the studies mentioned above outline several avenues for
subsequent research, for instance, into non-linear approaches, network-structured,
or relational data (Ter Wal et al., 2016; Banerji and Reimer, 2019). Thirdly, re-
searchers called for longitudinal data analysis which reflects the fundraising cycles
commonly found in ESVs and simultaneously analysing content and relationship
qualities rather than counting events or followership numbers (Zheng et al., 2010;
Yang and Berger, 2017). Fourthly, the studies encourage breaking away from self-
reported, ego-network data towards larger secondary data sets. Even beyond struc-
tured data, several researchers call for studies that harness contextual, web-scraped
data (Xiang et al., 2012; Martinez and Aldrich, 2011; Alexy et al., 2012; Banerji and
Reimer, 2019). Lastly, existing studies predominantly focus on US based companies.
Such focus can be seen as no longer timely, especially considering that the European
investment volumes are growing faster than their US counterparts and fundraising
volumes have reached historic highs (PitchBook, 2020a).
Besides the already mentioned calls, this study is similarly motivated by calls for
further research following qualitative studies. Researchers encourage studies of ESV
success concerning entrepreneurs’ aptness of using online social networks. Selected
examples demonstrated that online social networks and online social media have
emerged as an important entrepreneurial medium, and should be part of every en-
trepreneur’s “digital acumen” (Fischer and Reuber, 2011; Fischer and Rebecca Reu-
ber, 2014; Ellison et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2017). Matching the scope of the
thesis, Aggarwal et al. (2012, p. 990) emphasised the importance of “electronic
word-of-mouth” especially during the earliest stages of new ventures. Last but not
least, practitioners within the VC industry have started embracing social media as
a decision-relevant factor (Jin et al., 2017; Arnold, 2017) with some going so far
as to state: “Ten years from now, social media will be the starting point of any
investment” (Ted Leonsis, in Hong, 2013).
7.2.2 Hypothesis formulation
Informed by the insights gained from the previous study in Chapter 6, the social
network parameters of (a) size, (b) position, (c) density, and (d) and diversity were
also investigated in this study. A fifth parameter, (e) network relevance, expands
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the list of four social network parameters.
(a) Network size hypothesis
Researchers of previous studies have analysed the impact of the size of entrepreneurial
social networks on ESV success. Thus, to test whether this study can confirm such
a mechanism, the first hypothesis is formulated as:
Hypothesis 7.1: ESVs with a larger social network raise higher amounts
of funding, achieve higher valuations, and fundraise more
frequently.
(b) Network position hypothesis
Researchers in previous studies empirically demonstrated the importance of a central
ESV position. The hypothesis to test whether centrality positively impacts the ESV
success is:
Hypothesis 7.2: ESVs obtaining a central position in the global social net-
work, raise higher amounts of funding, achieve higher val-
uations, and fundraise more frequently.
(c) Network density hypothesis
Several studies in the reviewed literature found that the density and the resulting
increase of shortest paths between vertices in ESV social networks are associated
with increasing ESV success. The second hypothesis to be tested can, therefore, be
formulated as:
Hypothesis 7.3: ESVs with a denser social network raise higher amounts
of funding, achieve higher valuations, and fundraise more
frequently.
(d) Network diversity hypothesis
Network diversity has previously been studied theoretically and in empirical, qual-
itative works. Identified effects ranged from positive to negative. As the review in
Chapter 6 showed, an inverted U-shaped relationship can stem from being overly
diverse or overly homophilous (Uzzi, 1997; Xu, 2011). Consistent with Chapter 6,
the hypothesis is formulated as:
Hypothesis 7.4: ESVs with more diverse social network raise higher
amounts of funding, achieve higher valuations, and
fundraise more frequently.
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(e) Network relevance hypothesis
Previous quantitative studies encouraged further research into the contextual, con-
tent specific investigation of social networks (Martens et al., 2011; Banerji and
Reimer, 2019; Xiang et al., 2012). The debate of online versus offline social net-
works is fuelled by the idea that online relationships lack authenticity, relevance,
and depth of content (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Kane et al., 2014; Hoang and Yi,
2015). As the extant literature emphasises the relevance of ESVs’ ties to its stake-
holders, similarly should the online networks be relevant. Therefore the hypothesis
formulates as:
Hypothesis 7.5: ESVs with a more relevant social network stakeholders
fundraise higher amounts, achieve higher valuations and
fundraise more frequently.
The above literature review focused on measuring success, approaches to model ESV
success, and helped formulate the Hypotheses 7.1 to 7.5. These elementary building
blocks provide the foundation for the research design, and enable the researcher to
conduct the study, test the hypotheses, and answer Research Question 5.
7.3 Research design
This section describes the design of a real-time, longitudinal study of ESVs and
their fundraising activity. To build a tool which can serve as a decision-aid that
seeks correlation of fundraising data with online social media data, two types of
success metrics have to be selected. The first group of success metrics are consid-
ered dependent (7.3.1), to be explained variables, the second group are independent
(7.3.2), which serve as a proxy to explain the dependent variables. After identifying
suitable variables, the data sampling (7.3.4) and data gathering strategy (7.3.5) are
discussed.
7.3.1 Dependent variables
Table 7.1 shows an overview of success factors and success metrics that have been
used in previous studies and were considered as dependent variables for the study.
A central element of this study is to build upon and expand these factors. The
selection was derived through the exclusion of factors which the researcher considered
unsuitable for reasons explained below.
Firstly, following the reviewed literature, operational and financial metrics such as
the market share, revenue, profits, or ROI were excluded as they are not prevalent
among ESVs (Ramsinghani, 2014; Sharchilev et al., 2018). Secondly, jobs created,
especially for firms at the ESV stage were not considered a reliable predictor (Davila
et al., 2003; Fried and Tauer, 2015). Particularly the advent of software-based, high-
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technology ventures in the digital age have made staff count an unreliable predictor
as teams can be small and nonetheless create large financial successes (Ramsinghani,
2014; Hoffmann and Yeh, 2018)2. Thirdly, firm survival is difficult to assess, and
also a non-relational success metric as previous studies modelled it as a binary
event. The assessment of a company’s state as operational, deadpooled, or non-
operational is challenging because many firms continue to appear to be active in
databases although they have stopped trading. Fourthly, milestone achievements
were excluded as they are difficult to define, quantify, and most likely incomparable
among ESVs. A real time analysis of ESV achieving an IPO or M&A is not feasible
given the time horizon of several years. Comparing exited companies with current
ESVs is a procedure that has been criticised previously in this thesis as it resembles
an apple and pear comparison. Finally, the last available success metric to be used
were fundraising events, which have also been successfully used as described in the
literature review Section 7.2.1.
Table 7.3 lists and describes the dependent variables selected for this study.
Table 7.3: Dependent variables
Dependent variable Description/measure
fund raise t Mean duration between fundraises
acc fund raise Accumulated fundraise amounts across funding-rounds
max valuation Highest achieved post-money valuation
The metrics described in Table 7.3 are interpreted as positive when fundraises and
valuations are high, and fundraising cycles are short. It should be noted that
previous studies have shown that fundraise amounts have local optima and exces-
sive amounts lead to high dilution of the founders equity (Feinleib, 2011; Rowley,
2017). Similarly, intense fundraising in a short period of time could indicate that
entrepreneurs spend the majority of their time searching for capital. However, fol-
lowing suit with the approach of the reviewed studies, those direct fundraising met-
rics were considered the most applicable by the researcher, and the implications are
discussed as part of the study’s limitations.
7.3.2 Independent variables
In conjunction with the dependent variables, identification and selection of indepen-
dent variables was necessary to conduct the study. The focus of the analysis in this
study is on online social network characteristics of ESVs, in particular, independent
2 Evidence from several venture-backed firms shows that employee numbers can be a bad predictor
for ESV success. Relevant examples include firms such as Instagram which was 13 and WhatsApp
35 employees strong before being acquired for $1bn and $19bn respectively (Shontell, 2012; Metz,
2015).
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variables such as the investor network, online social media network of Twitter, and
the ESV’s website analytics. Here, the two website analytics, global page-rank and
number of inbound links, warrant further explanation.
The global page-rank is calculated based on the number of unique website visitors
over the last three rolling months, and the inbound links are counted as those third-
party websites that link onto an ESV’s website (Amazon Alexa, 2020).
Figure 7.2 shows the schematic description of the ESV user relationships analysed
as part of the study.
ESV
(a) Follower relationship
ESV
(b) Friend relationship
ESV
(c) Mutual relationship
ESV
w=5
(d) Mutual weighted relationship
Figure 7.2: Twitter follower and friendship schematic, own illustration.
Beyond focusing on follower and friendship numbers as performed in previous stud-
ies, additional information from the social media site Twitter, in combination with
content from the ESVs’ websites was used. This additional detail expands existing
research with first-time researched elements. Informed by the insights gained from
the previous study in Chapter 6, the metrics used are also categorised into size,
density, and position.
Table 7.4: Dependent variables
Independent variable Description/measure
Network size metrics
follower degree ti Absolute number of followers at time during survey per ESV
follower degree t Mean of followers during survey per ESV
follower degree∆ Absolute change of followers per ESV over survey period
follower degree rel∆ Relative change of followers per ESV over survey period
friends degree ti Absolute number of friends at time during survey per ESV
friends degree t Mean of friends during survey per ESV
friends degree∆ Absolute change of friends per ESV over survey period
friends degree rel∆ Relative change of friends per ESV over survey period
Network diversity met-
rics
fo div fr Quotient: follower degree ti/friends degree ti mean of
snapshots
new inv div f o inv Quotient: investors/f o investors mean of fundraise events
Continued on next page
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Independent variable Description/measure
Network density metrics
ego net followers density Density of follower network per ESV
ego net friends density Density of friends network per ESV
Network relevance metrics
followers match ti Absolute number of followers at time matching ESV’s web-
site content
followers match t Mean followers at time matching ESV’s website content
followers match∆ Absolute change of followers matching ESV’s website con-
tent over survey
followers match rel∆ Relative change of followers matching ESV’s website content
over survey
followers match w ti Absolute number of matching words at time matching in
ESV’s website content with all followers
followers match w t Mean matching words at time matching in ESV’s website
content with all followers
followers match w∆ Absolute change of matching words in ESV’s website content
with all followers
followers match w rel∆ Relative change of matching words in ESV’s website content
with all followers over survey
followers match w pf ti Mean of matching words at time with ESV’s website content
per follower
followers match w pf t Mean of matching words with ESV’s website content per
follower over survey
followers match w pf∆ Absolute change of the mean matching words in ESV’s web-
site content per follower
followers match w pf rel∆ Relative change of the mean matching words in ESV’s web-
site content per follower
followers match w u rel∆ Relative change of matching words per follower over survey
friends match ti Absolute number of friends at time matching ESV’s website
content
friends match t Mean friends at time matching ESV’s website content
friends match∆ Absolute change of friends matching ESV’s website content
over survey
friends match rel∆ Relative change of friends matching ESV’s website content
over survey
friends match w ti Absolute number of matching words at time matching in
ESV’s website content with all friends
friends match overlinew t Mean matching words at time matching in ESV’s website
content with all friends
friends match w∆ Absolute change of matching words in ESV’s website content
with all friends
friends match w rel∆ Relative change of matching words in ESV’s website content
with all friends over survey
friends match w pf ti Mean of matching words at time with ESV’s website content
per friend
friends match w pf t Mean of matching words with ESV’s website content per
friend over survey
Continued on next page
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Independent variable Description/measure
friends match w pf∆ Absolute change of the mean matching words in ESV’s web-
site content per friend
friends match w pf rel∆ Relative change of the mean matching words in ESV’s web-
site content per friend
friends match w u rel∆ Relative change of matching words per friend over survey
tweet count Absolute number of Tweets per ESV
Tweets per day Mean of Tweets per ESV per day
global pagerank Amazon Alexa page-rank of ESV’s website, the best achiev-
able web-rank is 1, the worst being 20 million
inbound links Absolute number of inbound-linked websites, the lowest link
count is 1 and can be infinite
Network position metrics
esv inv degree Absolute number of investors per ESV
esv f o inv degree Absolute number of follow-on investors per ESV
esv inv net degree cen Degree centrality of ESV in in investor network
esv inv net eigen cen Eigenvector centrality of ESV in investor network1
esv inv net between cen Betweenness centrality of ESV in investor network2
followers max X matches ESV edges to X most central followers in global network
friends max X matches ESV edges to X most central friends in global network
Binary ESV features
has Twitter ESV has a Twitter presence
has website ESV has a web presence
b2b ESV is sells B2B
accelerator ESV has been part of an accelerator program
1 Eigenvector centrality assigns relative scores to all vertices in the network based on the premise
that edges to vertices with high degree are favourable. Previous studies used this metric in an
ESV context (Spiegel et al., 2016). For a definition of eigenvector centrality view Table 2.3, p. 38.
Note: Variables only shown for followers and friends also exist for mutual relationship (mutual rel)
and weighted mutual relationship (weigh mutual rel) networks according to Figure 7.2 (c) and
Figure 7.2 (d) but are not listed here.
7.3.3 Control variables
Besides the dependent and independent success metrics for ESV, control variables
were introduced for the ESVs’ age, customer base, headquarter location and respec-
tive ecosystem, as well as the fundraise stage. As the data about ESVs was gathered
from three different private market databases, which apply varying classifications
and labels for sub-industry categories, the main search category artificial intelli-
gence (AI) & ML was the only control for industry influence besides b2b. Table 7.5
lists the control variables that were introduced to control for ESV characteristics.
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Table 7.5: Control variables
Control variable Description/measure
company age Number of days since ESV’s incorporation
b2b Binary 1 for B2B ESVs and 0 for B2C ESVs
hq city ecosystem Headquarter/ecosystem location in the UK
fund raise stage Highest achieved fundraise stage of the ESV
7.3.4 Sampling
As outlined above, the focus of the investigation was on the social networks, in
particular the investor networks, the web presence, and the social media network
Twitter. A large enough industry-vertical had to be identified to qualify as a relevant
sample, which at the same time must have a sufficiently high prevalence of the key
attributes. In the following, the (a) sampling criteria, (b) sample selection, and (c)
sample description are elaborated.
(a) Sampling criteria
The goal was to sample ESVs according to the following “main” sampling criteria:
1. Geography
2. Industry-vertical
3. ESV age, maturity, and fundraising history
As an additional constraint to the sampling criteria, the goal was to select a sample
in which the ESVs have maximum availability of attributes which were later used
as proxies. Thus in a suitable sample, most ESVs meet the “necessary availability”
criteria:
1. ESV has a Twitter presence
2. ESV has an active website
3. Website analytic for the ESV’s website is available
Finally, two “sufficient feasibility” criteria taking the form of one upper and one
lower boundary for the sample size were considered.
1. Lower boundary: sample size must be sufficient to make inferences about a
population
2. Upper boundary: limited sample size results from rate limit of Twitter appli-
cation programming interface (API)
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The upper boundary limits the sample size as a consequence of Twitter’s restric-
tions to data-mining3. As the survey period was scheduled to last six months, the
maximum feasible network size is around three to four million users.
For the lower boundary the Cochran formula was used to estimate the necessary
sample size n0 as shown below:
n0 =
Z2α/2 pˆ (1− pˆ)
E2
(7.1)
where:
• Zα/2 is the Z-score for a two-tailed test for a given confidence level α
• pˆ is the estimated probability that an attribute is present in the population
• E is the allowed margin of error
The aggregate of main, necessary, and sufficient sampling criteria was subsequently
used to select an initial sample for the survey.
(b) Sample selection
First, those geographies with sufficiently high Twitter prevalence were determined.
The private market database PitchBook4 offered this information as summarised in
Table 7.6. Regarding company maturity, the search focused on ESVs which had not
yet received Series B funding.
Table 7.6: ESV Geographies, their mean Twitter usage, and standard deviation
across verticals
Geography Mean Twitter use Std. dev. σ across verticals
Europe excl. UK 71.2% 11.6%
US 77.2% 12.6%
Asia 44.6% 15.5%
UK 84.3% 12.3%
Second, the Asian market was excluded on the basis of a low mean Twitter preva-
lence of 44.6%. The observation that geographies vary in their Twitter adoption
rates suggested to abstain from a global analysis due to difficulties in controlling
geographical bias5. Among the US and all European countries, the UK was the
one with the highest mean Twitter adoption. Accordingly the UK was chosen as a
geographic focus of the study.
Third, an industry vertical had to be selected. A summary of the verticals can be
3 The Twitter API allows up to 180 requests per 15 minute window, depending on the type of
requests. Given the rate limit of five Tweets per request and user and a total network size of,
for instance, one million Twitter users, the process would require 58 days.
4 The PitchBook database can be accessed via https://pitchbook.com.
5 ESVs may have multiple or undisclosed office locations.
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viewed in Table G.16. The two verticals with the highest Twitter adoption were
the AI & ML and financial technology (FinTech) vertical. The decision for the UK
AI & ML ESV vertical was made based on the representativeness of the candidate
samples.
Table 7.7: Twitter statistics for UK, AI&ML and FinTech ESVs
Vertical Stage Incorporation Frequency (Twitter)
All All 465/654 (71.1%)
Until Series A All 446/390 (87.4%)AI & ML
Until Series A From 2015 266/227 (85.3%)
All All 1,375/835 (60.7%)
Until Series A All 495/440 (88.8%)FinTech
Until Series A From 2015 226/190 (84.7%)
To estimate a minimum sample size for each sample, starting with AI & ML,
the Cochran Formula 7.1 was applied with an assumed confidence interval of 95%
for which Z0.05/2 =1.96, a conservative assumption of a 5% margin of error, and
pˆ=85.4% as the prevalence of Twitter use in the ESV sample. Therefore:
n0 =
1.962 · 0.853 · 0.147
0.052
≈ 192 (7.2)
However, since the population is finite, the Cochran formula 7.1 had to be adjusted
by a finite population correction factor 7.3. The total sample size of all AI & ML
firms in the UK was N=5061, which yields a corrected minimum sample size of:
ncorr =
n0
1 + n0−1
N
=
192
1 + 192−1
5061
≈ 185 (7.3)
whereby the expected margin of error given the corrected actual sample sizes equates
to:
Zα/2
√
p (1− p)
n
√
1− n
N
= 1.96
√
0.853 · 0.147
408
√
1− 227
5061
≈ 2.55% (7.4)
The result is significantly below the 5% assumed margin of error and indicates
that the sample is large enough. Accordingly, the calculations for the FinTech
industry yielded a minimum sample size of ncorr=192 rendering the FinTech sample
insufficient in size7.
6 Table G.1 can be viewed in Appendix G on page 273.
7 Corrected minimum sample size given pˆ=84.7%, N =5,073
n0=
1.962·0.847·0.153
0.052 ≈ 199, ncorr=199· 1991+ 199−15073 ≈ 192>190
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Last, the size of the sample was limited to companies that were less than than five
years old at the time of the survey to comply with Definition 2 of an ESV. The
resulting sample is described in the following section.
(c) Sample description
Before starting the survey period, the initial sample size of 266 ESVs on the Pitch-
Book database were complemented with search results of two additional private
market databases, Crunchbase8 and Tracxn9. Consequently, the number of iden-
tified ESVs was significantly increased, and data consistency and validity was en-
hanced through cross-checking. This procedure is explained in detail in Section 7.3.5
on data gathering and reviewed as part of the studies limitations in Section 7.5.1.
However, it had to be mentioned here to explain the discrepancy in sample size of
266 to 1,077 at survey start in Table 7.8, which outlines the fundraising stages along
the survey.
Table 7.8: Event frequencies for AI & ML ESV sample in the UK before, during,
and after the survey period
Stage Start of Survey End of Survey During Survey
Institutional Funding
Series B funding 0 7 +7
Series A funding 68 86 +37
Seed funding 222 233 +74
Corporate backed 6 9 +3
Non-institutional Funding
Angel funding 38 38 +7
Grant funding 30 31 +8
Crowd funding 16 19 +6
Accelerator/incubator 200 176 +18
Secondary transaction 2 2 +1
Convertible debt 0 1 +1
Merged or acquired 1 5 +4
Other
Unfunded 520 493 NA
Discontinued 0 3 +3
Sum 1,077 1,103 +26
Note: The difference between ESVs before and after the study does not add up since multiple
events occurred for ESVs as follows: 142 ESVs had 1 event, 20 ESVs had 2 events, 3 ESVs had 3
events.
During the survey period, 165 ESVs had a fundraising event at which they received
institutional or non-institutional VC funding. Table 7.9 and 7.9 provide further in-
8 The Crunchbase database can be accessed via https://www.crunchbase.com.
9 The Tracxn database can be accessed via https://tracxn.com.
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formation about the ESVs in the sample, including information on their headquarter
location, social media and web presence, representation in one of the three private
market databases, and their fundraising milestones since incorporation.
Table 7.9: Nominal descriptive statistics of sample
ESVs stages1 ESVs Headquarter ecosystem2
Accelerator/incubator 34.4% London ecosystem 69.6%
Angel funded 9.2% Cambridge ecosystem 3.5%
Convertible debt 0.3% Oxford ecosystem 2.0%
Corporate funded 1.4% Bristol ecosystem 1.0%
Crowd funded 3.1% Other ecosystems 23.9%
Debt funded 0.1%
Grant funded 7.9% ESVs binary characteristics
M&A 0.6% Twitter presence 77.2%
Secondary transaction 0.5% Website presence 98.3%
Seed funded 34.2% Event during study 18.1%
Series A funded 10.0%
Series B funded 1.1% Private market database source3
Out of business 0.4% PitchBook Crunchbase Tracxn
Sum 100% 649 (58.8%) 367 (33.3%) 736 (66.6%)
1 Stages which were achieved by ESVs in sample since their incorporation
2 All ecosystems with 1% or higher representation in the sample
3 649 duplicates were identified among the private market databases, resulting in 1103
unique ESVs.
Table 7.10: Interval descriptive statistics of sample
Mean Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
Days since ESV’s incorporation 1,045 −189 680 1,046 1,411 1,784
Days between past fundraises 373 0 205 315 472 1,749
Days since penultimate fundraise 371 0 135 315 506 1,749
Absolute number of fundraises 1 0 0 1 1 12
Absolute number of investors 2 0 0 1 1 19
Note 1: Q1, Q2, and Q3 are the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles.
Note 2: Company age is measured since the date of incorporation and ESVs with a negative
number of days (-N) since incorporation are to be founded in N days after the survey start.
As described above, different types of primary data were gathered. The mechanics
of the data gathering process are outlined in the following section.
7.3.5 Data gathering
Before the survey start, a setup period of one month was used to assemble the
starting sample of 1,077 ESVs. Subsequent data gathering took place over 202 days
between November 2018 and June 2019 during which bimonthly snapshots of all data
types were taken. At each snapshot, newly identified ESVs were added to the sample.
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Taking multiple snapshots of the ESVs’ Twitter networks was necessary as follower-
and friendship ties are not time-stamped, but the study relied on longitudinal time
series data.
Overall, four categories of data were required for the study: (a) private market
data, (b) Twitter network data, (c) as well as website content and analytic data. Of
those four, web analytic and Twitter data are used as direct independent variables,
the website content is post-processed to derive network relevance information which
then served as independent variables. In turn, private market information served as
dependent variables.
The choice of databases can be explained as follows. Twitter was used as a social
network platform over Facebook, LinkedIn, and others as it allows researchers to
mine data in sufficient quantities and has a high adoption rate among ESVs. Amazon
Alexa’s web analytics was used because it provided the researcher with inexpensive
data access. The private market databases were selected from a pool of 15 sources
and selected for data quality, access costs, and high coverage of ESVs. The data
was gathered using programming scripts in the Python language10.
(a) Private market data
Historical financial data. Data drawn from private market databases provided
historical financial information about the ESVs such as the amounts, valuation, and
the date of institutional or non-institutional fundraising rounds. To triangulate for
increased data validity and better coverage of the ESV market, the three databases
PitchBook, Crunchbase, and Tracxn were used. Data from the different private
market databases were merged and checked for inconsistencies11. Several duplicate
companies were found among the three databases. If information was only available
in one database, it had to be accepted. To resolve identified data inconsistencies,
the original source document and Companies House records were viewed12. Overall,
analyst curated and verified data was trusted over web-scraped data. The arithmetic
mean was used for remaining unresolvable inconsistencies.
ESV-investor network data. The ESV-investor network is formed of the ESVs
and their investors whereby connections represent investments. The network infor-
mation was composed by the researcher on the basis of the private market database
entries13.
10Unless explicitly mentioned, Python-native or standard data manipulation libraries, such as
Pandas (https://pypi.org/project/pandas/) and Numpy (https://pypi.org/project/numpy/)
were used.
11View Python code on https://github.com/Marcfelske/private-market-database-merge
12Companies House can be accessed via https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/compan
ies-house.
13View Python code on https://github.com/Marcfelske/NetworkX, the script used the NetworkX
library (https://pypi.org/project/networkx/)
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(b) Twitter network data
The main data used to derive the independent variables was obtained by scraping
data from Twitter. A main advantage of Twitter’s platform over other social me-
dia platforms is its relative openness and the availability of an API that facilitates
the download of large volumes of data for research purposes. In snapshots taken
throughout the survey, all Twitter followers and friends of each ESV were logged14.
Similar approaches to taking snapshots have been suggested and implemented in
previous research (Fischer and Rebecca Reuber, 2014; Yang and Berger, 2017). Be-
fore being included to the sample, each company was analysed for signs of having
ceased operating such as not functioning websites or a web-scrape search for key-
words15,16. For each ESV, only Twitter accounts registered as a business account of
the ESV were considered. Thus, in all cases where the ESV used a private account,
for instance, the founder’s own Twitter account, the ESV was excluded. The Python
library NetworkX was used to create different versions of the ESVs’ social networks
including, follower-, friends-, mutual friendship-, and weighted networks17.
(c) Website content and web analytic data
Website scraping. All identifiable ESVs websites were scraped for contextual in-
formation18, which was complemented with the ESVs’ description on Twitter and
in private market databases. As mentioned before, Twitter’s API was used to mine
Tweets, whereby reTweets were excluded. The content between ESVs and the ver-
tices in the respective follower-, friends-, mutual friendship-, and weighted networks
was matched using Python script and Porter word stemming (1980)19.
Website analytics. Amazon Alexa web analytics was used to extract information
about inbound links and the page-rank of the ESVs websites20.
7.3.6 Analysis
After gathering the data it was subjected to two analyses, (a) a time series analysis
and (b) three ML models.
14View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/Twitter-data-mining, the script used
the Tweepy library to mine data through Twitter’s API (https://pypi.org/project/tweepy/)
15The keyword search string used was “ceas*” OR “out of business” OR “deadpool*” OR
“bankrupt*”.
16View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/google-search-scrape, script used
the Beautifulsoup4 (https://pypi.org/project/beautifulsoup4/) and Requests library (https:
//pypi.org/project/requests/)
17View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/NetworkX, script used the NetworkX
library (https://pypi.org/project/networkx/)
18View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/web-scraping
19View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/content-matching, Porter stemmer on
https://pypi.org/project/nltk/
20View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcf elske/web-analytics, script used the
Beautifulsoup4 (https://pypi.org/project/beautif ulsoup4/) and Requests library (https:
//pypi.org/project/requests/)
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(a) Analysis: time series
The analysis of the time series was conducted with guidance from Robson and
McCartan (2016). Previous studies have analysed ESV metrics and their correlation
with fundraising events, such as studying changes in employee count (Davila et al.,
2003).
The aim of this research project was to investigate whether the occurrence of a
fundraising event correlates with a change in social media metrics. As illustrated by
Figure 7.3, the analysis split the time series in segments pre-event and post-event.
Metric
Time during survey
Fund-raising event
Figure 7.3: Time series schematic, own illustration
The time series was approximated with a linear regression as suggested by related
methodological guides (Blaikie, 2003; Ireland et al., 2005; Carpenter et al., 2012;
Dusatkova and Zinecker, 2016). When the slope of the regression changed by more
than the standard error of the regression, the change was considered relevant. In line
with Robson and McCartan’s (2016) recommendations, data series were discarded
when less than three time series elements existed before or after the event.
(b) Analysis: ML models
The goal of the analysis is to determine the applicability of SNA metrics to model
ESV success metrics. Several other studies have used such evaluation of signals to
measure a proxy variable they called “signal fit” (Connelly et al., 2011, p. 52).
As discussed in the literature review in Section 7.2.1, the availability of modern
ML models made analysis of large data sets feasible. The social network data set
comprises of over four million Twitter users, and the data set of 1103 ESVs contains
a large number of extreme outliers. As suggested by Carpenter et al. (2012) and
Dusatkova and Zinecker (2016), the applicability of a multi-variate regression and
OLS were first tested. However, as expected, traditional statistical approaches did
not yield significant effects with noteworthy effect strengths.
For further analysis, the data was post-processed into categorical values as sum-
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marised in Table D.3.321,22. The post-processing prepared the gathered data for
the training of three ML models: a Decision tree (DT), a Gradient Boosted Tree
(GBT), and a Random forest (RF)23. DTs are a non-parametric supervised learning
method which are often used for classification and regression (Raschka, 2012; Good-
fellow et al., 2016). RFs are a complified version of DT as they ensemble multiple
consecutive trees (Breimann, 2001).
The performance of the models used are judged by their accuracy, F1 score, pre-
cision, and recall compared to similar publications in the research domain (Xiang
et al., 2012; Liang and Yuan, 2016; Zhang et al., 2017; Sharchilev et al., 2018; Glup-
ker et al., 2019; Arroyo et al., 2019). The matrix in Figure 7.4 shows all potential
categorisation successes and mistakes which can occur when using a ML model to
classify instances, in the given case ESV success variables.
Predicted negative
Predicted positive
False negative (FN) True negative (TN)
True positive (TP) False positive (FP)
Actual positive Actual negative
Figure 7.4: Confusion matrix, modified from Davis and Goadrich (2006)
Formula 5, 6, and 7 were obtained from (Davis and Goadrich, 2006; Powers, 2011;
Flach and Kull, 2015).
First, the accuracy of a model, as shown in Formula 4, measures all correctly iden-
tified instances as a fraction of the total number of instances.
Formula 4:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
Second, an algorithm’s recall is defined as the ratio of the correctly predicted in-
stances of a class to the total of true instances of all classes.
Formula 5:
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
Third, the precision of an algorithm is defined as the ratio of the correctly predicted
instances of the total of false instances of all classes.
Formula 6:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
21Table D.3.3 can be viewed in Appendix D on page 253.
22View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/post-processing
23View Python code on: https://github.com/Marcfelske/machine-learning-models, script used
the SKlearn library (https://pypi.org/project/sklearn/).
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Fourth, the F1 score aggregates the recall and precision score by taking their hy-
perbolic function and thereby strikes a balance to optimise recall and precision
simultaneously.
Formula 7:
F1 =
2
1
Recall
+ 1
Precision
The composition of the ML models can be taken further by investigating the im-
portance of individual metrics24, which can either measure how often a metric was
used to split the trees within ML model, or the achieved information gain from
using each metric (Ke et al., 2017). Outlining the analysis approach concludes the
research design section. Thus far, the use of social networks to proxy ESV success
within this study was explained, all variables as well as the sampling procedure
were introduced, and the data gathering strategy was presented. Subsequently, the
results of the study are presented.
7.4 Results
The results of the time series analysis (7.4.1) as well as the results obtained from
applying the ML models to the data set (7.4.2) are presented separately.
7.4.1 Results: time series
The time series analysis overlayed the fundraising events with the developments in
the ESVs social networks and found significant changes as shown in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Time series results of 159 events and significant social media metric
changes
Significant changes in Twitter metrics
Variable Up Down Total
followers ti 59 (38%) 52 (33%) 111 (71%)
followers match ti 55 (35%) 45 (29%) 100 (64%)
followers match w ti 58 (37%) 48 (31%) 106 (68%)
followers match w pf ti 59 (38%) 48 (31%) 107 (69%)
friends ti 57 (37%) 49 (31%) 106 (68%)
friends match ti 57 (37%) 50 (32%) 107 (69%)
friends match w ti 57 (37%) 46 (29%) 103 (66%)
friends match w pf ti 58 (37%) 47 (30%) 105 (67%)
mutual rel ti 55 (35%) 46 (29%) 101 (65%)
mutual match ti 52 (33%) 52 (33%) 104 (67%)
mutual match w ti 58 (37%) 52 (33%) 110 (71%)
mutual match w pf ti 58 (37%) 53 (34%) 111 (71%)
Continued on next page
24In the literature, this is termed the “feature importance” (https://lightgbm.readthedocs.io/en/l
atest/pythonapi/lightgbm.plot importance.html) to maintain consistent terminology throughout
the thesis, feature importance will be referred to as metric importance hereafter.
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Significant changes in Twitter metrics
Variable Up Down Total
weigh mutual rel ti 56 (36%) 46 (29%) 102 (65%)
weigh mutual match ti 60 (38%) 52 (33%) 112 (72%)
weigh mutual match w ti 61 (39%) 55 (35%) 116 (74%)
weigh mutual match w pf ti 62 (40%) 54 (35%) 116 (74%)
Overall, the analysis covered 165 companies and 191 fundraising events. 32 events of
14 companies had to be excluded as the events happened to early or late during the
survey period with less than three snapshots pre-event or post-event. This leaves
151 companies with a Twitter and web-presence and 159 fundraising events. The
results indicate a support of the network relevance Hypothesis 7.5 and show that
the time around fundraises is particularly volatile for ESVs and their social media
presence. In about two thirds to three-quarters of the cases, Twitter metrics varied
significantly, meaning the linear regression slopes before and after a fundraising
event differed by more than one standard error. Also, a tendency of increases over
decreases in Twitter metrics was observed (0 to 7%). Hence, the time series analysis
showed a small positive association of fundraise events and changes Twitter metrics.
However, for each of the four analysed network types there were no clear tendencies
identified25. The weighted mutual relationship networks were only slightly more
prone to show effects than the other network types. As for the metrics within
each network type, the average word matches per user consistently had the highest
association.
Further in-depth analysis of the significant metric variation showed that the changes
in Twitter metrics lagged behind the fundraising event. As shown in Figure 7.3, the
data set was divided into two segments delimited by the fundraising event. The
lag can be shown through a sensitivity analysis which tests whether the pre-event
regression or post-event regression better describe the social media metrics around
the time of the event. On average, in 71% of the cases when the metrics increased
and 64% when the metrics decreased, the pre-event regression better described the
first post-event metric data point. Thus, it can be said that the change in Twitter
metrics lags around zero to two weeks.
The additional analysis used the control variables to segment the data sets into
two separate groups either into binary categories or separating at the median value.
The following two lists showcase where groups generated from splitting along control
variables either exerted notably different behaviour or might have been expected to
show different behaviour but failed to do so26.
Notable differences of ESVs characteristics on social media metric changes following
25The four analysed network types can be revisited in Figure 7.2 on page 164.
26Reported are those splits where notable differences occurred for at least half of the social media
metrics in excess of 10%.
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a fundraising event:
1. The older half of ESVs was 26% less likely to have a significant change in
metrics
2. ESVs with the upper half of followership numbers were 15% less likely to have
a significant change in metrics
3. ESVs with the upper half of friendship numbers were 11% less likely to have
a significant change in metrics
4. ESVs which raised funds as part of an accelerator program were 31% more
likely to have a significant change in metrics
5. ESVs which had a fundraise event after longer than the mean fundraise fre-
quency had a 22% higher chance to of a significant change in metrics
6. ESVs which had a fundraise event after longer than the mean initial fundraise
time were 18% more likely to show a significant change in metrics
7. In all but one case where multiple fundraise events were registered during the
survey period, the slope increased, however, the second and third event led to
smaller increases than the first.
8. ESVs, which had an above-median follower to friendship ratio, were 39% more
likely to show a significant change in metrics.
Notable lack of effect of ESVs characteristics on social media metric changes follow-
ing a fundraising event:
1. Similar metric changes were found for first or subsequent fundraises
2. Inconsistent social media effects for fundraises of varying investment stages
3. ESVs with their headquarters in various ecosystem locations had indiscernible
metric changes
4. Financing round size and valuation had no significant influence on the likeli-
hood of experiencing significant changes in metrics
Another clear trend was found from the analysis of the content matches among
ESV followers and friends. Firstly, over 90% of ESVs had a markedly, 13% higher
average of word matches with their friends than their followers. ESVs with above
median friend to follower content match-ratio were 17% more likely to see a change
in Twitter metrics, and a 29% higher chance that the change was positive meaning
an upwards trend post-event.
This concludes the time series analysis, the remaining analysis focuses on the results
generated with the ML models.
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7.4.2 Results: ML models
The ML models are used to determine the meaningfulness of ESV social media met-
rics as a proxy for ESV success. The three success metrics, (a) fundraise frequency
(fund raise t), (b) accumulated fundraise amounts (acc fund raise), and (c) max-
imum achieved valuation (max valuation) were analysed separately, the results of
which are summarised hereafter. Finally, the results of a (d) thought experiment to
predict ESV fundraises are presented.
(a) Fundraise frequency
The first success variable to be analysed was the fundraise frequency of the ESVs.
Table 7.12 shows the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score for the three ML
algorithms (DT, GBT, and RF) which modelled the fundraise frequency.
Table 7.12: Fundraise frequency ML model performance
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1
DT 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.52
GBT 0.57 0.52 0.57 0.53
RF 0.56 0.40 0.56 0.45
The results show that more than half of the fundraises were correctly classified into
the following categories:
1. no fundraise (NA fund raise t)
2. pre-incorporation fundraise (pre inc fund raise t)
3. fast fundraise frequency (fast fund raise t)
4. medium fundraise frequency (medium fund raise t)
5. slow fundraise frequency (slow fund raise t)
The most accurate results are achieved for the ESVs that have not yet fundraised
(1.) and those with a slow fundraise frequency (5.).
As a next step, all individual metrics were used to classify ESVs for their fundraises.
The best classification results were achieved using the GBT model for and Figure 7.5
shows the ten most relevant metrics, both in terms of highest information gain, and
number of tree splits to model fundraise frequency.
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Figure 7.5: Metric importance in fundraise frequency GBT model
Analysing the individual metrics shows support for multiple hypotheses as network
size, diversity, and relevance based metrics were factored in the GBT model. This
can be interpreted as a support of Hypothesis 7.1, 7.4, and 7.5. Overall, ESVs that
participated in an accelerator program (accelerated) have the highest information
gain in the GBT model, which implies that the metrics serve as a strong proxy to ex-
plain the fundraise frequency. Closer inspection reveals that accelerated ESVs have
a mean fundraise frequency of 326 days compared to 448 days for non-accelerated
ESVs. Both metrics, accelerated and new inv div f o inv support the network size
and diversity hypothesis. This support stems from the fact that affiliation with
an accelerator connects an ESV to a cohort and previous cohorts of ESVs, a high
number of newly investing VCs further increases the size of ESVs’ social networks,
hence increasing network size and diversity.
The remaining metrics support the network relevance hypothesis. Both website an-
alytic metrics, global pagerank and inbound links, are the most used metrics of the
GBT model measured by their number of DT splits. However, direct interpretation
and therefore meaningfulness for the relevance hypothesis of the two web metrics
is inconclusive upon closer inspection. As the mean fundraise time for the upper
half of inbound links27 and global pagerank28 only differs by ±20 days from that
of the lower half, no clear trend could be found. Another point worth noting is
that the metrics which measure content matches with friends and followers were
more important in the model than the plain follower or friend counts. Although the
mean for higher content matches and bigger increases over the survey period only
27A high number of inbound links is expected to be a positive success metric.
28A low global page-rank is expected to be a positive success metric.
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resulted in slightly shorter fundraise amounts, the results were consistent across the
content-based metrics. The metric importance in the model is comparable for the
content-based metrics and no clear critical metric stood out.
(b) Fundraise amount
The next set of ML models was used to classify the fundraise amounts of ESVs in
seven categories:
1. unfunded (no funding)
2. $US100,000 up to $US500,000 (five figure)
3. $US500,000 up to $US1m (half mil)
4. $US1m up to $US5m (six figure)
5. $US5m up to $US10m (five mil)
6. $US10m up to $US100m (seven figure)
7. more than $US100m (eight figure plus)
Table 7.13 shows the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score for the fundraise
frequency models.
Table 7.13: Fundraise amount ML model performance
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1
DT 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69
GBT 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.69
RF 0.69 0.52 0.69 0.59
The achieved results are substantially improved compared to the fundraise frequency
and range around 70%. Again, the GBT model achieved the best results of the dif-
ferent ML techniques. The model performance was best for the no funding and
mid to high range fundraise amounts six figure, five mil, and seven figure cat-
egories. However, the precision and recall scores for the lower fundraise amounts,
five figure and half mil, were only in the 10 to 40% range.
Figure 7.6 shows results of closer inspection of the the GBT model’s ten most im-
portant metrics.
This inspection of the individual metric importance reveals an ESV’s location in
among other ESVs and VCs, which can be interpreted as a support of the net-
work position Hypothesis 7.2. ESVs fundraise higher amounts when they inhabit
positions on shortest paths (esv inv net between cen) and are highly connected to
many investors (esv inv degree) who are actively investing. Active investing and
syndicating makes investors themselves highly connected to other ESVs and VCs
(esv inv net eigen cen). Other important metrics in the model are previous acceler-
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Figure 7.6: Metric importance in fundraise amount GBT model
ation and the ratio of new to follow-on investors (new inv div f o inv). ESVs with
higher fluctuation of investors raised, on average across the sample, more capital.
In the GBT model, the web metrics play an important role and are used in many
tree splits. As for the fundraise frequency model, the number of content matches
between ESV and its Twitter network bring an information gain, again a support
of the network relevance hypothesis. This time, the average word matches between
ESVs and their friends (friends match w pf t) and the increase in followers word
matches (followers match w pf∆) are factored in higher than the absolute change
in followership (follower degree∆).
(c) Valuation
The last set of ML models categorise the valuation achieved by the ESVs into the
same categories as the fundraise amounts. Table 7.14 shows the accuracy, precision,
recall, and F1 score for the fundraise frequency models.
Table 7.14: Valuation ML model performance
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1
DT 0.69 0.80 0.79 0.79
GBT 0.70 0.81 0.86 0.82
RF 0.69 0.75 0.87 0.81
For the third time, the GBT model achieved the highest modelling performance.
Particularly the lower valuations, five figure and six figure, were classified reli-
ably by the model, followed by ESVs with no valuation. The higher valuations are
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predicted unreliably. It should be noted that the valuation information was only
available for 162 ESVs which severely impacts the classification success29. A reason
for the higher accuracy can be traced back to the fact that most accelerator funding
comes in priced rounds with known valuations which are classified reliably.
Figure 7.7 shows the ten most important metrics of the GBT ESV valuation model,
which performed the best in predicting the ESVs’ valuation.
new inv div follow inv
esv inv degree
esv inv net between cen
accelerated
esv inv net eigen cen
global pagerank
inbound links
mutual rel match∆
friends max 10k matches
follower degree t
0255075100 0 25 50 75 100
Information gain Use for splits
Note: All metric strengths were normalised to calibrate the most important metric to “100”.
Figure 7.7: Metric importance in valuation GBT model
Similar to the results obtained for the GBT fundraise amount model, the posi-
tion in the ESV-investor network resulted in information gains which supports Hy-
pothesis 7.5. Regarding the social media metrics, this time the mutual relation-
ships, where a Twitter friend is a follower and vice versa, factor in the highest
(friends match w pf t). Matches of content with such Twitter users can be seen
as a support for the network relevance hypothesis. Lastly, the connectedness to the
10,000 highest connected nodes in the network, which includes all ESVs and Twit-
ter users, as well as the followership are used in the GBT model to classify ESV
fundraise amounts.
As the last evaluation of the ML models, the GBT model was used to obtain binary
classifications of seed, series a, and series b30 and was used to conduct a prediction
experiment.
29The classifier cannot discern between an ESV that has no available valuation information because
it has never fundraised or raised capital an “unpriced” round, versus an ESV which has raised a
priced round but valuation information is not available.
301 means the ESV fundraised the respective round, 0 means it did not, or not yet fundraise the
round.
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(d) Results: prediction experiment
The GBT model was finally used to identify ESVs which, form a social network
perspective, are better situated than their competitors at similar or later fundraising
stages. The model helped create predictions for ESVs which should, according to
their current social media metrics, be more likely to fundraise than others. The
prediction experiment investigated whether ESVs would receive Seed and Series A
funding nine months after the end of the survey period31. Table 7.15 presents the
predicted and actual fundraise events in the post-survey period.
Table 7.15: Series A and Series B fundraise prediction and evaluation
Model
Current Future ESVs Prediction Evaluation
Seed Series A 233
Fundraise 62 True positive 34 (55%)
Not fundraise 171 False negative 21 (12%)
Series A Series B 86
Fundraise 17 True positive 6 (35%)
Not fundraise 69 False-negative 4 (6%)
As no direct comparison predicted fundraising for ESVs was available from existing
literature, it was not possible to compare the predictive quality with other studies.
The results clearly indicated that the rate of true positive predictions significantly
outweighs the true negative predictions. Thus, a practitioner using the model, could
identify a significantly more ESVs which are likely to fundraise than falsely exclud-
ing promising ESVs. Of the 233 ESVs that were Seed funded at the end of the
survey period, the GBT model predicted 63 seed rounds, of which 34 fundraises
were correctly identified. Similarly, of 86 ESVs which were Series A funded, 17 were
predicted and 6 fundraised a Series B.
This analysis concludes the presentation of the study’s results, and the next section
evaluates the robustness.
7.4.3 Robustness
Robustness of the results of the time series analysis and ML models was ensured
by taking specific measures aligned with those of previous studies (Vismara, 2016;
Arroyo et al., 2019).
For the time series, a high threshold was set at one standard error for changes to
be considered significant. Furthermore, the analysis of time series yielded consis-
tent results across all metrics. This consistency reassures that the metric changes
timing-wise coincide with with fundraise events.
Robustness of the results generated from the ML models was ensured in five ways.
31From June 2019 to February 2020
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Firstly, to avoid introducing irrelevant dependent variables, Crame´r’s V was calcu-
lated and only features with associations above 0.1 were included. Secondly, the
chosen ML models are tolerant of multicollinearity, nevertheless a sensitivity analy-
sis was performed by selectively excluding metrics from the model (Leung and Yu,
2000; Wooldridge, 2002). The sensitivity analysis did not show noticeable problems
originating from multicollinearity.
Third, the ML models randomly split data sets for training, validating, and test-
ing the models (Goodfellow et al., 2016), to ensure that the random split did not
accidentally introduce a bias in the resulting sets, cross-validation through k-folds
(with k=10) was performed and models achieved consistent results (He and Ma,
2013; Fushiki, 2011).
Fourthly, the logarithmic loss curves of the models’ performance on training and val-
idation data were analysed to ensure the models do not over-fit (Brownlee, 2019).
For all three models, the log-loss training curves showed asymptotic behaviour, and
the maximum deviation between training and validation data never exceeded 11%
for the fundraise frequency, 8% for the fundraise and validation model. The fact
that model training and logarithmic loss developed in lockstep, which implies that
over-fitting has unlikely occurred during the training of the ML models.
Finally, the robustness of fundraise amount and valuation model was tested for its
applicability to fundraising stages (fund raise stage). Here, inconsistent results
were found, especially for higher fundraise amounts and valuations within the same
investment stage. This limits the generalisability of the models as categorisation
results across stages are not as precise as for the fundraise amounts and valua-
tions. One identified reason for the imprecise categorisation was the high variance
in investment-round size32.
Overall, the adopted measures and the conservative design ensure confidence in the
robustness of the results and repeatability of the study.
7.5 Discussion
Summary. The final study presented in this thesis used a unique data set to
identify how social networks can be used as a proxy for ESV success. The focus was
on fundraising success metrics, after a review of all identifiable studies in the field
suggested this research gap. Classification of ESVs based on these fundraise success
metrics highlighted the relevance of a dynamic social network perspective in ESVs
evaluation and could serve as an evaluation tool for practitioners. In many ways, the
study aggregates the suggested research opportunities found while conducting the
research for this thesis and other researchers’ studies. Firstly, the study integrates
32For instance the classifier would struggle to explain how an ESV raised a larger Seed round of
$US3m compared to a smaller $US2m Series A round albeit at a later stage of investment.
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concepts of stakeholders, in this case, investor and accelerator networks as well as
engagement with the Twitter community. Secondly, the study honed in on a specific
form of signalling, online signalling, through ESVs’ web and social media presence.
Thirdly, established metrics which were validated through a treatment-experiment
in Chapter 6 were applied in a real-world case.
Theoretical contribution. The study of social network proxies using a combina-
tion of established and new metrics expands the existing knowledge on ESV eval-
uation. As outlined in the literature review, this study supported the notion that
traditional statistical tests are impractical as they failed to describe the non-linear,
outlier-rich data (Nahata, 2008; Allison, 2010). Instead, the successful application
of ML models based on the size, diversity, position, and relevance of ESVs’ networks
demonstrated their meaningfulness as ESV success proxies. The only category of
SNA metrics that never ranked among the ones with the highest information gain
were density-based metrics as described in Hypothesis 7.3. The lack of support for
the density hypothesis is in contrast to the previous study in Chapter 6 in which it
was the second strongest effect after network size.
Notably, in every GBT model, which consistently outperformed DT and RF mod-
els, relevance-based metrics were among those yielding the highest information gain.
An analysis of and further research into metrics based on content has been called
for in existing research (Xiang et al., 2012; Sharchilev et al., 2018). Consequently
a contribution to theory has been made by this study by being the first to con-
sider relevance-based metrics in a study of social network metrics and ESV success
indicators. Moreover, the study expands a number of studies that stated relative
dominance of offline versus online social networks for ESVs because only offline net-
works allow an exchange of nuanced content (Tan and Tan, 2012; Song, 2015). As
detailed in the literature review, proxy metrics can be applied in ESV modelling.
This study contributes by expanding the candidates of metrics for such modelling by
online social media metrics. It was demonstrated that online social media content
can similarly be analysed and used for ESV success modelling.
A further contribution to theory can be found in the application of state-of-the-art
ML models to an important, practice-oriented cause. The literature review discussed
a controversy about the feasibility to model the inherently non-linear maturation
process and ESV success. Linking back to this controversy this study demonstrated
tangible information gains by applying ML models. Thus, the classification results
generated by the ML models illustrate how even testing a single perspective, that of
social network metrics, can complement the overall assessment of an ESV evaluation
by practitioners.
Another contribution to theory can be found in closing a theory practice gap. In the
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given case, applications in practice are ahead of academic understanding. This can
be observed in the increase of VC funds employing data-driven investment strategies
and practitioners who emphasised the importance of relevant online exchange. A
concrete example can be found in anecdotal supporting evidence of content and thus
the relevance of social network interactions given by AdVC5. In an interview dur-
ing the study, the Partner of a VC fund that heavily invests into their data-driven
decision platform stated that
“to get a clear picture of a start-up and its network, understanding con-
tent over merely counting instances of something is key, especially when
building models based on social media engagement. Whoever cracks that
nut first might win the race to build an investment decision AI.” (AdVC5)
Moreover, a Partner at Lightspeed Venture Partners, another US based VC fund
with a proprietary data-driven investment platform (Clark, 2019b), recently stated
on Twitter: “An ounce of engagement is worth 1,000x more than a pound of audience
online. Just having one person interact with and/or be impacted by a piece of
content (even as small as a tweet) contains energy - having lots of followers or
fishing for likes are often just empty calories.”33.
Implications for practice. The study surfaces several important points to be
considered by entrepreneurs and VCs. First, results increased the understanding of
online social networks’ role for ESVs for fundraising and investor signalling. Sec-
ond, it highlights that dynamic development of social networks could serve as a
measurable signal of ESV fundraising activity. The underlying signalling process
relates to the main literature review in Chapter 2, where it was found that many
founders are unaware of signals they emit and VCs unaware of the existence of sig-
nals (Connelly et al., 2011). Thus, from this study, entrepreneurs of ESVs could not
only learn about the importance of their firm’s social media presence but also see
the identified metrics as guidance for their online social network strategy. Third,
founders can learn about the meaningfulness of the content-related metrics. Fourth,
founders with mutual connections to the highest connected individuals might have
fundraising advantages. This finding supports evidence of other studies that found
affiliation to key individuals in the Twitter and VC community to be a competitive
advantage (Liang and Yuan, 2016). Together, these points underline how ESV so-
cial networks can be purposely built, a process that requires a founder’s attention
and digital acumen (Fischer and Rebecca Reuber, 2014). Fifth, VCs building data-
driven investment tools can seek inspiration from the methods used in this chapter,
as well as the metrics that were identified to yielding the highest information gain.
33The original Tweet can be found on https://Twitter.com/semil/status/1212948489111425024.
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Lastly, the results of the time series analysis yielded that continuous signalling of
ESVs could be beneficial for ESVs’ success. The rapid decay of signal strength and
the merit of constantly signalling has been previously documented in the literature,
and the results of this study support these mechanisms (Islam et al., 2018; Ko and
McKelvie, 2018).
7.5.1 Limitations and research opportunities
Despite the extensive efforts during the research design, the study has some inherent
limitations. It is worth reemphasising that this study aimed at finding correlation
and serve as a decision-aid to VCs and does not claim to find causation between
online social network, and fundraising metrics or to serve as the sole perspective
during pre-investment evaluation.
Although the sampling process identified a sample that should be statistically rep-
resentative and allow for generalisations, the sample was purposely chosen to have
high Twitter prevalence and a technology-oriented industry. It is therefore likely,
that samples with a lower prevalence could yield different results and higher statisti-
cal deviations. Next, this study’s sample comprised firms from one industry vertical,
which helped to rule out several methodological threats but limits the conclusions to
be drawn for the entire ESV population. Thus, researchers should exercise caution
when attempting to generalise the findings of this study in other industries. Never-
theless, within this analysis, it was not apparent that the firms at the extreme ends
of the industry spectrum displayed any particular behaviour. Therefore, it could
well be that the findings apply to a broader sample.
As discussed in the 3, the challenge with selecting and using proxies is to balance be-
tween availability, obtainability, and operationalisation, i.e. how relevant the proxy
in measuring the not directly measurable metric. Using Twitter metrics as a proxy
is limited in terms of the generalisability on the influence of fundraising outcomes.
Thus, it is important to note that the derived evaluation tool only supports and
objectifies one slice of a holistic evaluation. Furthermore, the data quality of private
market databases is a limiting factor. For instance, not all ESVs were featured in
every database and different methodologies used by the database providers could
induce biases. As privately owned firms are not required to disclose their reporting
as public companies do, a ground-truth information basis is not achievable. Private
market databases also provide potentially incomplete or even wrong information.
Further biases can be expected to result from inadequately logged, completed and
uncompleted deals as well as survivor bias that leads to over-representation of suc-
cessful ventures. Moreover, the reported deal data inherently lags the fundraising
event as the information has to either be picked up online by the private market
database or directly reported to them by the participating VC or ESV. Unfortu-
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nately, these biases are inevitable when working with this data type and ESVs and
VCs are incentivised to not report negative events such as failed investments or even
deliberately delete information to polish an entrepreneur’s or a fund’s history. The
introduced bias is hard to estimate, the database provider AngelList admitted that
the dark figure of unlisted deals could exceed 50% (Bernstein et al., 2017).
Several further research opportunities can be listed that could build on this study.
Future research could attempt to include different data types to explain ESV success.
It would be conceivable to use web scraping and extract investors’ and accelerators’
portfolios for sentiments of value propositions and using online social media to iden-
tify these in other ESVs. Including patent data, code-repositories from GitHub,
product and app ranking websites, hiring websites, or evaluating entrepreneurship
podcasts could yield additional promising signals.
Alternatively, different success metrics as listed in the literature review could be
considered. As highlighted in the limitations, different geographies or industries
could be tested to identify whether the same metrics apply. For instance, Asian
social media networks were excluded for language reasons and sparse use of Twitter.
Other researchers could repeat the study for non-western geographies.
Though the study was designed as a longitudinal study with a six month survey pe-
riod followed by a nine-month post-survey period, the success of ESVs only becomes
observable in significantly longer time-frames. Using data sources which facilitate
looking back in the past, or surveying for more extended periods, could yield addi-
tional findings.
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8.1 Thesis summary
An overarching theme governed the research questions explored in this thesis: the
process of ESVs emitting signals of investability and the reception and evaluation
of these signals by VCs. A detailed literature review contrasting the VC and en-
trepreneurial perspective on ESV evaluation set the scene. Following the litera-
ture review, five dedicated studies were subsequently planned and executed. Over
those five studies, the research focus gradually shifted from understanding the pre-
investment ESV signalling towards the exploration of social networks as an ESV
evaluation perspective.
The research project started with two sub-studies described in Chapter 4. One
study qualitatively enquired into the pre-investment signalling process between ESV
founders and VCs. The following sub-study examined visualisations of social net-
works that were provided by founders. While sketching their social network visuali-
sations founders emphasised the primary stakeholder groups in ESV networks. The
first sub-study served as the pilot study for this thesis, which identified the potential
of taking a social network perspective on ESV evaluation. Results drawn from the
second sub-study highlighted differences of ESV social network structures and gave
a more nuanced understanding of key stakeholders for ESVs. Furthermore, the two
studies reflected the contrasting views of ESVs founders and VCs on signalling, in
particular, social network signalling.
In Chapter 5, ESVs’ social network stakeholders and their involvement in shaping
ESVs’ business functions were analysed from a BMI perspective. ESVs researched in
the study have incorporated a variety of approaches to leverage their social network
for integral business functions and enabled entrepreneurs to optimised the ESVs’
operations.
Chapter 6 investigated previous qualitative findings from a more theoretical perspec-
tive. A scenario experiment of different ESVs’ stakeholder network constellations
was used to determine the influence on the perceived evaluation of ESVs by founders
and VCs under controlled circumstances. The study also showed that ESV networks
could be parameterised by four established social network metrics, size, diversity,
density, and position.
The final Chapter 7 synthesised the findings from previous studies into a novel,
social network focused evaluation methodology for VCs. Considering the dynamic
nature of social networks, helped develop a nuanced understanding of real-world
signals that can be used as proxies to improve the evaluation of ESVs’ fundraising
activity.
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8.2 Contrasting individual studies
The methodology used for the studies was developed in Chapter 3 to reflect the
multifaceted nature of the ESV evaluation process and the exploratory nature of the
research project. By acknowledging the merits and shortcomings of the individual
studies, collectively they addressed the particular limitations and enabled a more
nuanced, less biased perspective. The individual studies described in Chapters 4 to
7 differed fundamentally in their methodology, which included the enquiry methods,
reasoning, utilised theories, and data types. Likewise, the studied subjects, sampling
strategy, and consequently, the samples, were varied. Table 8.1 shows an overview
of the different studies and summarises their main characteristics.
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Table 8.1: Contrasting of research studies
Study of ESV... Signalling (RQ1) Stakeholders (RQ2) Social network functions (RQ3) Evaluation experiment (RQ4) Evaluation tool (RQ5)
Number of study 1 2 3 4 5
Chapter 4 4 5 6 7
Enquiry,
starting point/
observer’s interest
Exploratory; understand the
pre-investment process between
ESVs and VCs
Exploratory; investigate which
stakeholders ESVs include in
their social networks
Descriptive; seek and explain
approaches that ESVs take to
leverage social networks in sup-
port of essential business func-
tions
Descriptive; understand the
role of social networks in ESV
evaluation by studying influ-
ence of network constellations
Explanatory; identify relevant
social media metrics which are
associated with ESV fundrais-
ing success
Chapter finding/
Subsequent influence
Stakeholder importance→2;
network constellations→3,4
1→Stakeholder roles;
1→stakeholder importance for
ESV/VC→3
1,2→Stakeholder support of
business functions
1→Influence of constellation on
evaluation→5
4→Social network influence on
fundraising
Method Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative Quantitative Quantitative
Enquiry/data Semi-structured interviews, pri-
mary
Semi-structured interviews, pri-
mary
Semi-structured longitudinal
interviews, primary
Online survey, primary Database, secondary
Reasoning Inductive Inductive Inductive Deductive Abductive
Unit of analysis Entrepreneur and VC pre-
investment signalling
Entrepreneurial social support
networks
Business support through social
network
Perceived value of ESV based
on social network constellation
ESV fundraising success based
on social network metrics
Participants Entrepreneurs; VCs Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs; VCs; Academics NA
Sample 34 ESVs and 31 VCs 8 ESVs 5 ESVs 70 VCs, 30 ESVs, 10 academics,
11 other
1103 ESVs and their Twitter
and investor social networks
Contribution to theory Expands the knowledge on sig-
nalling theory, by focusing on
ESVs, their actions to fa-
cilitate pre-investment engage-
ment with VCs, and the percep-
tion of this process by founders
and VCs.
Contributes to signalling
and strategic alliance theory
through an elementary un-
derstanding of stakeholders
found in ESVs’ social net-
works and establishes variance
in perceived importance of
stakeholders by founders and
VCs.
Detailed descriptions of ap-
proaches performed by ESVs
to leverage external stakehold-
ers for business functions con-
tributes to ESV strategy and
dynamic capability theory.
Expands the knowledge on ESV
evaluation by isolating the so-
cial network perspective. Com-
bining stakeholder constella-
tions with perceived ESV eval-
uation to increase investability
contributes to signalling theory.
Contributes to the literature
on ESV evaluation parameters,
strategic choices to increase in-
vestability through online sig-
nalling, and knowledge on over-
coming liabilities of newness
and smallness. The study ex-
pands social network theory to
the area of ESV evaluation.
Notation explanation: Influence on subsequent study→x; x→Influence from previous study
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8.3 Conclusion and outlook
The studies conducted for this thesis have demonstrated the importance of consider-
ing social networks for a more comprehensive ESV evaluation. Additional research
into this specific problem could yield promising results. Across the chapters in
this thesis, several future research opportunities were identified. The findings and
identified research avenues present a substantial contribution to the academic and
practitioner community by enhancing the knowledge about social network influence
on ESV evaluation.
Especially the trend of data-driven investing in VC is relatively nascent. It will
be interesting to observe, both from an academic as well as a practitioner per-
spective, how metrics influence behaviour. As the relationship between VCs and
entrepreneurs is increasingly centered around data, it is imaginable that either side
aims to optimise or conceal their actions which could lead to new, or a change of
biases. Whether in natural sciences or in economic disciplines, the identification and
agreeing on new standards has historically taken years. The relevant academic and
practitioner communities will curiously observe where the debate might settle.
Another contribution of this work can be seen in the methodological approach.
Only collectively can the studies make a promising attempt to bring clarity to a
complex, non-linear, non-transparent, and uncertainty-laden process. The additions
to theories by the studies, the development of models, and the increased practitioner
understanding by this research project present a step towards more comprehensive
investment decision-aids in an ESV context.
In the future, both research and practice will advance, and the granularity and preci-
sion with which patterns of the ESV founding process can be modelled will increase.
Nonetheless, a substantial amount of uncertainty will prevail in ESV investment de-
cision making, which is both challenging and intriguing. Successful and unsuccessful
founding stories will continue to have unexpected outcomes.
“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be
counted.” (Cameron, 1963, p. 13)
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Figure A.1: Seed rounds in main geographies US, UK, Germany, and France,
based on Pitchbook data
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Figure A.3: Seed and early-stage VC investment volume in main geographies US,
UK, Germany, and France, based on Pitchbook data
B. Valuation approaches
B.1 Overview of valuation methods
The following overview can also be viewed as an extended version including descrip-
tions of the valuation procedures on:
https://github.com/Marcfelske/VC-valuation-approaches
Table B.1: Overview of traditional valuation approaches
Method name Qualitative/
quantitative
Post-revenue/
pre-revenue
Source
Venture capital quantitative pre- and
post-revenue
(Barrell et al., 2013)
Book value quantitative pre- and
post-revenue
(Koller et al., 2015)
Liquidation
value
quantitative pre- and
post-revenue
(Koller et al., 2015)
Replacement
value
quantitative pre- and
post-revenue
(Mothersill, 2009)
Discounted cash
flow
quantitative post-revenue (Gonza´lez Jime´nez and
Pascual, 2008; Jennergren,
2008; Holloway et al.,
1999; Koller et al., 2015).
Net present
value
quantitative post-revenue (Koller et al., 2015)
First Chicago
quantitative
quantitative post-revenue (Achleitner and Lutz,
2005)
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Table B.2: Overview of non-traditional valuation approaches
Method name Qualitative/
quantitative
Post-revenue/
pre-revenue
Source
Berkus qualitative pre-revenue (Berkus, 2009; Sahlman
and Scherlis, 1987)
Risk factor
summation
qualitative pre-revenue (Berkus, 2009; Sahlman
and Scherlis, 1987)
Scorecard
valuation
qualitative pre-revenue (Payne, 2011)
High-tech
start-up
valuation
qualitative
and
quantitative
pre-revenue (Cayenne Consulting,
2015)
Comparable
transactions
quantitative pre- and
post-revenue
(Campbell, 2003)
C. Samples
The following appendix chapter lists the participants of the studies described in
Chapter 4 to 6, and the stakeholders who advised the researcher at various points
throughout the research period.
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Table C.1: Signalling study ESV case studies
Case-
ciphre
Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Industry-
vertical
Current
stage
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
Interview
form
SigF1 CEO 2 England B2B 5, 50 Angel 1 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF2 CEO 2 England B2B 2, 5 Angel 1 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF3 CEO 2 England B2B 24, 50 Seed 1 1 0 0 L VCC
SigF4 CEO 8 Singapore B2C 24, 41 Series A 0 0 1 0 L VCC
SigF5 CEO 4 England B2B 50 Angel 1 0 0 0 L VCC
SigF6 CEO 1 Israel B2C 41 Seed 0 1 0 0 L VCC
SigF7 CFO 1 England B2C 5, 28, 37 Series A 0 1 1 0 L VCC
SigF8 CEO 7 England B2B 11, 24 Seed 1 1 0 0 PN VCC
SigF9 CEO 2 Wales B2C 50 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF10 CEO 3 England B2B 5, 27, 34, 44 Seed 0 1 0 0 PN IP
SigF11 CEO 2 England B2C 25, 34 Seed 0 1 0 0 PN IP
SigF12 CEO 4 England B2B 2, 5, 10, 37 Angel 1 0 0 0 E IP
SigF13 CEO 2 England B2B 10, 35, 37 Angel 0 0 0 0 E IP
SigF14 CTO 1 England B2C 27, 34 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF15 CEO 1 Scotland B2B 3, 5, 49 Angel 1 0 0 0 E IP
SigF16 CEO 1 England B2B 27, 34, 42 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 E IP
SigF17 CEO 3 England B2B 4, 5 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 E IP
SigF18 CEO 1 England B2B 27, 34 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 L VCC
SigF19 CEO 6 England B2B 5 Seed 0 1 0 0 L IP
SigF20 CTO 7 England B2B 27 Series B 0 0 0 1 PN IP
SigF21 CEO 3 England B2B 5 Seed 0 1 0 0 PN IP
SigF22 CEO 4 England B2B 11 Seed 0 1 0 0 PN IP
SigF23 CEO 2 England B2B 5, 30, 33, 36 Seed 0 1 0 0 L IP
SigF24 CEO 2 England B2B 27 Seed 0 1 0 0 L IP
Continued on next page
A
p
p
en
d
ix
C
.
S
am
p
les
243
Case-
ciphre
Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Industry-
vertical
Current
stage
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
Interview
form
SigF25 CEO 2 England B2B 5, 18, 27, 54 Seed 0 1 0 0 L IP
SigF26 CEO 1 England B2C 25 Angel 1 0 0 0 L IP
SigF27 CEO 1 England B2C 2, 10, 19, 40 Unfunded 0 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF28 CEO 3 England B2B 3, 5, 33, 36 Seed 1 1 0 0 PN IP
SigF29 CEO 8 US B2B 5, 28 Series A 1 0 1 0 PN IP
SigF30 CEO 6 US B2B 4 Series B 0 0 0 1 PN IP
SigF31 CEO 8 US B2B 7, 30, 53 Series A 1 1 1 0 PN IP
SigF32 CEO 5 England B2B 5 Angel 1 0 0 0 PN IP
SigF33 CEO 4 US B2B 15 Series B 1 1 1 1 PN IP
SigF34 CEO 8 US B2C 26 Series B 1 1 1 1 PN IP
Legend: Case study interviewee recruited via (PN = Personal network, L = LinkedIn, E = Event);
Interview conducted (IP = In person, (V)CC = (Video) conference call)
Note: Columns Angel to Series B list completed funding rounds; for industry-vertical codes confer Table G.1 on page 273
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Table C.2: Signalling study VC case studies
Case-
ciphre
Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
Interview
form
SigVC1 Sen. Associate 2 Germany Both 0 0 0 1 PN CC
SigVC2 Director 14 England Both 0 1 1 1 L IP
SigVC3 Director 4 England Both 0 1 1 0 PN VCC
SigVC4 Associate 2 England Both 0 0 1 1 E IP
SigVC5 Director 2 China B2B 0 0 0 1 PN VCC
SigVC6 Associate 2 US Both 0 1 1 0 L VCC
SigVC7 Angel 5 US Both 1 1 1 0 L VCC
SigVC8 Principal 2 US B2B 1 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC9 Director 7 US B2B 1 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC10 Director 10 US B2B 1 1 0 0 PN CC
SigVC11 Associate 5 France Both 0 1 1 0 L CC
SigVC12 Partner 5 England Both 0 1 1 0 L IP
SigVC13 Partner 10 US B2B 1 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC14 Partner 7 US B2B 0 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC15 Associate 7 US Both 0 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC16 Angel 4 England Both 1 1 0 0 L IP
SigVC17 Angel 8 England Both 1 1 0 0 E IP
SigVC18 Angel 3 US Both 1 0 0 0 PN IP
SigVC19 Angel 9 England Both 1 1 0 0 PN IP
SigVC20 Angel 3 England B2C 1 0 0 0 PN IP
SigVC21 Associate 1 England Both 1 1 0 0 E IP
SigVC22 Angel 8 England Both 1 0 0 0 E IP
SigVC23 Angel 7 England Both 0 1 0 0 E IP
SigVC24 Director 3 England Both 0 1 0 0 E IP
Continued on next page
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Case-
ciphre
Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
Interview
form
SigVC25 Associate 2 Germany Both 0 1 1 0 PN IP
SigVC26 Associate 3 England Both 0 1 0 0 PN IP
SigVC27 Associate 1 England Both 1 1 0 0 E IP
SigVC28 Sen. Associate 1 England Both 0 1 0 0 E IP
SigVC29 Associate 2 England Both 1 1 0 0 PN IP
SigVC30 Sen. Associate 1 England Both 0 1 1 0 L IP
SigVC31 Partner 14 England Both 0 1 1 1 E IP
Legend: Recruited via (PN = Personal network, L = LinkedIn, E = Event) Note: Columns Angel to Series B list
Interview form (IP = In person (V)CC = (Video) conference call) VC fund investment focus
Table C.3: Stakeholder study ESV case studies
Case-
ciphre
Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Industry-
vertical
Current
stage
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
Interview
form
StaF1 CEO 5 England B2B 3, 5 Angel 1 0 0 0 PN IP
StaF2 CEO 3 England B2C 14, 31, 33 Angel 1 0 0 0 L IP
StaF3 CTO 7 England B2B 5 Series A 1 1 1 0 L IP
StaF4 CEO 15 England B2B 32 Angel 1 0 0 0 PN IP
StaF5 CEO 4 US B2B 5, 6 Seed 0 1 0 0 PN IP
StaF6 COO 9 US B2C 5, 54 Series A 1 1 1 0 L IP
StaF7 CEO 21 US B2C 17, 30 Seed 0 1 0 0 L IP
StaF8 CEO 2 England B2B 18, 35, 54 Series A 0 1 1 0 L IP
Legend: Case study interviewee recruited via (PN = Personal network, L = LinkedIn, E = Event);
Interview conducted (IP = In person, (V)CC = (Video) conference call)
Note: Columns Angel to Series B list completed funding rounds; for industry-vertical codes confer Table G.1 on page 273
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Table C.4: Advising stakeholders for global thesis
Cipher Interviewee
position
Experience
[years]
Country B2B/
B2C
Angel Seed Series
A
Series
B
Recruited
via
AdVC1 Partner 8 US Both 0 1 0 0 L
AdVC2 Principal 7 UK Both 0 1 1 1 PN
AdVC3 Partner 12 US B2B 0 1 1 1 PN
AdVC4 Sen. Associate 6 US Both 0 1 1 1 PN
AdVC5 Partner 7 US Both 0 1 1 1 L
AdF1 CEO 4 UK B2B 0 1 0 0 PN
AdF2 CEO 3 UK B2B 0 1 0 0 PN
AdF3 CEO 3 UK B2B 1 1 1 0 L
AdLaw1 Partner 16 UK B2B 1 1 1 1 E
Legend: Recruited via (PN = Personal network, L = LinkedIn, E = Event)
Note: Columns Angel to Series B list all completed funding rounds for founders, investment foci
for VCs, and legal representation for fundraising by lawyers
D. Methods
D.1 Schematic coding procedure
Raw data Post-process 1 Post-process 2 Post-process 3 Result
1. Reorder 2. Summarise 3. Categorise 4. Allocate
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Legend:
Interview = I, Answer = A, Summary = S, Category = C
Within-case analysis Cross-case analysis
Figure D.1: Schematic coding procedure
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D.2 Exemplary coding procedure
The following coding example illustrates how the coding procedure applies to ex-
emplary answers given by the study participants. Consider the example question to
VCs: “Which part of your job is the most challenging?”
Table D.1 shows three answers in their raw form as they were given by participants.
Table D.2 shows how the answers were summarised and Table D.3 demonstrates
how summarised answers were categorised in code-groups.
Table D.1: Example sorted raw answers
Participant Answer
SigVC2 “It’s difficult to separate high quality deal flow from the vast amount
of total deal flow.” (SigVC2)
SigVC4 “One of the biggest problems for us is how to reduce the amount of
DD for each startup and be able to decide faster than the competing
investors. Say I’m a sector expert for x-technology, I’ll decide faster
than someone who first needs to do their homework on x-technology.”
(SigVC4)
SigVC8 “A challenge is always to get to a quick no. Time you waste on a
deal which fails late in DD and you could’ve weeded out earlier can’t
be spent on another which looks great.” (SigVC8)
Table D.2: Example summarised answer themes
Participant Summarised answer theme
SigVC2 (Theme 1) Quick identification of high quality deals
SigVC4 (Theme 2) Reduce decision-making time
SigVC8 (Theme 1) Quick identification of high quality deals
(Theme 2) Reduce decision-making time
Table D.3: Example classified answers
Summarised answer theme Code category number
Theme 1 (Code category 1) Managing diligence extent
Theme 2 (Code category 1) Managing diligence extent
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D.3 Python Scripts
The following section summarises the python scripts used for the data mining and
statistical analysis.
D.3.1 Corrected Crame´r’s V
For tables larger than 2x2 the bias of Crame´r’s V increases and should be corrected
as follows (Bergsma, 2013).
Formula 8:
V˜ =
√
φ˜2
min(c˜− 1, r˜ − 1)
with
φ˜2 = max(0, φ2 − (r − 1) ∗ (c− 1)
n− 1 ), φ
2 =
χ2
n
and
r˜ = r − 1
n− 1 − (r − 1)
2
and
c˜ = c− 1
n− 1 − (c− 1)
2
where:
• c is the number of columns
• c˜ is the corrected number of columns
• r is the number of rows
• r˜ is the corrected number of rows
• n is the number of observations
The implementation in the used Python code used for the statistical analysis was
modified from (Bergsma, 2013; Stackoverflow, 2017):
def cramers_v(x, y, nan_strategy=REPLACE,
nan_replace_value=DEFAULT_REPLACE_VALUE):
"""
Calculates Cramer’s V statistic for categorical-categorical
association.
This is a symmetric coefficient: V(x,y) = V(y,x)
**Returns:** float in the range of [0,1]
Parameters
----------
x: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of categorical measurements
y: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of categorical measurements
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nan_strategy: string, default = ‘replace’
How to handle missing values: can be either ‘drop’ to
remove samples with missing values, or ‘replace’
to replace all missing values with the nan_replace_value.
Missing values are None and np.nan.
nan_replace_value: any, default = 0.0
The value used to replace missing values with. Only applicable
when nan_strategy is set to ‘replace’.
"""
# replacing strategy:
if nan_strategy == REPLACE:
x, y = replace_nan_with_value(x, y, nan_replace_value)
elif nan_strategy == DROP:
x, y = remove_incomplete_samples(x, y)
# confusion matrix:
confusion_matrix = pd.crosstab(x,y)
# chi_squared, phi_squared and size corrected phi_squared:
chi2 = ss.chi2_contingency(confusion_matrix)[0]
n = confusion_matrix.sum().sum()
phi2 = chi2/n
r,c = confusion_matrix.shape
phi2corr = max(0, phi2-((k-1)*(r-1))/(n-1))
r_corr = r-((r-1)**2)/(n-1)
c_corr = k-((k-1)**2)/(n-1)
c_v = np.sqrt(phi2corr/min((c_corr-1),(r_corr-1)))
# pvalue p_v, with degrees of freedom dof:
dof = (c_corr-1)*(r_corr-1)
p_v = 1 - ss.chi2.cdf(chi2, dof)
return c_v, p_v
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D.3.2 Theil’s U
Before calculating Theil’s U, the uncertainty coefficient, also called conditional en-
tropy needs to be calculated (Shannon and Weaver, 1969; Press et al., 2007).
Formula 9:
CE(X|Y ) = −
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x|y) logPX|Y (x|y)
with:
PX|Y (x, y) =
PX,Y (x, y)
PY (y)
def conditional_entropy(x, y, nan_strategy=REPLACE,
nan_replace_value=DEFAULT_REPLACE_VALUE):
"""
Calculates the conditional entropy of x given y: S(x|y)
**Returns:** float
Parameters
----------
x: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of measurements
y: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of measurements
nan_strategy: string, default = ‘replace’
How to handle missing values: can be either ‘drop’ to remove
samples with missing values, or ‘replace’
to replace all missing values with the nan_replace_value.
Missing values are None and np.nan.
nan_replace_value: any, default = 0.0
The value used to replace missing values with. Only
applicable when nan_strategy is set to ‘replace’.
"""
if nan_strategy == REPLACE:
x, y = replace_nan_with_value(x, y, nan_replace_value)
elif nan_strategy == DROP:
x, y = remove_incomplete_samples(x, y)
y_counter = Counter(y)
xy_counter = Counter(list(zip(x,y)))
total_occurrences = sum(y_counter.values())
entropy = 0.0
for xy in xy_counter.keys():
p_xy = xy_counter[xy] / total_occurrences
p_y = y_counter[xy[1]] / total_occurrences
entropy += p_xy * math.log(p_y/p_xy)
return entropy
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With the conditional entropy function, Theil’s U can be defined (Zychlinski, 2019).
Formula 10:
U(X|Y ) = CE(X)− CE(X|Y )
CE(X)
with
CE(X) = −
∑
x
PX(x) logPX(x)
def theils_u(x, y, nan_strategy=REPLACE,
nan_replace_value=DEFAULT_REPLACE_VALUE):
"""
Calculates Theil’s U statistic (Uncertainty coefficient) for
categorical-categorical association.
This is the uncertainty of x given y: value is on the range of
[0,1] - where 0 means y provides no information about
x, and 1 means y provides full information about x.
This is an asymmetric coefficient: U(x,y) != U(y,x)
**Returns:** float in the range of [0,1]
Parameters
----------
x: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of categorical measurements
y: list / NumPy ndarray / Pandas Series
A sequence of categorical measurements
nan_strategy: string, default = ‘replace’
How to handle missing values: can be either ‘drop’ to remove
samples with missing values, or ‘replace’
to replace all missing values with the nan_replace_value.
Missing values are None and np.nan.
nan_replace_value: any, default = 0.0
The value used to replace missing values with. Only applicable
when nan_strategy is set to ‘replace’.
"""
if nan_strategy == REPLACE:
x, y = replace_nan_with_value(x, y, nan_replace_value)
elif nan_strategy == DROP:
x, y = remove_incomplete_samples(x, y)
s_xy = conditional_entropy(x,y)
x_counter = Counter(x)
total_occurrences = sum(x_counter.values())
p_x = list(map(lambda n: n/total_occurrences, x_counter.values()))
s_x = ss.entropy(p_x)
if s_x == 0:
return 1
else:
return (s_x - s_xy) / s_x
Appendix D. Methods 253
D.3.3 Post-processing ML categorisation
The detailed report of the classifications of all variables can be viewed on:
https://github.com/Marcfelske/machine-learning-models/blob/master/ML-data-
categories.json
The variables acc fund raise max valuation were logarithmically converted as fol-
lows:
log10(acc fund raise), and log10(max valuation). Table D.4 shows the categorisa-
tions for the three independent variables.
Table D.4: Categorisation of independent variables
acc fund raise max valuation
Interval Category Interval Category
(−0.0, 5.0] no funding (0.0, 5.0] no valuation
(5.0, 5.699] five figure (5.0, 5.699] five figure
(5.699, 6.0] half mil (5.699, 6.0] half mil
(6.0, 6.699] six figure (6.0, 6.699] six figure
(6.699, 7.0] five mil (6.699, 7.0] five mil
(7.0, 8.0] seven figure (7.0, 8.0] seven figure
(8.0, inf ] eight figure plus (8.0, inf ] eight figure plus
fund raise t
- NA fund raise t
(−3.0, 0.0] pre inc fund raise t
(0.0, 205] fast fund raise t
(205, 315] medium fund raise t
(315, inf) slow fund raise t
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E. Questionnaires
E.1 Signalling study
The following section presents the ESV and VC specific versions of the questionnaires
which were presented to ESV founders and VCs during the signalling study.
E.1.1 ESV questionnaire
Interviewee details
First name:
Last name:
Position in an ESV∗:
e.g. co-founder, CTO, employee, or else
Email address∗:
Please provide an email address which allows me to contact you.
ESV details
Name of the ESV:
ESV founding date?∗:
(MM/YYYY)
ESV legal incorporation date?∗:
(MM/YYYY)
State the target industry of the ESV∗:
B2B/B2C, Hard-, or software, and closer
description of the industry vertical
Which rounds of financing did ESVName complete to date?
Please provide a short description of the ESVName
∗ required, all other fields are optional
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Open questions
What are the main responsibilities of your position?
Which part of your job is the most challenging?
Have you spoken to investors? If yes, tell me about your interactions with investors
to fund ESVName
What information/documentation did you share with the investors?
How do you convince investors to fund ESVName?
What is makes ESVName unique, wherein lies the unfair advantage?
How would you respond to the following statement:
“I am familiar with VC investment criteria and preferences”
Please select: © Strongly disagree
© Disagree
© Neither agree nor disagree
© Agree
© Strongly agree
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What do investors care about when looking at ESVName?
Did you face any issues during your previous interactions and the overall process
of seeking investment? If yes, what is the matter, and how could it be improved?
What would help ESVs demonstrate value in an even more convincing/
efficient/transparent way?
Post interview info
Interview location:
How was the interview conducted?:
Recommended future interview partners:
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E.1.2 VC questionnaire
Interviewee details
First name:
Last name:
Position in VC firm:
Email address∗:
Please provide an email address which allows me to contact you.
VC firm details
Name of VC firm∗:
Investment focus:
Seed, Series A, etc.
Please give some examples of companies in your portfolio:
Open questions
What are the main responsibilities of your position?
Which part of your job is the most challenging?
How do you deal with uncertainty when evaluating a startup?
∗ required, all other fields are optional
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Can you explain the procedure how you evaluate ESVs?
Do you use any software, tools, work-flow, or decision-aids? If yes, for what?
Does the use of the above differ for scouring, diligence, etc.? If yes, how?
Do you face any issues during your engagement and diligence with founders?
If yes, what is the matter, and how could it be improved?
Which is the most critical piece of information you would want to know about an
ESV which so far is unattainable?
Post interview info
Interview location:
How was the interview conducted?:
Recommended future interview partners:
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E.2 Stakeholder study
The following section presents the questionnaire presented to ESV founders during
the stakeholder study.
E.2.1 ESV questionnaire
Interviewee details
First name:
Last name:
Position in ESV∗:
e.g. co-founder, CTO, employee, or else
Email address∗:
Please provide an email address which allows me to contact you.
ESV details
Name of the ESV:
ESV founding date?∗:
(MM/YYYY)
ESV legal incorporation date?∗:
(MM/YYYY)
State the target industry of the ESV∗:
B2B/B2C, Hard-, or software, and closer
description of the industry vertical
Which rounds of financing did ESVName complete to date?
Please provide a short description of the ESVName
∗ required, all other fields are optional
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Can you draw a representation of ESVName’s social network with all the
connections to stakeholders?
Which are the five most important stakeholder groups for ESVName
Post interview info
Interview location:
How was the interview conducted?:
Recommended future interview partners:
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E.3 Online survey
Section E.3 details the online survey as it was presented to participants.
E.3.1 ESV evaluation experiment study explanation for sur-
vey participants
This study focuses on a selection of key metrics which define ESVs social networks.
You will be asked to evaluate which social network depictions you perceive as valu-
able. First, you will be presented with charts that feature four different constella-
tions of ESV social networks, imagine them to be the social network visualisations of
four different exemplary ESVs. Each chart contains four constellations which vary
according to two metrics.
Network metric Description Example
Small or large How many entities does an
ESV know and engage with?
Does the ESV’s social network
compose of 5 or 50 entities?
Homogeneous or
heterogeneous
How diverse are the stake-
holder groups in the ESV’s so-
cial network?
5 VC investors or 1 VC, 1
mentor, 1 accelerator, 1 re-
searcher, and 1 lawyer
Interconnected or
dispersed
Do the people and entities in
a ESV’s network know each
other?
Is it beneficial that your men-
tor knows the VC who is in-
vested in the ESV?
Central or
peripheral
Does the ESV know a collab-
orator directly or via someone
else?
e.g. a VC is invested directly
or a ESV only knows lawyer
via mentor
Using these metrics to create different constellations allows to test the perception of
the resulting ESV social network. To increase understanding, the different constel-
lations are visualised as four extreme ESV social networks labelled: ESV1, ESV2,
ESV3, and ESV4. The visualisations are placed in a coordinate system and you are
asked to give their professional opinion and evaluate the four fictitious ESV social
network constellations. To do so, you have to agree or disagree with the presented
statements (example: The social network of ESVA is valuable) on the Likert scale
provided. We will understand your agreement or disagreement with the statement
as follows:
• If you agree with the statement, you perceive the social network configuration
is valuable and positively influencing the ESV’s evaluation.
• If you disagree with the statement, you perceive little value of the a social
network configuration which negatively influences the ESV’s evaluation.
• If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, you perceive the social
Appendix E. Questionnaires 263
network configuration to have neither a positive or negative relevance for the
ESV’s evaluation.
Figure E.1 shows an exemplary evaluation task.
Example metric 2
Example metric 2
Example metric 1 Example metric 1
Social network
of ESV3
Social Network
of ESV1
Social Network
of ESV2
Social Network
of ESV4
Disagree
strongly
Disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Agree
Agree
strongly
ESV1’s
social
network is
valuable
© © © © © © ©
ESV2’s
social
network is
valuable
© © © © © © ©
ESV3’s
social
network is
valuable
© © © © © © ©
ESV4’s
social
network is
valuable
© © © © © © ©
Figure E.1: Evaluation explanation, own illustration.
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E.3.2 Treatment A: size vs. diversity
Some ESVs engage with a limited array of stakeholder types (homogeneous net-
work), whereas others engage with a broader spectrum of stakeholders (hetero-
geneous network). In the following illustration, colours represent stakeholder
groups. In addition, the size of a ESV’s social network can vary. Below you see four
different ESV networks.
Network metric Description Example
Small or large How many entities does an
ESV know and engage with?
Does the ESV’s social network
compose of 5 or 50 entities?
Homogenous or
heterogenous
How diverse are the stake-
holder groups in the ESV’s so-
cial network?
5 VC investors or 1 VC, 1
mentor, 1 accelerator, 1 re-
searcher, and 1 lawyer
A.1 A.2
A.3 A.4
Heterogeneous
Homogeneous
Small Large
ESV1 ESV2
ESV3 ESV4
Figure E.2: Social network size and diversity, own illustration.
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E.3.3 Treatment B: size vs. density
ESV networks can compose of people/organisations who are interconnected or
who are not connected (dispersed) to one another. Below you see four different
ESV networks. You are asked to evaluate them based on their networks.
Network metric Description Example
Small or large How many entities does an
ESV know and engage with?
Does the ESV’s social network
compose of 5 or 50 entities?
Interconnected or
dispersed
Do the entities in a ESV’s net-
work know each other?
Is it beneficial that your men-
tor knows the VC who is in-
vested in the ESV?
B.1 B.2
B.3 B.4
Interconnected
Dispersed
Small Large
ESV1 ESV2
ESV3 ESV4
Figure E.3: Social network size and density, own illustration.
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E.3.4 Treatment C: size vs. position
An ESV can either occupy a core position in a social network, where stakehold-
ers converge on the ESV itself (ESV densely connected/ a hub) or occupy a
peripheral position, where their role is not the focal point in the network (few con-
nections/not a hub). Below you see four different ESV networks. You are asked
to evaluate them based on their networks.
Network metric Description Example
Small or large How many entities does an
ESV know and engage with?
Does the ESV’s social network
compose of 5 or 50 entities?
Central or
peripheral
Does the ESV know a collab-
orator directly or via someone
else?
e.g. a VC is invested directly
or a ESV only knows lawyer
via mentor
C.1 C.2
C.3 C.4
Central
Peripheral
Small Large
ESV1 ESV2
ESV3 ESV4
Figure E.4: Social network size and centrality, own illustration.
F. Results
F.1 Stakeholder study (Chapter 4)
Table F.1: 29 stakeholder categories and their importance to ESVs and VCs in
alphabetic order
Mentions
Stakeholder Importance to ESVs Importance to VCs Total
Accelerator 4 (80%) < 5 (100%) 5
Adviser 3 (60%) < 5 (100%) 5
Competitor 2 (100%) > 0 (0%) 2
Contract researcher 1 (100%) > 0 (0%) 1
CRO 1 (100%) = 1 (100%) 1
Customer 4 (67%) < 6 (100%) 6
Consultant 1 (100%) > 0 (0%) 1
Corporate (buyer) 5 (100%) = 5 (100%) 5
Corporate (user) 3 (75%) < 4 (100%) 4
Former employee 2 (100%) > 1 (50%) 2
Former employer 3 (100%) > 2 (67%) 3
Incubator 2 (100%) = 2 (100%) 2
Investor 7 (100%) > 4 (57%) 7
Other Start-up 3 (100%) > 2 (67%) 3
Other SME 0 (0%) = 0 (0%) 1
Supplier 1 (100%) = 1 (100%) 1
Journal editor 1 (50%) > 0 (0%) 2
Journalist 1 (33%) > 0 (0%) 3
Lawyer 4 (100%) > 0 (0%) 4
Industry expert 3 (100%) > 1 (33%) 3
Mentor 2 (67%) < 3 (100%) 3
Policy maker 1 (100%) = 1 (100%) 1
PR firm 0 (0%) < 2 (100%) 2
Media analyst 0 (0%) < 2 (100%) 2
Publisher 2 (100%) = 2 (100%) 2
Recruiter 3 (75%) < 4 (100%) 4
Technology expert 0 (0%) < 3 (100%) 3
University 4 (80%) < 5 (100%) 5
Uni. researcher 3 (100%) = 3 (100%) 3
Sum 66 > 64
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F.2 ESV evaluation experiment (Chapter 6)
Table F.2: Combined treatment A, B, C (network size) regression results, OLS
model 1 to 3
Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C
(Diversity) (Density) (Position)
Effect variable (size)
1 ESV eval 0.599∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.134) (0.160)
Control variables
0 constant 4.809∗∗∗ 4.734∗∗∗ 4.507∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.340) (0.413)
2 age −0.086 −0.133 −0.053
(0.094) (0.102) (0.106)
3 gender −0.141 0.078 −0.092
(0.192) (0.181) (0.230)
4 tenure 0.023 −0.014 −0.022
(0.039) (0.041) (0.046)
5 active investor 0.274 0.590 0.416
(0.502) (0.445) (0.535)
6 MWE −0.177 0.256 0.073
(0.287) (0.291) (0.326)
7 investor −0.252 −0.448 −0.388
(0.540) (0.487) (0.579)
8 founder 0.190 −0.134 0.083
(0.230) (0.237) (0.261)
9 academic −0.070 0.090 0.193
(0.263) (0.241) (0.274)
R2 0.046 0.106 0.034
F-statistics 2.711∗∗∗ 6.861∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗
Notes: N=121; MWE = multiple work experiences; (standard deviations);
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table F.3: Treatment A (network diversity) regression result, OLS model 4 to 9
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
(A1 vs A2) (A1 vs A3) (A1 vs A4) (A2 vs A3) (A2 vs A4) (A3 vs A4)
Effect variable (diversity)
1 ESV eval −0.686∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 1.884∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗ −0.512
(0.155) (0.176) (0.175) (0.177) (0.174) (0.192)
Control variables
0 constant 6.295∗∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗ 4.925∗∗∗ 4.008∗∗∗ 5.346∗∗∗ 4.522
(0.424) (0.484) (0.467) (0.463) (0.450) (0.472)
2 age −0.185 −0.080 −0.114 −0.058 −0.093 0.012
(0.115) (0.120) (0.118) (0.122) (0.119) (0.129)
3 gender −0.054 0.111 −0.311 0.029 −0.394 −0.228
(0.233) (0.255) (0.239) (0.249) (0.240) (0.259)
4 tenure 0.045 0.062 0.014 0.033 −0.015 0.001
(0.040) (0.049) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.053)
5 active investor −0.015 −0.067 0.252 0.296 0.615 0.563
(0.450) (0.624) (0.672) (0.664) (0.672) (0.865)
6 MWE −0.225 −0.036 −0.533 0.178 −0.319 −0.130
(0.345) (0.389) (0.406) (0.371) (0.393) (0.426)
7 investor −0.059 0.173 −0.071 −0.434 −0.678 −0.446
(0.512) (0.687) (0.727) (0.726) (0.733) (0.928)
8 founder −0.154 0.160 0.452 −0.073 0.219 0.533
(0.293) (0.308) (0.318) (0.308) (0.313) (0.330)
9 academic 0.201 0.113 0.044 −0.184 −0.253 −0.341
(0.308) (0.322) (0.350) (0.319) (0.340) (0.326)
R2 0.109 0.175 0.086 0.330 0.240 0.064
F-statistics 3.815∗∗∗ 5.563∗∗∗ 2.562∗∗∗ 13.264∗∗∗ 8.761∗∗∗ 1.894
Notes: N=121; MWE = multiple work experiences; (standard deviations); ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table F.4: Treatment B (network density) regression result, OLS model 10 to 15
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
(B1 vs B2) (B1 vs B3) (B1 vs B4) (B2 vs B3) (B2 vs B4) B3 vs B4)
Effect variable (density)
1 ESV eval −0.760∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 0.017 1.835∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ −1.058∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.179) (0.177) (0.184) (0.180) (0.184)
Control variables
0 constant 7.107∗∗∗ 3.701∗∗∗ 5.292∗∗∗ 4.160∗∗∗ 5.751∗∗∗ 4.180∗∗∗
(0.398) (0.469) (0.456) (0.466) (0.449) (0.459)
2 age −0.263∗∗ −0.165 −0.195 −0.071 −0.101 −0.003
(0.133) (0.127) (0.139) (0.130) (0.139) (0.132)
3 gender −0.403 0.334 0.087 0.069 −0.177 0.560∗∗
(0.253) (0.240) (0.245) (0.270) (0.267) (0.247)
4 tenure 0.014 0.027 0.025 −0.053 −0.055 −0.042
(0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
5 active investor −0.060 0.578 0.406 0.774 0.602 1.240∗∗
(0.545) (0.376) (0.552) (0.556) (0.686) (0.559)
6 MWE 0.422 0.151 0.137 0.375 0.361 0.089
(0.383) (0.405) (0.414) (0.374) (0.388) (0.400)
7 investor −0.082 −0.246 −0.344 −0.552 −0.650 −0.815
(0.592) (0.447) (0.611) (0.611) (0.741) (0.630)
8 founder −0.367 −0.219 −0.126 −0.142 −0.049 0.099
(0.309) (0.311) (0.318) (0.314) (0.322) (0.323)
9 academic −0.249 0.093 0.156 0.025 0.087 0.430
(0.286) (0.344) (0.312) (0.316) (0.279) (0.336)
R2 0.123 0.168 0.025 0.315 0.110 0.174
F-statistics 4.424∗∗∗ 5.845∗∗∗ 0.729 14.588∗∗∗ 4.185∗∗∗ 6.190∗∗∗
Notes: N=121; MWE = multiple work experiences; (standard deviations); ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table F.5: Treatment C (network position) regression results, OLS model 16 to 21
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
(C1 vs C2) (C1 vs C3) (C1 vs C4) (C2 vs C3) (C2 vs C4) (C3 vs C4)
Effect variable (position)
1 ESV eval. −0.587∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗ 1.479∗∗∗ 2.628∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ −0.562∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.177) (0.189) (0.181) (0.188) (0.210)
Control variables
0 constant 6.671∗∗∗ 2.690∗∗∗ 3.872∗∗∗ 3.662∗∗∗ 4.845∗∗∗ 3.491∗∗∗
(0.398) (0.458) (0.488) (0.467) (0.492) (0.527)
2 age −0.052 −0.110 −0.089 −0.016 0.005 −0.053
(0.117) (0.115) (0.123) (0.132) (0.134) (0.138)
3 gender −0.431∗ 0.485∗ 0.037 −0.221 −0.670∗∗ 0.246
(0.250) (0.271) (0.288) (0.289) (0.291) (0.320)
4 tenure −0.025 0.047 −0.018 −0.025 −0.090∗ −0.018
(0.047) (0.050) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.059)
5 active investor 0.766 0.323 0.082 0.750 0.509 0.066
(0.546) (0.620) (0.694) (0.699) (0.712) (0.825)
6 MWE 0.181 0.176 −0.119 0.265 −0.030 −0.035
(0.301) (0.370) (0.369) (0.390) (0.395) (0.458)
7 investor −0.798 −0.372 0.078 −0.854 −0.403 0.022
(0.594) (0.651) (0.711) (0.746) (0.750) (0.850)
8 founder −0.151 −0.032 0.227 −0.061 0.198 0.317
(0.237) (0.287) (0.294) (0.314) (0.327) (0.363)
9 academic −0.077 0.182 0.270 0.116 0.204 0.463
(0.230) (0.283) (0.282) (0.296) (0.298) (0.343)
R2 0.090 0.377 0.210 0.481 0.369 0.050
F-statistics 2.789∗∗∗ 16.549∗∗∗ 7.747∗∗∗ 24.537∗∗∗ 16.738∗∗∗ 1.311
Notes: N=121; MWE = multiple work experiences; (standard deviations); ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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G. ESV industries
G.1 Pitchbook database industry-verticals
The following categories can also be viewed including their descriptions on:
https://github.com/Marcfelske/pitchbook-industry-verticals
Table G.1: Pitchbook database industry-verticals
# Industry vertical # Industry vertical
01 3D Printing 28 HRTech
02 AdTech 29 Impact Investing
03 Advanced Manufacturing 30 Industrials
04 AgTech 31 Infrastructure
05 AI & ML 32 InsurTech
06 AudioTech 33 Internet of Things
07 Augmented Reality 34 Life Sciences
08 Autonomous Cars 35 LOHAS & Wellness
09 B2B Payments 36 Manufacturing
10 Beauty 37 Marketing Tech
11 Big Data 38 Micro-Mobility
12 Cannabis 39 Mobile
13 Car-Sharing 40 Mobile Commerce
14 CleanTech 41 Mortgage Tech
15 Construction Technology 42 NanoTech
16 Cryptocurrency & Blockchain 43 Oil & Gas
17 Cybersecurity 44 Oncology
18 Digital Health 45 PetTech
19 E-Commerce 46 Real Estate Tech & PropTech
20 EdTech 47 Restaurant Tech
21 Ephemeral Content 48 Ride-sharing
22 eSports 49 Robotics and Drones
23 FemTech 50 SaaS
24 FinTech 51 SpaceTech
25 FoodTech 52 TMT
26 Gaming 53 Virtual Reality
27 HealthTech 54 Wearables & Quantified Self
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